One Year of War - Public Opinion in Israel at the One Year Anniversary of the War in Gaza

The most common reason given for ending the war (53%) is because continued fighting endangers the hostages while 62% of all Israelis think bringing back the hostages should be the primary goal of the war. Levels of solidarity have dropped since December 2023, with only 26% of Israelis reporting a high sense of "togetherness," compared with 54% in December.

Photo by: Israel Hadar/Flash90

Methodology

This survey marking a year of the “Iron Swords” war (and forming the Israeli Voice Index survey for September 2024) was carried out by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between September 15 and September 19, 2024, with 800 male and female participants interviewed in Hebrew and 200 in Arabic, constituting a representative sample of the population in Israel aged 18 and above. The maximum sampling error was ±3.10% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute.

Topics covered in this report:

• Personal situation
• The management of the war and the functioning of the country’s leadership
• The functioning of the defense forces
• The hostages
• Israel-US relations and relations between Israel and the diaspora
• Assessment of the current situation and the future of Israel

Personal Situation [1]

How would you describe your sense of personal security today compared to your feelings before the events of October 7?

• A majority of two-thirds of the total sample reported that their personal security has deteriorated. Only small percentages define their situation as better or the same. The distribution of responses is similar in both the Jewish and Arab samples, though a slightly higher share of Arab respondents say that their situation is now worse.

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a majority in all three camps who say that their personal security has worsened. This majority is largest on the Left (82%) and smallest on the Right (66%), with the Center in between (77%).
• Analyzing responses in the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 elections finds a majority in all groups who report a deterioration in their sense of personal security, but this majority is larger among voters for Zionist parties (86%) than among those who did not vote at all (80%) or who voted for Arab parties (77%).

And how would you describe your financial situation today compared to your situation before the events of October 7?

• In the total sample, the share of respondents who report that their financial situation has deteriorated since October 7 is only slightly higher than the share who say that it has not changed (with only a small minority reporting an improvement in their financial situation).
• However, a comparison of the findings in the Jewish and Arab samples reveals a large difference between them: Among Jewish respondents, the largest share say that there has been no change in their financial situation, while among Arab respondents, a large majority report that their financial situation has worsened.

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals almost no differences between the camps on this issue. In all three, the largest share of respondents report no change in their financial situation (Left and Center, 46%; Right, 49%). However, the proportion who say that their financial situation has worsened is smaller on the Right (36%) than in the Center (42%) and on the Left (44%).
• A breakdown of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections finds that a large majority in all three voter groups report a deterioration of their financial situation, though this majority is larger among respondents who did not vote (89%) than among those who voted for Zionist parties (78%) and for Arab parties (78%).

To what extent has your personal life (such as work, media consumption, get-togethers with family and friends, etc.) returned to normal, or close to normal, recently?

• This is the fifth time that we have asked this question over the last year. On this occasion, a majority of 59% of respondents in the total sample reported that their lives have returned to normal, and only a minority (39%) said the opposite. However, as on previous occasions, we found a large difference between Jews and Arabs on this issue, with a majority of two-thirds of Jewish respondents who say their lives have gone back to normal, compared with a minority of just a quarter of Arab respondents.

• A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a majority in all three camps who report a return to normality, with this majority largest on the Right at 71%, compared with 67% on the Left and 57% in the Center.
• Breaking down the Jewish sample by age finds that in the youngest age group (18–34), more than three-quarters (76%) say their lives have returned to normal, compared with some two-thirds (64%) of the intermediate age group (35–54) and more than half (58%) of the oldest age group (55+). Among Arab respondents, only a minority in all three age groups report a return to normality, though again the largest share was found in the youngest group (18–34, 30%; 35–54, 28%; 55+, 12%).
• In the Arab sample, the share of respondents who say that their lives have returned to normal is larger among those who voted for Zionist parties at the last elections (37%) than among those who voted for Arab parties (27%) or who did not vote at all (23%).

Following the events of October 7 and the war, have you started using, increased your usage of, or decreased your usage of antidepressants, alcohol, mental health care, or social media?

• In the total sample, the great majority of respondents say that there has been no change in their use of antidepressants (88.5%), alcohol (89%), and mental health care (85%), though a much lower proportion reported no change in their use of social media (47%, versus 42% who reported a rise in social media use).
• In line with the data shown above about the negative personal impact of the war, we found that the share of Arab respondents who reported an increase in their use of the means listed was higher than the equivalent share among Jews: antidepressants: Arabs, 18%; Jews, 9%; alcohol: Arabs, 10%; Jews, 7%; mental health care: Arabs, 24%; Jews, 11%; social media: Arabs, 54%; Jews, 43%.

The Management of the War and the Functioning of the Country’s Leadership

In your opinion, has the time come to end the war in Gaza?

• In the total sample, a small majority of respondents (53%) think that the time has come to end the war in Gaza. However, while the Jewish sample is divided on this issue and contains a fairly large proportion who “don’t know,” an overwhelming majority of Arabs support ending the war.

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals dramatic differences: On the Left and in the Center, the majority think that the war should be ended (83% and 63%, respectively), while on the Right, only a minority take this view (27%) while the majority (61%) think that the time to end the war has not yet arrived.
• A breakdown of the Arab sample by vote in the last elections shows that all the respondents who voted for Arab parties believe that the time has come to end the war, as do 85% of voters for Zionist parties and 86% of those who did not vote.
• In the Jewish sample, we found differences between women and men: 50% of women support ending the war now, compared with 40% of men. No substantial differences between the genders were found in the Arab sample.

In your opinion, what is the main reason why the war in Gaza should be ended?[2]

• The majority of respondents to this question (53%) think that the war should be ended because its continuation endangers the hostages, while 16% say that ending the war will enable the decision-makers and the IDF to turn their attention to the northern front, and 14% give the reason that the fighting has already achieved most of what can be achieved. Only a small minority cite improved relations with the United States as their reason for wanting the war to end now.

• Among both Jews and Arabs, the most common reason for supporting the end of the war is that continuing the fighting endangers the hostages (Jews, 56%; Arabs, 45%). Among Jews, the second most common reason is that ending the war in Gaza will make it possible to focus on the northern front (20%), while among Arabs, the second most common reason given is the great cost in human life and the desire for quiet, peace, and security (14%).

In your opinion, do the Palestinian people have or not have the right to their own state?

• In the total sample, a slight majority of respondents say that the Palestinian people do not have the right to their own state. However, the difference between Jews and Arabs on this issue is huge: While almost two-thirds of Jewish respondents believe that the Palestinians do not have the right to their own state, an overwhelming majority of Arabs hold the opposite view.

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that a large majority of those on the Left (73%) think that the Palestinians have the right to a state. Only 39% of those in the Center concur and 45% disagree, while on the Right, 12% say that the Palestinian people have the right to their own state, and fully 80% take the opposite view.
• Analysis of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 elections shows that a large majority in all three groups support the right of the Palestinian people to their own state (voters for Arab parties, 97%; voters for Zionist parties, 80%; did not vote, 79.5%).
• A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion finds that 93% of Muslims agree that the Palestinian people have the right to their own state, as do 88% of Christians, while among Druze respondents, 70% agree and 30% disagree.[3]

In your opinion, who should control the Gaza Strip after the end of the war?

• In the total sample, the largest share of respondents think that a multinational force should control Gaza after the war (37%). A slightly smaller proportion (34%) are in favor of Israel having control, while 11.5% support transferring control to the Palestinian Authority. Only 2% believe that a weakened Hamas should control the Gaza Strip after the war ends.
• In the Jewish sample, similar shares of respondents think that control of Gaza should be held by a multinational force (40%) or by Israel (39%). A small minority (8%) support having the Palestinian Authority in charge, while just 1% would prefer Hamas to have control. In the Arab sample, an unusually high share of respondents selected the “don’t know” response (33%), while almost a third think that control should be given to the Palestinian Authority, 20% to a multinational force, and just 9% support Israeli control of Gaza.

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that on the Left, the largest share of respondents (43%) think that a multinational force should control Gaza after the war, and around a quarter (27%) that control should be given to the Palestinian Authority. In the Center, the majority (57%) support transferring control to a multinational force, and 19% would prefer control to remain in Israeli hands. On the Right, the majority (56%) believe that Israel should control Gaza after the war, while 31% support transferring control to a multinational force.
• Analysis of the Arab sample by vote in the last elections finds that among voters for Arab parties, the largest share (40%) support transferring control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority after the war, and 18% prefer installing a multinational force. This picture is reversed among voters for Zionist parties: 43% express a preference for a multinational force, and 24% for control by the Palestinian Authority. Among those who did not vote, the story is slightly different: 20% support handing control to the Palestinian Authority and 12.5% to a multinational force, while fully 52% said that they don’t know—a particularly large share.

Some people argue that the extensive and continued evacuation of residents of the north has turned out to be a mistake. Do you agree or disagree with this claim?

• Overall, the Israeli public is divided on this issue, with similar shares holding that the evacuation of residents of the north has turned out to be a mistake, and that it was not a mistake. Among Jews, there is a slight advantage (44% to 41%) in favor of those who say that the evacuation was not a mistake, while in the Arab sample, the largest share believe that the evacuation was indeed a mistake (47% versus 37%).

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that around half the respondents on the Left and in the Center think that the extensive and continued evacuation of residents from the north has turned out to be a mistake (48% and 47%, respectively). However, there is a difference between these two groups in the size of the share who do not agree with this claim: Left, 32%; Center, 39%. On the Right, meanwhile, the largest share of respondents (48.5%) do not agree that the evacuation has turned out to be a mistake, while 37% take the opposite view.
• In the Arab sample, the largest share of all three voter groups agree that evacuating the residents of the north has turned out to be a mistake—a view held by 45% of voters for Arab parties, 61% of voters for Zionist parties, and 44% of those who did not vote. The shares of those who disagree with this claim: Arab party voters, 41%; Zionist party voters, 29%; did not vote, 36%.

On a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent, what grade would you give to each of the following individuals for their functioning since October 7?

• In the total sample and in the Jewish and Arab samples, the overall assessment of all the individuals’ functioning is negative, with all six receiving an average grade below the mid-point of 3.
• The lowest average grades were given to Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir (1.90), Head of the Opposition Yair Lapid (2.10), and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (2.17). The highest grades, which were still below middling, went to IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi (2.75), Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant (2.67), and former minister Benny Gantz (2.47).
• Head of the Opposition Yair Lapid received the lowest average grade in the Jewish sample (2.00), but the highest average grade in the Arab sample (2.59).

• The table below presents the percentages of those who rate the functioning of the following individuals since October 7 as good or excellent (grades of 4–5), ordered by political orientation (Jews) and vote in the 2022 elections (Arabs).

• On the Left and in the Center (Jewish sample), IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant have the highest shares of respondents who rate their functioning as good or excellent. By contrast, on the Right it is Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir who enjoy the highest shares of respondents rating their functioning as good or excellent.
• In the Arab sample, the share of respondents rating the functioning of Head of the Opposition Yair Lapid as good or excellent are the highest in all three groups: voters for Arab parties, voters for Zionist parties, and those who did not vote.

The Functioning of the Defense Forces

On a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent, what grade would you give to the IDF’s combat capabilities?

• In the total sample, more than three-quarters of respondents awarded high grades to the IDF’s combat capabilities. Among Jews, these respondents formed an overwhelming majority (86%), while the largest share of Arab respondents gave the IDF low grades in this regard (45.5%).

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a remarkable uniformity of views, with 85% on the Left, 87% in the Center, and 86% on the Right rating the IDF’s combat capabilities as good or excellent.
• Analysis of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 elections finds that more than half (53%) of voters for Arab parties gave low grades to the IDF’s combat capabilities, as did around half of those who did not vote (49%). By contrast, 47% of voters for Zionist parties awarded high grades to the IDF’s combat capabilities, and only 23% gave low grades.

On a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent, what grade would you give to the IDF for its ethical conduct during war?

• Almost three-quarters of respondents in the total sample gave high grades to the IDF for its ethical conduct during the war. The share of respondents in the Jewish sample giving high grades is 83%, whereas in the Arab sample, more than two-thirds of respondents awarded low grades to the IDF for its ethical conduct during the war.

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that 65% of respondents on the Left, 85% in the Center, and 87% on the Right rate the ethical conduct of the IDF as good or excellent.
• Analysis of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 elections finds that 78% of voters for Arab parties and 73% of those who did not vote think that the ethical conduct of the IDF during the war has been poor or very poor. By contrast, 41% of voters for Zionist parties rate the IDF’s ethical conduct as good or excellent, and only 31% as poor or very poor.

Do you support or oppose investigating soldiers when suspicions arise of abuse of Palestinians from Gaza who are being held in detention by the IDF?

• In the total sample, the majority of respondents oppose investigating soldiers when suspicions arise of abuse of Palestinian detainees. As expected, the differences between Jews and Arabs on this question are enormous: While the majority of Jews (61.5%) oppose the investigation of soldiers in such circumstances, three-quarters of Arabs support it.

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation finds that three-quarters (76.5%) of respondents on the Left support investigating solders in the circumstances described in the question, as do around half (51.5%) of respondents in the Center. By contrast, more than three-quarters of those on the Right (78%) oppose the investigation of soldiers when suspicions arise of abuse of Palestinian detainees.
• Analysis of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 elections shows that 78% of voters for Arab parties, 61% of voters for Zionist parties, and 84% of those who did not vote support investigating soldiers in such cases.

In your opinion, what punishment should be given to someone found guilty of abusing detainees from Gaza held by the IDF?

• In the total sample, a small majority support giving a reduced punishment to anyone found guilty of abusing detainees from Gaza held by the IDF, as these detainees were suspected of involvement in terrorism. Again, the differences between Jews and Arabs are extremely large: The majority of Jews (60%) are in favor of reduced punishments, while more than three-quarters of Arabs (77%) think that soldiers in such cases should receive the usual punishment defined by law.

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals significant differences between the three camps: On the Left, around two-thirds (64.5%) support punishment in accordance with the law, while around a third (34%) favor reduced punishment. In the Center, almost half (47%) support reduced punishment, while 37% prefer the usual punishment defined by law. On the Right, around three-quarters (73%) support reduced punishment, while 16.5% are in favor of the normal legal punishment. It is worth noting the high share of respondents who selected the “don’t know” option in the Center (16%) and on the Right (10%), compared with just 1.5% on the Left.
• Analysis of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 elections finds that 86% of voters for Arab parties support handing down the usual punishment defined by law for such cases, while just 6% of them support reduced sentences. Among voters for Zionist parties, 54% are in favor of punishment according to the law, while 31% would prefer reduced punishment. Among those who did not vote, 81% are in favor of the normal legal punishment, and just 12% support reduced punishment.

On a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent, what grade would you give to the Israel Police for crime prevention?

• In the total sample, more than two-thirds of respondents rate the performance of the police on crime prevention as poor or very poor. The share of such respondents is particularly high in the Arab sample (86%).

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that 81.5% of respondents on the Left, 71% in the Center, and 55% on the Right gave the police a grade of poor or very poor for crime prevention.
• In the Arab sample, 84% of voters for Arab parties, 72.5% of voters for Zionist parties, and 96% of those who did not vote rate the police’s performance regarding crime prevention as poor or very poor.

On a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent, what grade would you give to the Israel Police for enforcing the law in a politically neutral manner?

• Around two-thirds of all respondents awarded the police a grade of poor or very poor for enforcing the law in a politically neutral manner. The share of such respondents is particularly high in the Arab sample, at 79%.

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that 84.5% of respondents on the Left, 69% in the Center, and 54% on the Right gave the police a grade of poor or very poor for enforcing the law in a politically neutral manner.
• In the Arab sample, 77% of voters for Arab parties, 64% of voters for Zionist parties, and 86% of those who did not vote rate the police’s performance as poor or very poor in terms of enforcing the law in a politically neutral manner.

The Hostages

Recently, it has been argued that there is a contradiction between Israel’s two war goals—toppling Hamas and bringing the hostages home. In your opinion, which of the two should be Israel’s main goal today?

• While in January 2024 around half of all respondents (51%) cited bringing the hostages home as Israel’s main goal, and just over a third (36%) prioritized toppling Hamas, there is now a clear majority (62%) who view the return of the hostages as the main goal, and only 29% rank toppling Hamas as the highest priority.
• Among both Jews and Arabs, a majority of respondents think that bringing the hostages home should be Israel’s main goal, with this majority higher among Arabs (77%) than among Jews (59%).

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that on the Left and in the Center, a majority of respondents think that Israel’s main goal should be bringing the hostages home (86% and 78%, respectively), while on the Right, opinions are divided (bringing the hostages home, 44%; toppling Hamas, 44%).
• A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that in the Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious groups, the highest share of respondents view toppling Hamas as the main goal (50%, 56%, and 45% respectively). By contrast, the majority of traditional non-religious and secular respondents consider the main goal to be the return of the hostages (62% and 76%, respectively).
• Analysis by gender does not reveal substantial differences between men and women in the Arab sample, though there are differences among Jewish respondents—40.5% of Jewish men rank toppling Hamas as the main goal, compared with just 24% of Jewish women, while 50% of men cite bringing the hostages home as the main goal, compared with 68% of women.
• A large majority in all three religious groups in the Arab sample say that Israel’s main goal should be returning the hostages, with the size of this majority larger among Druze respondents (88%) than among Muslims (77%) and Christians (73%).

On a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent, what grade would you give each of the following for their management of the negotiations over a deal for the return of the hostages?

• All of those involved in the negotiations received low grades for their performance in this context, with the lowest average grades in the total sample awarded to Benjamin Netanyahu (2.17) and the mediating countries (2.19). The negotiating team, which includes the head of the Shin Bet and the head of the Mossad, scored slightly higher (2.76), but still scored below the mid-point of the scale (3).

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals, as expected, that the average grade on the Left for Prime Minister Netanyahu is very low (1.35) and also much lower than the average grade on the Right (3.00), though the latter is still only a middling score. This picture is reversed for the mediating countries, which received their highest average score from the Left (2.83—again, less than middling), and lower grades from the Center (2.33) and particularly the Right (1.90). The negotiating team was awarded its highest grade by the Left (3.17), followed by the Center (3.07) and the Right (2.74).
• Analysis of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 elections finds only small differences between voters for Zionist parties, voters for Arab parties, and non-voters.

In your opinion, are the protests by the Hostages and Missing Families Forum improving or reducing the likelihood of a deal for the return of the hostages?

• In the total sample, the largest share of respondents said that the protests by the Hostages and Missing Families Forum are reducing the likelihood of a deal for the return of the hostages (39%), while smaller proportions think that they are improving the likelihood of a deal (29%) or that they are having no effect one way or the other (25%).
• Views on this issue are fundamentally different in the Jewish and Arab samples: Among Jews, the largest share of respondents (45.5%) think that these protests are damaging the chances of a deal for the release of the hostages, while much smaller shares think that they are helping (21%) or make no difference (26%). By contrast, the majority of Arabs (68%) think that the Families Forum’s activities are helping the chances of securing a deal, while only 7% think that they are harming those chances, and 23% say that they are not making any difference.

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals very large differences between the camps: On the Left, a small majority think that the Forum’s protests are advancing the prospect of a deal, around a third think they make no difference, and a tiny minority say that they are making things worse (52%, 33%, and 7.5%, respectively). In the Center, the largest share of participants believe that these activities neither improve nor reduce the likelihood of a deal (33%), while similar proportions say that they are improving (29%) or reducing (27%) that likelihood. By contrast, the large majority of those on the Right think that the protests by the Families Forum are harming the chances of a deal (64%), around a fifth that they are making no difference (21%), and only a small minority that they are improving those chances (9%).
• Analysis of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 elections finds that a larger share of voters for Arab parties think that the Families Forum’s efforts are improving chances of a deal (79%) compared with voters for Zionist parties (62%) and non-voters (62%).

Israel-US Relations and Relations between Israel and the Diaspora

In your opinion, what is the likelihood that the United States will take the following actions with regard to its relations with Israel: sign a new nuclear deal with Iran, in contravention of Israel’s position on the issue; join international sanctions against Israel; vote against Israel in international institutions; dramatically reduce military aid to Israel.

• Analyzing the responses to this question with regard to each of the four possible actions finds that only a minority of the total population of Israel—and of Jews and Arabs separately—think that there is a strong likelihood that the United States will take these steps against Israel. That is, there is a high level of trust in US support for Israel. The figure below shows the shares of respondents who think that there is a high likelihood that the United States will take the following actions against Israel:

• However, while the majority of the total sample rate the likelihood of the United States joining international sanctions against Israel or voting against Israel in international institutions as low (66% and 54%, respectively), almost equivalent shares of respondents rate the likelihood of America signing a new nuclear deal with Iran against Israel’s wishes as being low (36%) and moderate (37%). Regarding the possibility of the United States dramatically reducing military aid, a larger proportion consider this to be moderately likely (41%) than to have a low likelihood (37%).
• Differentiating between the Jewish and Arab samples reveals a certain similarity between Jewish and Arab assessments that there is only a low or moderate likelihood that the United States will reduce military aid to Israel (78% and 80% respectively) or will vote against Israel in international institutions (83% and 86%). However, when it comes to signing a new nuclear deal with Iran in contravention of Israel’s position on the issue, a smaller share of Jews than of Arabs consider the likelihood of the United States taking such a step to be low or moderate (72% and 82%, respectively). That is, Jews are more worried about this prospect than are Arabs.
• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation finds only negligible differences between the three camps for all the possible actions, with the exception of the United States signing a new nuclear deal with Iran, regarding which there is slightly higher concern on the Right (19%) than in the Center (15%) and on the Left (17%); the same is true for the possibility of a dramatic reduction in military aid to Israel (Left, 15%; Center, 10%; Right, 19%).
• Israelis’ confidence in the stability of American support also emerges from a question discussed below: Only a small minority of respondents (12% of the total sample) view the possible loss of US support as the main external existential threat to Israel.

How have the following affected or not affected relations between Israel and the diaspora: the events of October 7 and the “Iron Swords” war; the increased harassment of Jews abroad?

• In the total sample, the majority of respondents think that these two developments have improved relations between Israel and the diaspora (October 7 and the war, 55%; increased harassment of Jews abroad, 59.5%).
• In the Jewish sample, the majority (58%) think that the events of October 7 and the war have improved relations between Israel and diaspora Jewry, while less than half of this share (23%) say they have worsened these relations. While the largest share of Arab respondents say that these events improved relations between Israel and the Jewish diaspora, many expressed their uncertainty about this issue (20% selected the “don’t know” response).

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that less than half of respondents on the Left (44%) think that the events of October 7 and the war have improved relations between Israel and diaspora Jewry, while 30% take the opposite view (and the rest say that they have not affected relations, or that they don’t know). In the Center, the majority (59%) believe that there has been an improvement in relations, while only a fifth (21%) say the opposite. On the Right, by contrast, a clear majority (61%) think that relations have improved as a result, and only 23% say that these events have pushed Israel and diaspora Jewry further apart.
• Regarding the increased harassment of Jews abroad, the share of Jews who think that this development has improved relations between Israel and the diaspora (63%) is even larger than in the previous case, while a smaller share say that it has worsened relations (17%). Among Arabs, the largest share of respondents (44.5%) once again believe that the increased harassment of Jews abroad has improved relations between Israel and diaspora Jewry, while a smaller proportion than in the previous case say that it has worsened relations, and once again, many respondents had no opinion on the matter (23%).

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that there are smaller differences regarding the issue of increased harassment of Jews abroad than regarding the events of October 7 and the war: In all three camps, the majority of respondents say that relations have improved as a result (Left, 58%; Center, 60%; Right, 65%), and less than a fifth that relations have deteriorated (Left and Center, 18%; Right, 17%).

Assessment of the Current Situation and the Future of Israel

How would you rate the level of solidarity (the sense of “togetherness”) today of Israeli society as a whole (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens), on a scale from 1 = no solidarity at all to 10 = a very high level of solidarity?

• This question has been asked several times in the past, most recently in December 2023. While in December, 54% of the total sample rated the level of solidarity in Israeli society as high, this share has fallen to a minority of 26%. Conversely, 19% of respondents rated the level of solidarity as low back in December, compared with 44% in the current survey.
• The largest share of Jewish respondents (44.5%) now rate the level of solidarity in Israeli society as low. This stands in contrast to an equivalent share of just 17% in December 2023, when the majority rated it as high (59.5%). Among Arab respondents, too, there has been a rise in the share of respondents who rate Israeli solidarity as low (from 29% to 41%) and a decline in the share who rate it as high, though in this latter case the difference between the two measurements is smaller.

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that the highest share of respondents in all three camps rate solidarity in Israel as low (Left, 51%; Center, 43%; Right, 44%), and that only a quarter in each camp rate it as high (Left, 23.5%; Center, 28%; Right, 28%).
• Analysis of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 elections presents a similar picture: Respondents who rate Israeli solidarity as low constitute the largest share of voters for Arab parties (43%), voters for Zionist parties (43%), and non-voters (41%).

In your opinion, what is the greatest external existential threat to the State of Israel?

• In the total sample, the largest share of respondents cite a full-scale multi-front war as the greatest threat to Israel today. The other threats are seen as the most important by much smaller shares: the Iranian nuclear threat, 23%; international isolation, 10%; losing American support, 12%; and in last place, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, selected as the greatest external threat to Israel by just 8.5% of respondents.
• Comparing the responses from Jews and Arabs reveals a very different set of assessments between the two publics. While a full-scale multi-front war is ranked highest in both samples (albeit to differing degrees—Jews, 41%; Arabs, 27%), a much larger share of Jews cited the Iranian nuclear threat (26%) than of Arabs (7%). On the other hand, the share of Jews who view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the greatest threat to Israel (7%) is much smaller than the equivalent share of Arabs (17%).

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that a full-scale multi-front war is viewed as the greatest external threat to Israel by almost identical shares of respondents in all three camps (Left, 40%; Center, 42%; Right, 40%). The Iranian nuclear threat is ranked in second place, and is cited by a much larger share on the Right (32%) than on the Left (15%) and in the Center (22%). The remaining threats were chosen by similarly small shares of respondents in all three camps.
• Analysis of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 elections finds that the share of respondents who say that a full-scale multi-front war is the greatest external threat to Israel is larger among those who did not vote (39.5%) than among voters for Zionist parties (28%) and for Arab parties (23%). The Iranian nuclear threat is perceived as more serious by voters for Zionist parties (17%) than by voters for Arab parties (7%) and non-voters (4%).

In your opinion, which of the following policy steps is the main step that the government of Israel should use in order to reduce the budget deficit created as a result of the cost of the war?

• In the total sample, the largest share of respondents (44.5%) think that the government should uniformly cut the budgets of all government ministries. A third say that the government should cut some government ministry budgets in line with its priorities, only 9% prefer the imposition of a special mandatory loan arrangement (in which the government borrows money from the public to be repaid at a predetermined date), and a tiny minority (2%) view raising taxes as the most appropriate step for reducing the budget deficit created as a result of the cost of the war.

• The differences between Jews and Arabs on this question are small, except for the fact that the share of Arabs who selected the “don’t know” response is double the equivalent share of Jews (20.5%, versus 10%).
• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that the first and second preferences of all three camps are identical (uniformly cutting the budgets of all government ministries, and cutting the budgets of only some government ministries in accordance with government priorities), but to different degrees of support (Left, 49% and 33%; Center, 55% and 31%; Right, 43% and 36%).

When do you think elections should be held?

• In the total sample, just under half the respondents (47%) think that elections should be held before the end of 2024, a third that the government should be allowed to complete its term and elections should be held as scheduled in 2026, and just 16% that elections should be held in 2025.
• The difference between Jews and Arabs on this issue is very large: Among Jews, the largest share (41%) would like to have elections before the end of 2024, more than a third (37.5%) in 2026 as scheduled, and a small minority (17.5%) in 2025. By contrast, a large majority of Arabs (76%) would like elections to be held this year, and only 9% each would prefer elections in 2025 or in 2026.

• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals majorities on the Left (74%) and in the Center (64%) who prefer elections before the end of 2024, and a majority on the Right who think that elections should be held as scheduled in 2026 (55%).
• Analysis of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 elections finds that a large majority in all three groups favors elections before the end of 2024, with this majority largest among the non-voters (82%), followed by voters for Arab parties (76.5%) and voters for Zionist parties (66%).

In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of Israel?

• The total sample is evenly divided, with 45% optimistic about the future of Israel and 48% who are pessimistic.
• The distribution of responses is fundamentally different in the Jewish and Arab samples: The largest share of Jews (49%) are optimistic about the future of Israel, and 44% are pessimistic, while a large majority of Arabs are pessimistic (69%), and only 25% are optimistic.

• A breakdown of the Jewish sample by age reveals that optimists form the majority of those aged 18–34 (54%), constitute about half (51%) of the oldest age group (55 and over), and are less than half (43%) of the intermediate group (35–54).
• In the Arab sample, optimists are the minority in all three age groups, with the intermediate group being the least optimistic of the three (18–34, 27%; 35–54, 19%; 55+, 32%).
• Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals sizable differences: Optimists are a relatively small minority on the Left (29%), a larger minority in the Center (40%), and a majority on the Right (59.5%).
• Analysis of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 elections finds a larger share of optimists about the future of Israel among voters for Zionist parties (36%) than among voters for Arab parties (19%) and those who did not vote (24%).

[1] It should be noted that due to the difference in size between the majority Jewish group and the minority Arab group, a ratio that is maintained in the samples for this survey, the findings for the total sample are always skewed toward the majority Jewish group. This effect is particularly strong in cases of extreme opposing views among the Jewish and Arab publics.

[2] This question was posed only to respondents who expressed agreement that the time has come to end the war in Gaza.

[3] Breakdowns of the Arab sample by religion should be treated with caution, as the data for Christians and Druze are based in both cases on samples of less than 30 respondents.