Across Political Orientations; Jewish and Arab Israelis Have Negative Feelings Toward the Government
Across the Left, Right and Center, rates of Jewish Israelis who say they feel "anger," "disappointment," or "frustration" are considerably higher than those expressing satisfaction, pride, or trust. A large majority of Israelis (90%) support the establishment of an inquiry into the events of Oct. 7th, but do not agree on the timing of such an inquiry.
Photo by Avshalom Sasson/Flash90
The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute between July 30 and August 4, 2024. It was based on a representative sample of the population in Israel aged 18 and above, comprising 600 Jewish interviewees and 150 Arab interviewees.
Topics covered in this report:
- The national mood
- Feelings toward the government
- Feelings toward the protest movement
- A deal for the release of the hostages
- The northern front
- Netanyahu’s speech to the US Congress
- Holding an inquiry into the events of October 7
The national mood is currently extremely low, by a number of different parameters. The levels of optimism with regard to both the future of national security and the future of democratic rule in Israel are continuing to fall, even though on a monthly basis this decline appears slow and not dramatic. Thus, on the issue of national security, July’s optimism level was the lowest ever recorded, and on the issue of democratic rule, almost the lowest ever. It should be noted that this month’s survey was carried out after the deadly missile strike on the football field in Majdal Shams, but before the assassinations of the Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr and the head of the Hamas Political Bureau Ismail Haniyeh, in response to which Iran has threatened to attack Israel, greatly raising levels of anxiety in the Israeli public.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security (total sample; %)
Once again, as in the past, the (low) share of optimists in the Jewish sample is still higher than that in the Arab sample, regarding both the future of democratic rule and the future of national security.
Share of optimists by nationality (%)
Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that among those on the Left, the percentage of optimists is now down into single digits, with only a tiny difference between the two issues. In the Center, optimism is slightly higher about national security than about democratic rule, while on the Right, those optimistic about the future of democratic rule outnumber the optimists about the future of national security.
Share of optimists by political orientation (Jews; %)
These findings correspond with the public’s assessment of Israel’s overall situation today. In the total sample, a record high of just under two-thirds of respondents define the overall situation as bad or very bad, while a record low of just one-eighth characterize it as good or very good. Around a quarter say it is “so-so.”
How would you characterize Israel’s overall situation today? (total sample; %)
Though the majority of respondents define the overall situation negatively in both the Jewish sample and the Arab sample, there is a very large difference in the size of this majority between the two samples (Jews, 58%; Arabs, 85%). In other words, Jews’ assessment of the situation is not as negative as that of Arabs. There are also large differences within the Jewish sample according to political orientation: On the Left, 81% think that the situation is bad or very bad, compared to 65% in the Center and precisely half of those on the Right.
Further to the situation described above, this month we asked our respondents about their feelings toward the government. We offered them a range of positive and negative feelings to choose from, as well as the option of “other.” The share of those who expressed negative feelings was considerably higher than those who reported positive feelings, though as we shall see below, those with negative feelings do not necessarily come from a particular political camp. It should be noted that the feeling options were presented to the respondents in a random order, that is, the order was changed from respondent to respondent.
There may be very different reasons for negative feelings: It is fairly clear that voters for right-wing parties are disappointed, frustrated, or angry with the government for different reasons from those of voters for left-wing or centrist parties. Even so, the findings indicate that the majority of Israel’s citizens are dissatisfied with their government for one reason or another. In this context, it is worth noting that while only a tiny proportion of respondents selected the “other” option and provided their own response, the overwhelming majority of “other” feelings expressed were negative.
As can be seen from the figure below, there were only small differences between the Jewish and Arab samples, with negative feelings clearly dominant (frustration, anger, and disappointment). The percentage of those with positive feelings toward the government (pride, satisfaction, trust) was slightly higher among Jews than among Arabs.
Of the following feelings, which best characterizes your attitude toward the government? (Jews and Arabs; %)
The figure below shows that negative feelings toward the government are dominant in all three political camps in the Jewish sample. On the Left, and to a lesser extent in the Center, anger and disappointment are prominent, and on the Right, disappointment and frustration. It is possible that those on the Left are less disappointed with the current government than those in the Center and on the Right because they had no positive expectations of it in the first place. However, the low levels of satisfaction, pride, and trust in the government among those on the Right are rather surprising.
Of the following feelings, which best characterizes your attitude toward the government? (Jews, by political orientation; %)
We cross-tabulated the responses to the question about feelings toward the government by responses to the question about Israel’s overall situation. Among those who defined Israel’s situation as good or very good, the dominant feelings expressed were satisfaction (22%) and trust (20%). By contrast, among those who defined the situation as so-so, the strongest feelings are disappointment (37%) and frustration (25%), while among those who defined the situation as bad or very bad, the dominant feelings are anger (34%) and frustration (29%).
We have already noted that there may be different, and even contradictory, reasons for anger, disappointment, and frustration with the government. And indeed, this is demonstrated by a breakdown of responses by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections. Disappointment is the leading feeling cited by voters for Hadash-Ta’al (50%) and for National Unity and Yisrael Beytenu (36% in both cases), but also by voters for Likud (32%), Religious Zionism (31%), and United Torah Judaism (29%). Frustration ranks highest among Ra’am voters (33%), but also among Shas voters (25%). Notably, Shas voters are the only voter group for which satisfaction is at the top of the rankings (25%). Anger is in first place only among voters for the Labor Party (67%), Meretz (64%), and Yesh Atid (47%).
Compared to the previous question on feelings toward the government, we found much larger differences in the Arab sample and the Jewish sample when we asked about respondents’ feelings toward the protest movement. The range of responses is relatively large among Jewish respondents (from 30% for anger down to 5.5% for satisfaction), but is much smaller among Arab respondents (from 21% for frustration down to 6% for pride). At the same time, the main feelings expressed toward the protest movements are negative ones—in particular, anger among Jews, and frustration and disappointment among Arabs. Once again, the majority of the “other” feelings cited are negative.
Of the following feelings, which best characterizes your attitude toward the protest movement? (Jews and Arabs; %)
Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals considerable differences. On the Left, positive feelings reign, headed by pride. Only a very few report frustration, anger, or disappointment regarding the protest movement. The picture is different in the Center: While pride is the leading feeling cited, it has a smaller share than on the Left, and is followed closely by frustration—possibly due to the perceived lack of impact of the movement in practice. On the Right, the dominant feeling toward the movement is anger (even more dominant than pride is on the Left), followed by disappointment and frustration.
Of the following feelings, which best characterizes your attitude toward the protest movement? (Jews, by political orientation; %)
As in the last month, we once again asked our respondents: “What do you think Israel should do now regarding a deal for the release of the hostages?” The distribution of responses has hardly changed. In the total sample, a majority (though not large) would prefer a comprehensive deal for the release of all the hostages in return for an end to the war and a full withdrawal from Gaza (53.5%). This share is almost double that of the respondents who are in favor of a deal for the release of some of the hostages in return for a temporary ceasefire in Gaza (28.5%). Among Jews, there has been a slight fall in the proportion of those supporting these two options, and a rise in the share of those selecting the “don’t know” option. This option could be used to express uncertainty, but also to express opposition to the possibility of any kind of deal for the release of the hostages that would restrict the continuation of the fighting. Among Arabs, an overwhelming majority support a deal for the release of all the hostages.
What do you think Israel should do now regarding a deal for the release of the hostages? (%)
In the Jewish sample, a large majority of those on the Left and in the Center support a comprehensive deal for the release of all the hostages in return for an end to the war and a full withdrawal from Gaza, while on the Right the largest share of respondents (though not the majority) are in favor of a deal for the release of some of the hostages in return for a temporary ceasefire in Gaza.
Breaking down the Jewish sample by gender reveals once again (as last month) significant differences between men—who are divided on this issue—and women, who clearly lean toward a deal for the release of all the hostages. In the Arab sample, no differences were found between women and men.
What do you think Israel should do now regarding a deal for the release of the hostages? (Jews; %)
We found sizable differences between the different age groups in the Jewish sample. In the 18–34 age group, 41.5% support a deal for the release of some of the hostages, while 34.5% support a deal for the release of all the hostages. In the older groups, the picture is reversed: Among those aged 35–54, 49% support a deal for the release of all the hostages, while 28% support a deal for the release of some of the hostages; and among those aged 55 and over, the share who support a deal for the release of all the hostages stands at 54%, while only 28% support a deal for the release of some of the hostages.
Following the deadly missile strike on the football field in Majdal Shams but before the assassinations of the Hezbollah and Hamas leaders, we asked: “What do you think Israel should do now on the northern front?” We found significant differences between the Jewish and Arab samples. Almost half of the Jewish respondents support launching an assault deep into Lebanon that includes striking at its infrastructure, and more than a quarter think that Israel should respond more aggressively to Hezbollah but refrain from striking at Lebanon’s infrastructure. Among Arabs, a very large share responded that they don’t know what Israel should do, which may indicate disagreement with all the possibilities presented and support for a non-military solution.
Breaking down response in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a majority in all three camps who support escalating Israel’s military response, whether by launching an assault deep into Lebanon that includes striking at its infrastructure or by adopting more aggressive action directed solely at Hezbollah (Left, 61.5%; Center, 69%; Right, 80.5%). The majority of respondents on the Right support a long-range assault that includes striking at infrastructure, while on the Left the largest share of respondents (though not the majority) are in favor of taking more aggressive action against Hezbollah alone. In all camps, only a small minority think that Israel should continue the fighting in the current format.
What do you think Israel should do now on the northern front? (%)
Though some time has passed since Netanyahu’s speech to Congress, we wanted to assess the public’s view of it. We asked: “What grade would you give to the speech by Prime Minister Netanyahu to the US Congress?” The majority of Jewish respondents rate the prime minister’s speech as good or excellent, while only a small minority of Arab respondents hold the same view.
Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that almost three-quarters of respondents on the Right think that the speech was good or excellent, as do almost half of those in the Center. Surprisingly, the share of respondents on the Left who rated the speech as poor or very poor was similar to the share who rated it as good or excellent. It is worth noting the high proportion of respondents—more than a fifth—who didn’t watch the speech or have no opinion about it.
What grade would you give to the speech by Prime Minister Netanyahu to the US Congress, on a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent? (%)
We also asked our respondents whether Netanyahu’s speech was more beneficial or more harmful to Israel’s national interests. Once again, we found significant differences between Jews and Arabs, with almost one-half of the Jewish respondents saying that the speech was more beneficial, while the most common response from Arabs was that the speech was neither harmful nor beneficial. Interestingly, the proportion of the total sample who think that the speech was beneficial to Israel’s national interests (41.5%) is around 10 percentage points lower than the share who rated the speech as good or excellent (52%).
Unsurprisingly, we found significant differences in the Jewish sample between the different political camps. The majority of respondents on the Right think that the speech was more beneficial, while on the Left and in the Center, the most common response was that the speech was neither harmful nor beneficial.
In your opinion, was Netanyahu’s speech to the US Congress more beneficial or more harmful to Israel’s national interests? (%)
We examined the relation between the grade given to Netanyahu’s speech and the assessment as to whether it was beneficial or harmful to Israel’s national interests. Among those who rated the speech as poor or very poor, around half think that it was more harmful, while almost 40% think that it was neither harmful nor beneficial. By contrast, among those who rated the speech as good or excellent, more than two-thirds think that it was more beneficial, and almost a quarter think that it was neither harmful nor beneficial.
Was Netanyahu’s speech to the US Congress more beneficial or more harmful to Israel’s national interests, by what grade would you give to Netanyahu’s speech (total sample; %)
We wanted to know whether the Israeli public supports in principle establishing an inquiry into the events of October 7. We found that a very large majority of both Jews and Arabs support the establishment of some form of inquiry. Among Jews we found high levels of support (“strongly support” or “somewhat support”) of at least 80% among all religious groups, as well as in all three political camps.
In principle, do you support or oppose establishing some form of inquiry into the events of October 7? (%)
We then asked: “If it is decided to establish an inquiry into the events of October 7, in your estimation, when should it be established?” Unlike the question of whether there should be an inquiry in principle, on which we found a high degree of consensus, there was no broad agreement as to the timing of such an inquiry, though in both the Arab and the Jewish sample, a majority of respondents think that an inquiry should be set up as soon as possible (63% and 55%, respectively).
Breaking down the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, we found significant differences between voters for coalition parties and voters for opposition parties, but we also found differences among coalition voters and among opposition voters. As expected, a large proportion of opposition voters support establishing an inquiry as soon as possible, though there are significant differences between the very high level of support among voters for Yesh Atid and Labor, and the less pronounced level of support among voters for National Unity, Yisrael Beytenu, and the Arab parties. Meanwhile, the majority of voters for coalition parties are in favor of establishing an inquiry only when the war ends, though more than a third of Likud voters and Religious Zionism voters support holding an inquiry as soon as possible.
When should an inquiry into the events of October 7 be established? (total sample, by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections; %)
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The July 2024 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between July 30 and August 4, 2024, with 600 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.58% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.