Netanyahu Government Gets Low Grades Across Various Wartime Issues
May 2024 Israeli Voice Index
Across the issues of US-relations, the war in Gaza, evacuees from the south and the north, fighting Hezbollah, and public diplomacy efforts abroad—both Jewish and Arab Israelis give the government low grades.
Protestors in the north. Photo by David Cohen/Flash90
The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute between May 26 and May 28, 2024. It was based on a representative sample of the population in Israel aged 18 and above, comprising 600 Jewish interviewees and 150 Arab interviewees.
Topics covered in this report:
- The national mood
- Is there a plan for “the day after”?
- Rating the government’s performance on various issues
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The international arena:
- The recognition of a Palestinian state by several countries, and how Israel should respond
- The request from the chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Court in The Hague to issue arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant
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The government’s advancement of legislation as part of its judicial reform:
- Is now the right time?
- How will it affect the public protests?
On both issues—the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of national security—the declining trend in the share of optimists in the Israeli public has continued. In fact, this month’s results for the total sample, for both issues, were the lowest recorded since we began asking this question. While we found a very small and statistically insignificant drop in the share of optimists among Jewish respondents (from 35% in April to 32% in May), the main factor in this month’s decline was the sharp fall among Arab respondents (from 16% in April to 6% in May), who in any case are always less optimistic than their Jewish counterparts. Another measurement will be necessary in order to determine whether this fall represents a sea change in the level of optimism in the Arab public, or was merely a blip.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security (total sample; %)
As in previous surveys, we found large differences this month between political camps in the Jewish sample, but in none of them are optimists the majority (future of democratic rule: Left, 14%; Center, 20%; Right, 45%; future of national security: Left, 14%; Center, 19%; Right, 43%).
In the total sample, a majority of 80% think that the government does not currently have a clear plan of action for the day after the war. This view is shared by Jews and Arabs, by the different political camps in the Jewish sample, and by voters for most of the parties. Among Jewish respondents who define themselves as Left or Center, the overwhelming majority say that the government does not have a plan of action for the day after the war (98% and 94%, respectively). Even among those who identify as on the Right, a clear majority of two-thirds hold the same opinion. The same holds true when analyzing the results by vote in the 2022 elections: 56% of Likud voters think that the government does not have a plan of action for the day after the war, as do 67% of voters for Religious Zionism, and 55% of voters for United Torah Judaism. This view is also held by 96% of voters for the National Unity party, which at the time of writing is still a part of the coalition. Only among Shas voters is the share of those who think that the government has no plan of action less than half (46%).
In your opinion, does the government currently have or not have a clear plan of action for the day after the end of the fighting in Gaza? (%)
Moreover, this month’s findings show a sharp rise in the share of those who think that the government does not have a clear plan of action for the day after the war, relative to previous surveys. While in October 2023, the public was divided on this question, in each of the following two months there was a majority of close to two-thirds who thought that there was no such plan, and this share has increased still further this month.
In your opinion, does the government currently have or not have a clear plan of action for the day after the end of the fighting in Gaza? (October 2023–May 2024; %)
*In the October 2023 survey, the question asked was: “Does the government currently have or not have a clear plan of action for the next phases of the operation in Gaza?”
The increase in the proportion of respondents who believe that the government has no plan of action is noticeable across all political camps, and is especially prominent on the Right (while the Left and the Center are subject to the “ceiling principle,” in that given the large shares who held this opinion in previous surveys, there is not much room for an increase).
Think or are certain that the government does not have a clear plan of action for the day after the end of the fighting in Gaza (%)
*In the October 2023 survey, the question asked was: “Does the government currently have or not have a clear plan of action for the next phases of the operation in Gaza?”
We cross-tabulated the responses to this question with the responses to the two questions about optimism/pessimism (regarding the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of national security). We found that for both issues—the future of democratic rule and the future of national security—the share of pessimists is significantly lower among those who think that the government has a clear plan of action for the day after. Thus, regarding the future of democratic rule, only around a third (31%) of those who think that the government has such a plan are pessimistic, while pessimists constitute a majority of around three-quarters (74%) of those who think that the government does not have a clear plan. The same is true when it comes to the future of national security: Of those who think that the government has a plan, “only” 39% are pessimistic, compared with 75% of those who think that it does not have a plan.
We asked our respondents to rate the performance of the Netanyahu government since October 7 on the following issues: the war in Gaza; the fighting against Hezbollah; treatment of the evacuees from the south; treatment of the evacuees from the north; public diplomacy efforts abroad; and relations with the US administration. For each, respondents were asked to award the government a grade from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent.
First, as shown in the figure below, the average grades given by Arab respondents were lower than those given by Jews.
Second, for none of the issues presented did the average grade reach the mid-point of 3—not across the total sample, nor in either the Jewish sample or the Arab sample. That is, the overall public rating of the government’s performance since October 7 in the areas examined is low. For some of these issues (such as the treatment of evacuees, albeit without differentiation between north and south), we have results from surveys in October and December, though the questions were not phrased in exactly the same way. In those surveys, the grades given were also low, and thus we are looking at a stable low rating over time, not influenced by momentary events.
In both the Jewish sample and the Arab sample, the highest average grade was for relations with the US administration. In the Jewish sample, the lowest average grade was for public diplomacy efforts abroad (and this issue also had the smallest difference between the average grades in the Jewish and Arab samples), while in the Arab sample, the lowest average grade was for the government’s management of the war in Gaza—the issue for which the government received the highest average grade from the Jewish public (though still below the mid-point score of 3).
Interestingly, the Israeli public (both Jewish and Arab) rates the government’s performance more highly with regard to the treatment of the evacuees from the south than to the treatment of the evacuees from the north. Another interesting finding is that the average grade given by Jews for the fighting against Hezbollah is lower than the average grade for the war in Gaza, while among Arabs, the government scores more highly for its management of the conflict with Hezbollah than for its management of the conflict in Gaza.
Average grades for the government for the six issues examined (1 = very poor, 5 = excellent)
Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that for all the issues we asked about, the average grades given by the Left were the lowest, those from the Center were slightly higher, and the grades given by the Right were higher, though still low. Only in two cases (the war in Gaza and relations with the US administration) did the average grade given by those on the Right exceed the mid-point of 3.
Several countries have formally declared their recognition of a Palestinian state in recent days (or are about to do so shortly), despite fierce opposition from the State of Israel. We asked: “In your opinion, what is the main reason for these declarations at this particular time?” Almost half the Arab sample responded that the main reason is the way in which Israel and the IDF have conducted the war in Gaza. By contrast, the majority of Jews believe that the main reason is either hatred of Israel (37%) or conceding to Palestinian and international pressures (27%). Among both Arabs and Jews, only a minority of respondents cite ideological support for the Palestinians’ right to their own state (17% and 13%, respectively).
In the Jewish sample, we found large differences between political camps: A majority of those on the Right (50%) cite hatred of Israel as the main factor behind recognition of a Palestinian state; in the Center, the largest share of respondents viewed this recognition as a result of conceding to pro-Palestinian pressure (31%); while on the Left, the main reason identified was the way in which Israel and the IDF have conducted the war (32.5%).
Once again, we found that the views of voters for the National Unity party, which at the time of writing remains part of the coalition, are more similar to those of voters for opposition parties: 28% think that the way in which the war in Gaza has been conducted is the main reason for these declarations (similar to the 32% found among Yesh Atid voters)—a much higher proportion than among voters for other coalition parties (for example, just 8% of Likud voters and 9% of Religious Zionism voters).
In the Jewish sample, we also found differences between age groups: In the youngest group (18–34), the largest share of respondents (44.5%) think that hatred of Israel is the main reason behind the recognition of a Palestinian state. This percentage falls gradually among older age cohorts (to 39% among those aged 35–54, and 29% among those aged 55 and over). However, this may be attributed not necessarily to age, but to the fact that a larger proportion of younger than older Israelis define themselves as on the Right.
Several countries are set to formally declare their recognition of a Palestinian state, despite Israel’s fierce opposition to this step. In your opinion, what is the main reason for these declarations at this particular time? (%)
The chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague recently announced that he plans to submit a request for arrest warrants to be issued against Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gallant for alleged actions taken as part of the fighting in Gaza, such as using starvation as a method of warfare and willfully harming civilians. We asked: “In your opinion, what is the main reason for this step by the chief prosecutor?”
We found large differences between Jews and Arabs: While half of the Arab respondents identified the main reason as being the way in which Israel and the IDF have conducted the war in Gaza, the majority of Jewish respondents (60%) cited long-standing anti-Israel bias at the ICC.
There were also large differences between political camps in the Jewish sample. Among those who place themselves in the Center, the largest share think that the main reason behind the chief prosecutor’s requests to issue arrest warrants is anti-Israel bias at the ICC (45%), while 37% identify the main reason as being Israel’s ineffective public diplomacy efforts. On the Left, 39% cite ineffective public diplomacy efforts as the main reason, while 31% point to the way in which the war has been conducted. On the Right, these explanations receive short shrift, while a large majority (75%) say that the main reason is long-standing anti-Israel bias at the ICC.
In your opinion, what is the main reason behind the intention of the chief prosecutor at the ICC to issue arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant? (%)
Is now the right time? We asked: “Several laws that were part of the government’s judicial reform, and that were supposedly taken off the table, will now seemingly be advanced by the reform’s architects during the Knesset’s summer session. In your opinion, against the backdrop of the continuing war and the need for unity among Israelis, is it correct or not correct to advance parts of the reform at the current time?”
In the total sample, we found a clear majority who think or are certain that this step is not correct, while only around a quarter think it is correct. The distribution of responses among Jews is very similar to that among Arabs.
As the figure below shows, in the Jewish sample, the share of those who think that advancing this legislation is the correct thing to do at the current time is larger on the Right than in the Center and on the Left, though even on the Right, this view is only held by around one-third of respondents, while one-half take the opposite view. Incidentally, the share of those who selected the “don’t know” response was much larger on the Right than in the other two camps (Right, 13%; Center, 5.5%; Left, 1%).
Among voters for coalition parties at the 2022 elections, there are significant differences between, on the one hand, Likud and Shas voters, of whom only a minority think that the judicial reform should be advanced (40% and 37.5%, respectively), and on the other, voters for Religious Zionism and United Torah Judaism, of whom a majority are in favor of this step (55% and 56%, respectively).
Against the backdrop of the continuing war and the need for unity among Israelis, is it correct or not correct to advance parts of the judicial reform at the current time? (%)
Expected effect of this step on the protests against the government: We asked: “In your opinion, how (if at all) will partial advancement of the judicial reform affect the current scale of the civil protests against the government?” In the total sample, as well as in the Jewish sample overall and in each of the political camps in the Jewish sample, the large majority of respondents think that this step will strengthen the protests. This view is shared by only 38% of Arab respondents, while a much larger proportion of Arabs than of Jews think that advancing the reform will have no effect on the protests (Arabs, 17.5%; Jews, 10.5%).
Expected effect of the partial advancement of the judicial reform on the civil protests against the government (%)
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The May 2024 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between May 26 and May 28, 2024, with 600 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.58% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.