A Majority of Jewish Israelis See a Hostage Deal as a Higher National Priority Than Military Action in Rafah
War in Gaza Survey 16
The majority of the Jewish public (56%) think that securing a deal for the release of the hostages is the highest priority; a higher share of Jewish respondents think Trump would be better for Israel as US president than Biden; most Israelis think that celebrations of Israel's 76th Independence Day should be more restrained and less prominent this year.
Photo by Oren Ben Hakoon/Flash90
The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute between May 1–6, 2024. The survey was based on a representative sample of the population in Israel aged 18 and above, comprising 600 Jewish interviewees and 150 Arab interviewees.
Topics covered in this report:
- The national mood
- Which is the highest priority—a military operation in Rafah, or a deal for the release of the hostages?
- The strategic balance between Israel and Iran
- In terms of Israel’s interests, who is the better candidate for the US presidency—Biden or Trump?
- Assessments of the justifiability and effectiveness of the international economic sanctions against far-right organizations and activists
- Israel’s conduct as an accelerating factor in international recognition of a Palestinian state
- Do the pro-Palestinian protests at universities in the United States and Europe reflect the opinion of the majority of the public in those countries?
- National days of remembrance:
- Is there a basis for comparison between the events of the Holocaust and the events of October 7?
- Attendance by government ministers at Memorial Day ceremonies in military ceremonies
- How should local authorities celebrate Independence Day this year?
On both issues—the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of national security—the Israeli public’s optimism has declined somewhat relative to last month, and in fact is now even lower than it was during the low point of mid-2023. This decline has come mainly among Arab respondents, where the levels of optimism are much lower than among Jews. In the Jewish sample, there has been no real change this month. Only 18% of Arabs are optimistic about the future of democratic rule and 16% are optimistic about the future of national security. By contrast, around 35% of Jews are optimistic both about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of Israel’s national security.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security (total sample; %)
For Jewish respondents, we looked at whether there is a connection between optimism/pessimism on one issue and optimism/pessimism on the other (among Arab respondents, the share of optimists is so small as to make this assessment pointless). We found a relation between the two, but it is not perfect. Moreover, it is stronger among pessimists. Thus, of those who are optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel, 62% are also optimistic about the future of national security. By contrast, of those who are pessimistic about the future of democratic rule, fully 81% are also pessimistic about the future of national security.
Against the backdrop of disagreements among Israel’s political leaders, we asked our respondents what should be the highest priority in terms of Israel’s national interests—a military operation in Rafah or a deal for the release of the hostages. We found that a majority of the Jewish public (56%) agree more with the claim that securing a deal for the release of the hostages is the highest priority, while 37% agree more with the opposite claim, according to which pursuing a military operation in Rafah is the highest priority. In the Arab sample, an overwhelming majority prefer a deal for the release of the hostages (88.5%).
We found large differences in the Jewish sample between the different political camps. A large majority of those on the Left and in the Center consider a deal for the release of hostages to be the highest priority (92.5% and 78%, respectively), while the majority on the Right (55%) prioritize a military operation in Rafah. However, even among voters for right-wing parties in the Jewish sample there is a significant difference between those who voted for Likud at the last elections—who are divided between preference for a military operation (48.5%) and for a deal for the release of the hostages (44%)—and voters for Haredi parties and (especially) Religious Zionism voters, the majority of whom give highest priority to a military operation in Rafah (Shas, 55%; United Torah Judaism, 61%; Religious Zionism, 83%).
Breaking down the Jewish sample by gender reveals that a solid majority of women prioritize a deal for the release of the hostages (63.5%), while the men are divided, with a slight advantage to those who prefer a deal (49% rate a deal as the highest priority, compared to 44% for a military operation). We also found a gender gap within the political camps, particularly on the Right: While 65% of men in this camp express preference for a military operation and only 28% for a deal for the release of the hostages, the share of women who prefer a deal is slightly higher than the share of women who prefer a military operation (47% and 45%, respectively). Among Likud voters, 55.5% of women prioritize a deal and 39% of women prioritize a military operation, while the picture is reversed for men—57% of male Likud voters prefer a military operation, and 34% a deal for the release of the hostages.
In addition, in the Jewish sample we found higher rates of preference for a deal for the release of the hostages among older age groups: The 18–34 age group is divided, with 48.5% preferring a deal and 45.5% preferring a military operation, while the majority of respondents in the 35–54 and 55+ age groups prefer a deal (53% and 67%, respectively).
What should be the highest priority in terms of Israel’s national interests—a military operation in Rafah or a deal for the release of the hostages? (%)
We asked: “After the measured exchanges of fire between Israel and Iran, which of the two countries is now in a better strategic position in the region?” Among Jewish respondents, almost half (46%) said that Israel has the advantage, while an identical proportion of Arab respondents think that the strategic position of the two countries is identical. Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation revealed that only on the Right is there a majority of respondents who think that Israel’s situation is better. On the Left and in the Center, the share of those who think that Israel has the advantage is lower than on the Right, though it is still higher than the share of those who think that Iran is in a better position. In the Center, the most common response given was that the position of the two countries is identical.
After the measured exchanges of fire between Israel and Iran, which of the two countries is now in a better strategic position in the region? (%)
We asked: “In terms of Israel’s interests, which of the two candidates for the US presidency would be better?” Among Jews, a higher share of respondents said that Trump would be better for Israel. By contrast, a large majority of Arabs responded that there is no difference between the two presidential candidates.
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that a large majority of those on the Left prefer Biden as the next president of the United States in terms of Israel’s interests, while a large majority on the Right prefer Trump. The Center is divided, with just under half expressing a preference for Biden, around a quarter preferring Trump, and the remainder either holding the opinion that there is no difference between them or stating that they don’t know which is preferable.
In terms of Israel’s interests, which of the two candidates for the US presidency would be better? (%)
We asked: “Recently, the United States and the European Union have imposed economic sanctions against far-right organizations and activists in Israel on the basis that they have been involved in violations of human rights and in repeated violence against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. In your opinion, do the actions of these activists and organizations justify or not justify these sanctions?” A clear majority of the Jewish public (58.5%) think that these sanctions are not justified, while less than a third think that they are justified. Among Arab respondents, the majority (54%) believe there is justification for the imposition of these international sanctions, while a third take the opposite view.
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that around three-quarters of those on the Left think that the sanctions are justified, while an even larger majority on the Right (81%) hold the opposite opinion—that the sanctions are not justified. In the Center, just under half (48%) believe that the sanctions are justified, and just over a third (37%) think they are not justified.
Do the actions of far-right activists and organizations against Palestinians justify or not justify the imposition of international sanctions? (Jews; %)
Given the large differences of opinion among the political camps regarding the justifiability of the imposition of sanctions, it was surprising to find a high level of similarity among them regarding the expected effectiveness of these sanctions in curbing the actions of the far-right actors against whom the sanctions were imposed.
Will the economic sanctions imposed on these organizations and activists be effective or not effective in curbing their actions against Palestinians? (Jews; %)
Arab respondents are more “optimistic” than Jews regarding the effectiveness of these sanctions: 47% anticipate that they will be effective (46% think that they will not be effective), while only a small minority of Jews (12%) expect sanctions to be effective (78% think that they will not be effective).
We asked: “Several European countries are shortly expected to announce their recognition of a Palestinian state. In your opinion, has the recent conduct of the government of Israel in military and international affairs accelerated this recognition of a Palestinian state?” The majority of Jewish respondents (55%) think that the recent conduct of the government of Israel in these arenas has indeed accelerated the expected recognition of a Palestinian state. Around a third think that Israel’s conduct has not been an accelerating factor, and the remainder selected the “don’t know” response. However, breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that the large majority of those on the Left and in the Center hold Israel responsible for the acceleration of the process of international recognition of a Palestinian state, while an even larger proportion of those on the Right say that Israel’s conduct has not been a factor.
A very large majority of Arab respondents (75%) believe that Israel’s conduct has accelerated the process of international recognition of a Palestinian state.
In your opinion, has the recent conduct of the government of Israel in military and international affairs accelerated recognition of a Palestinian state? (%)
Against the backdrop of growing pro-Palestinian protests at universities in the United States and Europe, we asked whether these protests reflect or do not reflect the opinion of the majority of the public in these countries. We found significant differences between Jews and Arabs: 62% of Arab respondents think that the protests do indeed reflect majority public opinion in the United States and Europe, a view held by only a small minority of Jews (18.5%). In the Jewish sample, there is broad consensus among all political camps that the protests do not reflect the opinion of the majority in these countries.
Do pro-Palestinian protests at universities in the United States and Europe reflect or not reflect the opinion of the majority of the public in these countries? (%)
The validity of comparisons between the events of October 7 and the Holocaust: On the eve of Israel’s Holocaust Remembrance Day, before the country’s leaders had delivered their speeches to mark the occasion (President Herzog rejected such comparisons, while Prime Minister Netanyahu reinforced them), we asked: “Is there or is there not a basis for the comparisons that many people are currently making between the events of the Holocaust and the events of October 7?” We found that even before the official speeches, a small majority of Jewish respondents thought that there is indeed a basis for these comparisons.
Is there or is there not a basis for the comparisons that many people are currently making between the events of the Holocaust and the events of October 7? (%)
Attendance by government ministers at Memorial Day ceremonies in military cemeteries: There have recently been calls for ministers not to attend ceremonies in military ceremonies on this year’s Memorial Day. We found that the general public is divided on this issue: 48% think that ministers should not attend these memorial ceremonies, while 42% think that they should attend. Interestingly, while the Jewish sample is evenly split (with 46% holding each opinion), the majority of the Arab sample (56.5%) say that ministers should not go to military cemeteries this year. There are significant differences between political camps in the Jewish public: On the Left and in the Center, a solid majority think that ministers should not attend memorial ceremonies in cemeteries, while a majority of those on the Right hold the opposite view.
Another interesting finding relates to the National Unity party, which has three representatives serving as ministers in the government. Only 33% of National Unity (ha-Machane ha-Mamlachti) voters think that government ministers should participate in Memorial Day ceremonies in military cemeteries, a much lower percentage than of voters for other parties in the coalition—for example, 64% of Likud voters say that ministers should attend such ceremonies. In this sense, National Unity voters are much more similar to voters for opposition parties (Yesh Atid, 28%; Yisrael Beytenu, 36%).
Should government ministers attend or not attend memorial ceremonies in military cemeteries? (%)
In conclusion, we asked: “How should local authorities celebrate this year’s 76th Israel Independence Day?” Only a small minority of respondents (10%) think that celebrations should be held as usual, almost a third say that local authorities should refrain from holding celebrations this year, and just over one-half think that there should be celebrations, but held in a more restrained and less prominent way. Among Jewish respondents, we found an almost identical majority (around 60%) in each political camp who are in favor of holding more restrained celebrations this year, while around one-half of Arab respondents (51%) support refraining from celebrations altogether this year.
How should local authorities celebrate this year’s 76th Israel Independence Day? (%)
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The April 2024 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between May 1–6, 2024, with 600 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.58% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.