Most Israelis Support Deal to Release All Hostages and End the War in Gaza; Israelis Divided on How to Handle the Northern Front
Israeli Voice Index June 2024
Across the total sample, 56% of Israelis support a deal to release all the hostages and end the war in Gaza; 29.5% support a deal to release some hostages in exchange for a temporary ceasefire; 14.5% don't know.
"Mothers never give up." Photo by: Yonatan Sindel/Flash90
The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute between June 30 and July 2, 2024. It was based on a representative sample of the population in Israel aged 18 and above, comprising 600 Jewish interviewees and 150 Arab interviewees.
Topics covered in this report:
- The national mood
- The northern front
- Israeli society’s ability to endure continued fighting
- A deal for the release of the hostages
- The impact of the security situation on Israelis’ mood
- Getting back to normal, and growing closer to or further from religion
- What might bring about the fall of the government?
- The Conscription Law
This month’s findings regarding the level of optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of national security are similar to those of last month, and are also among the lowest we have ever recorded. An almost identical share of respondents, less than a third, say they are optimistic about both issues. Arabs are less optimistic than Jews, both about the future of democracy and about the future of national security (future of democratic rule: Jews, 34%; Arabs, 17%; future of national security: Jews, 32%; Arabs, 14%).
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security (total sample; %)
Analysis of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that in none of the three camps is there a majority of optimists, regarding either issue. However, the lowest level of optimism is found on the Left, and the highest, on the Right. The Center is in between, albeit closer to the Left.
Share of optimists by political orientation (Jews; %)
Against the backdrop of the complicated military situation in the north, we asked: “What do you think Israel should do now on the northern front?” We found that overall, the Israeli public is divided between those who think that Israel should pursue a diplomatic agreement with Hezbollah, despite the chances of an additional conflict in the future (42%), and those who think it should pursue a military victory against Hezbollah, even at the cost of significant damage to civilian areas (38%). Around a tenth of Israelis think that the fighting should be continued at the current intensity, and around the same proportion don’t know what should be done. We found very sizable differences between the Arab sample, in which the large majority of respondents (75%) support seeking a diplomatic agreement, and the Jewish sample, in which those who support seeking a military victory against Hezbollah (43.5%) slightly outweigh those in favor of pursuing a diplomatic agreement (35.5%).
The responses to this question can be compared with responses to a similar question we asked in October, November, and December 2023: “What should Israel do in response to the attacks by Hezbollah?” In December 2023, 34% of the total sample thought that Israel should avoid opening up another front in the north, while 51% were in favor of dealing Hezbollah a heavy military blow. Despite the differences in wording between the two questions, we can say that there is less support from the Israeli public now for striking militarily against Hezbollah than there was in the past, and that there has been a rise in support for a diplomatic (non-military) solution.
We found considerable differences in the Jewish sample between political camps: On the Right, the majority think that Israel should pursue a military victory (59%), while half of those in the Center are in favor of pursuing a diplomatic agreement (50%), a position also taken by the majority of those on the Left (70.5%).
Jewish men support the military option more strongly than do Jewish women (57% compared with 31%, respectively). In the Arab sample, we did not find significant differences between men and women, with only a minority of both sexes in favor of seeking a military victory against Hezbollah.
What do you think Israel should do now on the northern front? (%)
Against the backdrop of the continuing war, we once again asked: “In your estimation, for how much longer will Israeli society be able to bear the burden of continued fighting in Gaza and the confrontation in the north?” Among Jewish respondents, we found an increase in the share of those who estimate Israeli society’s endurance at just a few months, from 20% in March to 29% in June. The share of those who think that Israeli society can continue for six months to a year has remained unchanged, but there has been a significant decline in the share of those who think that Israel can remain at war for as long as it takes (March, 39.5%; June, 34%).
Among Arabs, there has also been an increase in the share of those who rate Israel’s ability to continue bearing the burden of war at just a few months (March, 37%; June, 47%), but the share of those who estimate it to be six months to a year has fallen considerably (March, 32%; June, 13%). There has been an increase in the proportion of Arab respondents who think that Israeli society can endure being at war for as long as it takes, from 7% in March to 12% in June, and the share of those who selected the “don’t know” response also rose markedly, from 12% to 21%.
In your estimation, for how much longer will Israeli society be able to bear the burden of continued fighting in Gaza and the confrontation in the north? (Jews and Arabs; %)
Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals considerable differences. All three camps showed a significant rise in the share of those who think that Israeli society can only bear the burden of fighting for a few more months, and a decline in the share of those who think that it is possible to go on for as long as it takes.
In your estimation, for how much longer will Israeli society be able to bear the burden of continued fighting in Gaza and the confrontation in the north? (Jews, by political orientation; %)
What should Israel do now regarding a deal for the release of the hostages? We asked: “What do you think Israel should do now regarding a deal for the release of the hostages?” A majority of all respondents, albeit not a large majority (56%), would prefer a deal for the release of all the hostages in return for an end to the war and a full withdrawal from Gaza. The proportion of respondents who support this answer is almost double than that who support a deal for the release of some of the hostages, in return for a temporary ceasefire in Gaza (29.5%). Around half of the Jewish respondents support a deal for the release of all the hostages, while around a third support a deal for the release of some of the hostages. In the Arab sample, an overwhelming majority support a deal for the release of all the hostages.
What do you think Israel should do now regarding a deal for the release of the hostages? (%)
Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that the Haredim express the highest level of support (53%) for a deal for the release of some of the hostages in return for a temporary ceasefire in Gaza, while secular respondents demonstrate the highest level of support (67%) for the release of all the hostages in return for an end to the war and a full withdrawal from Gaza.
A large majority on the Left and in the Center support a deal for the release of all the hostages in return for an end to the war and a full withdrawal from Gaza (86% and 63%, respectively), while the largest share of those on the Right (though not a majority) support a deal for the release of some of the hostages in return for a temporary ceasefire in Gaza (45%). A noteworthy finding is the large share of “don’t know” responses on the Right and among the more religious groups, a pattern that may indicate uncertainty about the preferred option, but also opposition to the possibility of any kind of deal for the release of the hostages that would restrict the continuation of the fighting.
What do you think Israel should do now regarding a deal for the release of the hostages? (Jews; %)
We found sizable differences between men and women in the Jewish sample, with men divided on this issue (43% favoring a deal for the release of all hostages, and 40% supporting a deal for the release of some of the hostages), and women strongly in favor of a deal for the release of all hostages (56%, compared with just 28% who support a deal for the release of some of the hostages).
We also found considerable differences in the Jewish sample between the various age groups. In the 18–34 age group, 49.5% support a deal for the release of some of the hostages, while 31% support a deal for the release of all the hostages. In the older groups, the picture is reversed: Among those aged 35–54, 49.5% support a deal for the release of all the hostages, while 31% support a deal for the release of some of the hostages; and among those aged 55 and over, the share who support a deal for the release of all the hostages stands at 69%, compared with just 21% who support a deal for the release of some of the hostages.
The demand for the return of all hostages, whether alive or dead: We wanted to assess the extent of public agreement with the statement issued by the Hostages and Missing Families Forum that any deal must include the return of all the hostages, both alive and dead. We found a broad consensus on this issue: 72% of Jews and 88% of Arabs support the notion that any deal should include the return of all the hostages, whether alive or dead. This consensus cuts across all political camps and religious groups.
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement from the Hostages and Missing Families Forum that any deal must include the return of all the hostages, both alive and dead? (Jews; %)
Breaking down responses to this question in the total sample by responses to the question about a deal for the release of the hostages and a ceasefire, we found that a majority of respondents support the call for any deal to include the return of all hostages, both alive and dead. Among those who support a deal for the release of all the hostages in return for ending the war and withdrawing from Gaza, a large majority agree with the statement from the Hostages and Missing Families Forum. More surprising was the finding that among those who support a more limited deal for the release of some of the hostages, 56% still agree with the call for any deal to include all the hostages, whether alive or dead. Even among the “don’t know” respondents, some of whom may be in opposition to any deal, a majority of 61% agree with the Families Forum statement. These findings would seem to indicate a high degree of sensitivity in Israeli society to the issue of the hostages in general, and to the state’s responsibility for both the living and dead hostages.
Agree or disagree with the statement from the Hostages and Missing Families Forum that any deal must include the return of all the hostages, both alive and dead, by view on what Israel should do now regarding a deal for the release of the hostages (total sample; %)
We asked: “To what extent is the current security situation negatively affecting your mood?” We found that a large majority of respondents report that their mood has been negatively affected by the security situation to a very large or fairly large extent. A considerably larger share of Arab than of Jewish respondents say that their mood has been negatively affected by the security situation (81.5% and 66%, respectively).
To what extent is the current security situation negatively affecting your mood? (total sample; %)
A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation also found a majority in all three camps who say their mood has been negatively affected, but this majority is larger on the Left and in the Center (both 73%) than on the Right (60%). A breakdown by religiosity reveals that less than half of Haredi and national religious respondents say that the security situation is negatively affecting their mood, compared with a majority of both traditional groups and of the secular group.
Report that the current security situation is negatively affecting their mood to a very large or fairly large extent (Jews, by religiosity; %)
The proportion of Jewish men who report a negative impact on their mood is lower than the equivalent share of Jewish women (58% and 73%, respectively). A similar pattern was observed in the Arab sample, though with a smaller difference between the sexes (Arab men, 78%; Arab women, 85%).
In the total sample, we looked at whether there is an association between the level of optimism about the security situation in Israel in the foreseeable future and the impact of the security situation on mood. While less than a half (46.5%) of those who say they are optimistic feel that the security situation is negatively affecting their mood to a fairly large or very large extent, this feeling is shared by fully 78% of those who define themselves as pessimistic.
Getting back to normal: We repeated a question that we asked in December 2023, and in January and February/March 2024, about returning to normal. Among Jews, a similar majority of respondents now and at the beginning of 2024 (around 70%) reported normalization in their lives. By contrast, among Arabs, a majority said at the beginning of the year that their lives have returned to normal, while now a majority report that their lives have not returned to normal.
To what extent has your personal life (such as work, media consumption, get-togethers with family and friends, etc.) returned to normal, or close to normal, recently? (Jews and Arabs; %)
A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals a majority in all groups who report having returned to normal, but this majority is particularly large among the national religious (82%), compared with between 67% and 70% in the other groups. In terms of political orientation, around two-thirds of those on the Left and in the Center say their lives have gone back to normal, compared with around three-quarters of those on the Right (65%, 64%, and 74%, respectively).
In both the Jewish and the Arab samples, a larger proportion of women than of men report having returned to normality (Jews: women, 73%; men, 67%; Arabs: women, 39%; men, 33%). Among Jews, this difference may stem from the fact that men, more than women, have served extended periods of reserve duty.
Closer to religion? We once again asked our Jewish respondents: “Compared to the period before the outbreak of the war, do you now feel closer to or further from religion?” In December 2023, just over half of our respondents reported that their relation to religion had not changed, while in the current survey, this share has fallen to 45%. A similar share of around a third of the respondents in both surveys said that they now feel closer to religion, while the share of those who feel further from religion has risen from 10% in December to 22% in June.
Compared to the period before the outbreak of the war, do you now feel closer to or further from religion? (Jews; %)
Breaking down responses by religiosity, we found that the majority of secular respondents have not changed their relation to religion, while a third feel further away from religion relative to the period before the outbreak of the war, and around 10% now feel closer. In the other groups, only a minority reported no change with regard to religion. Around a fifth of traditional non-religious respondents said they are now further away from religion, but more than a third have grown closer to it. In the other groups, the share of those who have become closer to religion is much larger than the share who have become more distant.
Compared to the period before the outbreak of the war, do you now feel closer to or further from religion? (Jews, by religiosity; %)
We asked: “What is the main issue that could bring about the fall of the government?” The most interesting finding was that in all groups, the continuation of the war in Gaza, the continuation of the fighting in the north, and failing to reach a deal for the release of the hostages are not seen as factors that could lead to the fall of the government. The issue most commonly viewed by respondents (44.5%) as having the potential to bring down the government is that of tensions between the Haredi parties and the other parties in the coalition, against the backdrop of the conscription of Haredim and the “Rabbis Law” (Jews, 47%, Arabs, 32%).
There are sizable differences between the various religious groups in the Jewish sample: The majority of secular respondents think that this latter factor could lead to the fall of the government, a view shared by around 40% of both traditional religious and traditional non-religious and Haredi respondents, and by only around one-third of the national religious. A breakdown of the secular group by political orientation finds that around two-thirds of secular respondents on the Left (65%) consider this issue to have the potential to bring down the government, as do a slightly smaller majority of secular respondents in the Center (60.5%). Among secular respondents on the Right, however, less than half think that this factor could result in the government breaking up (45%).
What is the main issue that could bring about the fall of the government? (Jews, by religiosity; %)
This month, we asked several questions related to the conscription of young Haredim and the Conscription Law, topics that have been dominating public discourse in recent weeks. The first question was as follows: “A number of Knesset members in the coalition have declared that they will vote in favor of a new Conscription Law only if it provides a response to the IDF’s current needs. Do you support this position, even at the cost of the breakup of the coalition and new elections?”
For the next four questions, the proportion of Arab respondents who selected the “don’t know” option was very large (between a quarter and a third), and thus we have opted to present the data for these questions only with regard to the Jewish sample.
Do you support passing a new Conscription Law only if it provides a response to the IDF’s current needs, even if this results in the breakup of the coalition and new elections? (Jews; %)
Breaking down responses by political orientation revealed an almost identical majority on the Left and in the Center who would support a Conscription Law tailored to the IDF’s needs, even if this results in the breakup of the coalition (81% and 80%, respectively), compared to around half of those who define themselves as on the Right (52%).
A breakdown by religiosity found that a minority of Haredi and national religious respondents think or are certain that they would support such legislation, compared to a majority of those in the two traditional groups, and a huge majority of secular respondents. Support for passing a Conscription Law is common to secular respondents in all three political camps: 87% on the Left, 85% in the Center, and 72% on the Right.
Certain or think that they would support a Conscription Law tailored to the IDF’s needs, even if this results in the breakup of the coalition and new elections (Jews, by religiosity; %)
The second question we asked in this context was as follows: “In the wake of last week’s ruling by the Hight Court of Justice, the Knesset has three options. Which one do you support? (1) Not passing a new Conscription Law, in which case the current Military Service Law will apply to young Haredim just as it applies to all young Jews in Israel; (2) Passing a new Conscription Law that will exempt many young Haredim from conscription in the short term, but will include the gradual conscription of Haredim in increasing numbers; (3) Passing a new Conscription Law that will exempt the vast majority of young Haredim from conscription on a permanent basis, but will allow them to enter the labor market.”
The first option was chosen by the largest share of respondents (though these did not constitute a majority), followed in popularity by the second option, and then the third. In other words, close to 80% of the Jewish sample support general or gradual conscription of the majority of young Haredim.
Support for each of the three options available to the Knesset regarding the Conscription Law (Jews; %)
A breakdown of responses by religiosity revealed major differences, as expected. A clear majority of Haredim are in favor of the third option, of exempting the vast majority of young Haredim from military service and allowing them to enter the labor market, while the majority of secular respondents support the first option, of not passing a new Conscription Law and applying the current Military Service Law to young Haredim. In all groups apart from the Haredim, a majority of two-thirds (national religious) or more support general or gradual conscription of the majority of young Haredim.
Support for each of the three options available to the Knesset regarding the Conscription Law (Jews, by religiosity; %)
Breaking down responses by vote in the 2022 elections revealed that the largest share of Likud voters, though not a majority (41%), support a short-term exemption and phased conscription, with the next most popular option being that of not passing a new Conscription Law and sending draft notices to young Haredim on the basis of the existing law (36%). Among voters for Religious Zionism, a small majority (53%) support a short-term exemption and phased conscription, while a majority of voters for Yesh Atid (69%), National Unity (65%), and Yisrael Beytenu (61%) are in favor of leaving the Military Service Law as it is. On the other side of the scale, the majority of Shas voters (73%) and United Torah Judaism voters (70.5%) support permanent exemption from service with the possibility of entering the labor market.
The third question we asked in this context was: “The chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Yuli Edelstein, announced that he will only introduce a new Conscription Law if there is broad agreement in favor of it. How do you think the opposition should respond? (1) Strongly consider supporting the law; (2) Act to bring forward the elections and wait for a new Conscription Law to be passed in the next Knesset assembly.” The largest share of Jewish respondents, though not a majority (43%), think that the opposition should support such a law, while 38% would prefer it to wait and in the meantime to work to bring forward the elections. A breakdown of responses by political orientation reveals that a large majority on the Left, and slightly over half of those in the Center, are in favor of waiting and acting to bring forward the elections, while a small majority on the Right are in favor of supporting the law.
The fourth question in this context was as follows: “In light of the Supreme Court ruling and the declarations by Haredim that they will not agree to be drafted even at the cost of severe sanctions, what do you think the IDF should do? (1) Send out draft notices to all young Haredim, and in practice draft those that the IDF is able to absorb; (2) Wait until the Knesset decides what law to pass; (3) Announce that it is prepared for the conscription of Haredim and hope that they present themselves for military service willingly.” In the Jewish sample, around half the respondents (51%) support the first option, of issuing draft notices to all relevant Haredim, while the remainder are divided almost evenly between those who support waiting for the Knesset to decide and those who think that the IDF should wait for the Haredim to present themselves willingly for conscription (23% and 20%, respectively).
A breakdown of responses by religiosity finds that a majority of Haredim (59%) think that the IDF should wait for the Knesset to make a decision. Among national religious respondents, there is no majority for any of these options, and almost identical shares support waiting for the Knesset to decide and issuing draft notices in the hope that the Haredim will present themselves willingly for conscription (37% and 38%, respectively). In the traditional religious group, the largest share (37%) support issuing draft notices and drafting in practice those that the IDF can take in, while the remainder are divided almost evenly between the two other options. In the traditional non-religious group, 53% support the option of issuing draft notices immediately and drafting as many Haredim as the IDF can manage, a position also taken by 75% of secular respondents.
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The June 2024 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between June 30 and July 2, 2024, with 600 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.58% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.