Israelis Split on Motivations for Holding the Philadelphi Corridor
Israelis are divided on the question of the main reasons for Netanyahu's demand that Israel continues to control the Philadelphi Corridor. While over half of the Jewish respondents (58.5%) think this decision is based on military and strategic considerations, 66.5% of Arab-Israeli respondents thing it is due to political reasons.
The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute between August 26–28, 2024. It was based on a representative sample of the population in Israel aged 18 and above, comprising 600 Jewish interviewees and 150 Arab interviewees.
Topics covered in this report:
- The national mood
- Optimism about the future of democratic rule and national security in Israel
- The impact of the ongoing anticipation of an attack by Iran and Hezbollah
- Leisure activities during the summer against the backdrop of the current situation
- The northern front
- A deal for the release of the hostages
- Optimism/pessimism that a deal will be reached
- Is this really “the last opportunity” for a deal?
- The Philadelphi Corridor: What is Netanyahu’s primary consideration?
- Has Israel “achieved all that it can militarily in the Gaza Strip”?
- The impact of the tension between Netanyahu and Gallant on the management of the war
Levels of optimism: Possibly due to Israel’s preemptive strike on Lebanon, or for some other reason, this month saw a certain improvement in the national mood. The share of those optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel rose by 6 percentage points (from 30% in July to 36% in August), while the share of optimists regarding the future of national security jumped by 13 percentage points (from 26% in July to 39% in August). Moreover, while the share of optimists about national security has been slightly lower than the share of optimists about the future of democratic rule since December 2023, this relationship was reversed this month, with the former now higher than the latter. Further measurements will be required to establish whether this is a one-time finding or the beginning of a new trend.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security (total sample; %)
As in the past, the share of optimists in the Jewish sample is higher than that in the Arab sample, though there has been an increase in optimism among both publics. In fact, the increase in the level of optimism regarding the future of democratic rule recorded this month was greater among Arabs than among Jews.
Share of optimists by nationality (%)
Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that, once again, the lowest share of optimists regarding both issues is found on the Left, with the highest share on the Right, and the Center somewhere in between. Indeed, around half of those who define themselves as on the Right reported being optimistic, outnumbering the pessimists on both issues (on the Right, 45% of respondents are pessimistic, regarding both the future of democratic rule and the future of national security).
Share of optimists by political orientation (Jews; %)
Impact of the ongoing anticipation of an attack by Iran and Hezbollah: We asked: “To what extent is the ongoing anticipation of an attack by Iran and Hezbollah affecting or not affecting the following: your daily behavior; your mood.” Somewhat surprisingly, the majority of the total sample (67%) responded that this state of anticipation is affecting their daily behavior only a little or not at all. Regarding their mood, 55% of respondents said the same. However, there are very large differences between Jews and Arabs on this issue: A large majority of Jews stated that the anticipation of an attack by Iran or Hezbollah is affecting them to a fairly small extent or not at all (more so regarding their daily behavior than their mood—73% and 60%, respectively), while only a minority of Arabs reported the same (daily behavior, 36%; mood, 32%). That is, the state of constant anticipation has had a greater impact on the Arab public than the Jewish public, and in both groups, has affected mood more than daily behavior.
To what extent is the ongoing anticipation of an attack by Iran and Hezbollah affecting or not affecting the following: your daily behavior; your mood? (%)
Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals an interesting finding: In all three camps, a majority of respondents say that the constant anticipation of an attack is having little or no impact on their daily lives (Left, 64%; Center, 76%; Right, 73%). However, when it comes to their mood, only a minority on the Left say that there has been little or no impact (37%), while a majority report a fairly large or very large effect. By contrast, a majority both in the Center and on the Right say there has been little or no impact (61.5% and 65, respectively). That is, the Left has been much more affected on an emotional level than have the Center and the Right.
Leisure activities during the summer against the backdrop of the current situation: We wanted to know whether the current situation has resulted in a change in the public’s leisure behavior (trips, hikes, leisure activities, and visits around the country) this summer compared with previous years. In the total sample, 72% of respondents said that they undertook these activities a little less or much less than in previous years. There was only a small difference here between Jews and Arabs (71% and 76%, respectively), and we did not find any substantive differences between political camps in the Jewish sample.
We asked those respondents who said that they had engaged in these activities less this summer than in previous years about the reason for this change in behavior. The majority cited the security situation, while only a small minority blamed the economic situation, and around a third said that both these factors had contributed equally.
What is the main reason that you undertook fewer trips, hikes, leisure activities, and visits around the country? (respondents who reported that they undertook leisure activities to a lesser extent this summer than in previous years, total sample ; %)
In light of the escalation of the conflict on Israel’s northern border, we asked: “What do you think Israel should do now on the northern front?” The majority of Jewish respondents (67%) think that Israel should intensify its response to Hezbollah, whether by launching a deep offensive, including targeting Lebanese infrastructure (46%) or by responding more aggressively against Hezbollah while refraining from striking at Lebanese infrastructure (21%). Only a minority think that Israel should pursue a diplomatic agreement with Hezbollah or continue the fighting in its current format. By contrast, in the Arab sample, more than three-quarters of respondents think that efforts should be made to reach a diplomatic agreement with Hezbollah, despite the chances of an additional conflict with Hezbollah in the future.
Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation revealed considerable differences. On the Left, almost half the respondents think that Israel should pursue a diplomatic agreement, while a quarter favor responding more aggressively to Hezbollah (but not striking at Lebanon’s infrastructure). By contrast, a large majority on the Right are in favor of launching a deep offensive, including targeting Lebanese infrastructure. Respondents from the Center are divided: around a third support an assault on Lebanon including striking at the country’s infrastructure, around a quarter support a more aggressive response but only against Hezbollah, and around a fifth are in favor of seeking a diplomatic agreement. Furthermore, around a tenth of those in the Center think that Israel should continue with the current format of fighting against Hezbollah forces, compared with even smaller shares of those on the Right (8%) and the Left (3%).
What do you think Israel should do now on the northern front? (%)
Optimism/pessimism: In light of the ongoing (and so far, fruitless) negotiations over the return of the hostages, we asked: “Are you optimistic or pessimistic that a deal for the return of the hostages will be reached soon?” The Arab sample is fairly evenly divided between optimists and pessimists. By contrast, a large majority of Jewish respondents are pessimistic about the likelihood of a deal being reached. In all the subgroups we examined in the Jewish sample, we found similarly high levels of pessimism. For example, in a breakdown by political orientation, we found that 85% of those on the Left are pessimistic, not dissimilar from the equivalent shares in the Center (80%) and on the Right (78%).
In previous surveys, we found much higher levels of support for reaching a deal for the release of the hostages, even at a high cost, among female Jewish respondents than among male Jewish respondents. In the current survey, a higher percentage of Jewish women are optimistic than of Jewish men, though in both cases the levels of optimism are very low (19.5% and 11.5%, respectively).
Are you optimistic or pessimistic that a deal for the return of the hostages will be reached soon? (%)
Is this really “the last opportunity” to bring the hostages home? We sought to assess the public’s opinion regarding the claim that has been made repeatedly, including by US Secretary of State Blinken, that this is now the last opportunity to secure the release of the hostages. We asked: “Do you think that this characterization of ‘last opportunity’ is correct or incorrect?” The Jewish respondents are divided on this issue, while in the Arab sample, the most popular response (though not a majority response) was that this is indeed the last opportunity.
Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that large shares of those on the Left and in the Center agree that this may indeed be the last opportunity to bring the hostages home. By contrast, the majority of those on the Right do not think that this is the case.
Similarly, we found that a small majority of Jewish women agree with the statement that this is possibly the last opportunity to bring the hostages home, while a similar proportion of Jewish men disagree.
US Secretary of State Blinken has said that “this is maybe the last opportunity to get the hostages home.” Do you think that this characterization of “last opportunity” is correct or incorrect? (%)
In the context of the negotiations over a deal that will include the return of the hostages, Prime Minister Netanyahu is demanding that Israel retains control the Philadelphi Corridor along the border between Gaza and Egypt. We asked our respondents whether they think that this demand is largely based on military and strategic considerations, or is largely intended to prevent a deal from being reached, for Netanyahu’s own political reasons.
In the Arab sample, around two-thirds of respondents think that Netanyahu’s demand is largely driven by political motivations. By contrast, a majority of Jews think that the demand to control the Corridor is largely based on valid military and strategic considerations.
Unsurprisingly, a breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals almost symmetrically opposing views on the Left and on the Right: Around three-quarters of respondents on the Left think that Netanyahu’s demand to retain control of the Philadelphi Corridor is largely political, while an almost identical share of respondents on the Right think that it is largely based on valid military and strategic considerations. In the Center, a small majority of respondents think that this demand is mainly based on political motivations.
The main reason for Prime Minister Netanyahu’s demand that Israel continues to control the Philadelphi Corridor along the border between Gaza and Egypt (%)
We cross-tabulated the responses from these last three questions and found that in the total sample there is a majority of pessimists that a deal will be reached for the return of the hostages soon, with no dependency on respondents’ views about whether this is the last opportunity for their release or whether Netanyahu’s position on the Philadelphi Corridor is based largely on military considerations or political interests.
Sources in the US administration reportedly told the New York Times that “Israel has achieved all that it can militarily in the Gaza Strip.” We asked our respondents whether they think this statement is correct or incorrect. The majority of respondents, in both the Jewish sample (66.5%) and the Arab sample (52%), think that this claim is not correct. However, in a breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found sizable differences: Almost two-thirds of those on the Left think that Israel has achieved all it can militarily in Gaza, compared with only a minority of those in the Center and on the Right.
Do you think that the statement by sources in the US administration, as reported by the New York Times, that “Israel has achieved all that it can militarily in the Gaza Strip” is correct or incorrect? (%)
We wanted to know whether Israelis who live closer to the Gaza Strip, and who are thus more affected by the military capabilities that Hamas retains, are more inclined to think that Israel can still achieve more militarily in Gaza than are those who live further away, and thus are less affected by Hamas’s military capabilities. We found support for this hypothesis among respondents on both the Left and the Right: In both camps, the further respondents live from Gaza, the higher the rates of agreement with the statement that “Israel has achieved all that it can militarily in the Gaza Strip.” On the Left, only 40.5% of respondents living in the south think that Israel has achieved all it can militarily, compared with more than 60% of those who live in the center of the country, and more than 70% of those living in the north. A similar pattern (though with much smaller percentages) was found among respondents on the Right: Just 3% of those living in the south, compared with 13% of those living in the center and 21% of those living in the north, think that Israel has achieved all that it can militarily in the Gaza Strip. Among respondents in the Center, we found only partial support for our hypothesis: The share of respondents who think that Israel has achieved all it can is actually highest among residents of central Israel, followed by those who live in the south, with the lowest proportion found among residents of the north.
Think that Israel has achieved all that it can militarily in the Gaza Strip (Jews, by political orientation and area of residence; %)
There have been repeated reports in the media recently of differences of opinion and tensions between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Gallant. We wondered whether the public think that these difficulties are having or not having a negative impact on the management of the war in Gaza and in the north. We found that in both the Arab and Jewish samples, a solid majority of respondents think that this tension is having a negative impact on the management of the war (Arabs, 73%; Jews, 64%).
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that a majority of respondents in all three camps think that this tension is having a negative effect on the management of the war, though the proportion of those holding this opinion is higher on the Left and in the Center than on the Right (Left, 81%; Center, 76%; Right, 55%).
To what extent is the tension between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Gallant having or not having a negative impact on the management of the war in Gaza and in the north? (%)
We looked at whether there is a link between respondents’ views on this question and their level of optimism about the future of national security. We found that in all three political camps (Jews), the share of pessimists regarding the future of national security is larger among those who think that the tension between Netanyahu and Gallant is having a negative impact than among those who think that it is not having a negative impact.
***
The August 2024 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between August 26–28, 2024, with 600 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.58% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.