'Northern Arrows' Special Survey: Overwhelming Support for Last Week's Lebanon Offensive; Jews and Arabs Split

Jewish Israelis are broadly united (90%) in their belief that launching an in-depth offensive against Hezbollah last week was the correct move, while the largest share of Arab Israelis (47%) think it was not. A large majority of Israelis, over 70%, think both the IDF and Israel's civilian population would be able to withstand an extended war on two or more fronts.

Southern Lebanon as seen from the Israeli side. Photo by David Cohen/Flash90

This survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. Data collection was carried out between September 26 and September 29, 2024, with a representative sample of 600 Jews and 150 Arabs.

Note: Some of the interviewees (N=609) were surveyed before the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah became known, while some (N=141) were surveyed afterward. We presented a comparison between the two groups only for questions where the difference was noteworthy.

In your opinion, was it correct or not correct for Israel to launch its in-depth offensive against Hezbollah last week while the war in Gaza has not yet finished and the hostage issue has not been solved?

Among Jewish respondents, there is a consensus (90%) that it was correct to launch the in-depth offensive against Hezbollah. By contrast, the largest share of Arab respondents—just under half (47%)—think that this course of action was not correct.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a majority in all three groups who think the offensive was correct, albeit of different sizes: Left, 67%; Center, 87%; Right, 95%.

A breakdown of the sample by date of completing the questionnaire finds only a slight increase (2 percentage points) in the share of Jewish respondents who think that this action was correct after the assassination of Nasrallah, and a slightly larger increase in the equivalent share of Arab respondents (5 percentage points), though as stated, both before and after the assassination this view was held by the majority of Jews and the minority of Arabs.

What do you think Israel should do now on the northern front?

Among Jews, the clear preference is for Israel to increase the intensity of its long-range aerial offensive (52%; before the assassination became known, 55%). A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation finds that the preference on the Left is for seeking a diplomatic agreement (49%), in the Center for continuing the long-range offensive in the same manner (35.5%) or for increasing their intensity (33%), and on the Right, for increasing the intensity of the attacks (65%).

Do you support or oppose a ground invasion by IDF forces into South Lebanon in the event that the long-range aerial offensive does not lead to Hezbollah ceasing its fire?

The largest share Jewish respondents support a ground invasion (support, 47%; oppose, 41%), while the majority of Arab respondents are opposed (59.5%).

Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that the clear preference on the Left and in the Center is not to undertake a ground invasion (65.5% and 58%, respectively), while those on the Right lean the other way, with a majority of 58% in favor of a ground invasion.

In your estimation, will dealing a heavy blow to Hezbollah force it to renege on its declaration that it will continue firing on Israel until the end of the war in Gaza?

A majority of the total sample think that dealing a heavy blow to Hezbollah will cause it to renege on its declaration. This share remained stable even after the assassination of Nasrallah (before, 52%; after, 53.5%).

The majority of Jewish respondents think that dealing a heavy blow will make Hezbollah retreat from its declared intention, while in the Arab sample, the largest share of respondents think that the organization will not recant.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals significant differences between the camps: The Right believes more strongly than the Left and the Center that Hezbollah can be forced to change its mind: Left: yes, 40%; no, 46.5%; Center: yes, 46%; no, 38%; Right: yes, 67%; no, 24.5%.

Would the IDF / Israel’s civilian population be able or not able to withstand an extended war on two or more fronts?

While the majority of Jewish respondents think that both the IDF and Israel’s civilian population (the IDF slightly more than the civilian population) would be able to withstand an extended war on two or more fronts (87% and 79%, respectively), only a minority of Arab respondents take the same view (27% in both cases).

Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a majority in all three camps who think that both the IDF and Israel’s civilian population can withstand an extended war on two or more fronts (IDF: Left, 77%; Center, 83%; Right, 90%; civilian population: Left, 64%; Center, 73%; Right, 85%).

In light of the escalation on the northern front, to what extent are you worried or not worried about the lives and health of you or your loved ones?

In the Jewish sample, the largest share of respondents say that they are somewhat worried about the lives and health of their loved ones, while among Arabs, the largest share say that they are very worried.

A breakdown of the sample by date of completing the questionnaire finds a sharp rise in the share of Jews who are worried following the assassination of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah, from 53% to 67%. There was no real change among Arabs, presumably because the share of those who are worried was already very large.

On this question, we found large differences between men and women: Less than half of Jewish men report being somewhat or very worried about the wellbeing of their loved ones and themselves in light of the escalation in the north (45%), compared with a majority of Jewish women (67%). Among Arabs, those who are worried form a majority of both men and women, though this majority is smaller among men (77%, compared with 88% of women).

To what extent would firing Minister of Defense Gallant harm or not harm Israel’s military capability to deal with the multiple security challenges facing it?

The majority of Jewish respondents (54%) think that firing Minister Gallant would harm Israel’s military capability. The share of “don’t know” responses to this question was considerably higher than usual (14%). Interestingly, the proportion of those who think that Israel’s military capability would be damaged by such a step rose considerably after the assassination of Nasrallah, from 53% to 59.5%.

Among Arab respondents, the share of “don’t know” responses was fully 40%, with the rest of the opinions divided, and thus we will not present the distribution of responses in this sample.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals clear differences: On the Left and in the Center, a majority think that firing Gallant would harm Israel’s military capability (81% and 80%, respectively), while on the Right, only a minority concur (39%) and the largest share (44%) think that it would do no such harm.

Which of the following two options will better ensure the security of the towns in the north of Israel and enable all of the evacuated residents to return to their homes: destroying Hezbollah’s military capabilities and pushing it north of the Litani River; or a diplomatic agreement secured with international mediation that will remove Hezbollah from the border with Israel?

The majority of Jewish respondents think that destroying Hezbollah’s military capabilities and pushing it north of the Litani River is the better option, while on the other hand, the majority of Arab respondents say that securing a diplomatic agreement will better ensure this outcome.

There are very large differences in the Jewish sample among the different political camps: On the Left, the majority of respondents think that a diplomatic agreement will be better for achieving the goal of returning residents to their homes in the north (50.5%, versus 34.5% who believe that destroying Hezbollah’s military capabilities is preferable in this regard). By contrast, the majority of those in this Center believe that destroying Hezbollah’s military capabilities would be more effective (53%, versus 35.5% who favor a diplomatic agreement); and on the Right, a huge majority (86%) think that destroying Hezbollah’s capabilities and pushing it northward will do more to enable the safe return of residents to Israel’s north.

We are approaching the first anniversary of the October 7 attack. Do you intend to mark this event personally, and if so, how? (Respondents may select more than one option, and thus the accumulated percentage is higher than 100%)

In the Jewish sample, 36% of respondents intend to participate in or watch one of the ceremonies organized by civilian groups and the hostage families, while just 21% intend to watch the televised government ceremony. A further 4% plan to travel to the Gaza border region, while 18% do not intend to mark this date personally.

In the Arab sample, 9% intend to watch the televised government ceremony, 3.5% to participate in or watch one of the civilian ceremonies, and 31% do not intend to mark the event personally. It should be noted that both in the Jewish sample and (particularly) in the Arab sample, very large proportions of respondents stated that they have not yet decided or don’t know whether or how they will mark this date (Jews, 29.5%; Arabs, 56%).

Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that large shares on the Left and in the Center are planning to participate in or watch a civilian ceremony, while only a very small minority intend to watch the televised government ceremony. On the Right, there is an even split between the two types of ceremony.

Is your mood ahead of Rosh Hashanah (the Jewish New Year): the same as in previous years; much better than in previous years; a little better than in previous years; a little worse than in previous years; much worse than in previous years?

Among Jewish respondents (Arab respondents were not asked this question), a large majority (70%) reported that their mood ahead of Rosh Hashanah is worse than in previous years. This picture holds true in all three political camps (Left, 82%; Center, 76%; Right, 64.5%).

In the coming year, do you think Israel’s situation will be: the same; much better; a little better; a little worse; or much worse than in previous years?

Among Jewish respondents, one-half think that the coming year will be better, and just over a quarter that it will be worse. By contrast, the majority of Arab respondents think that it will be worse, and only a minority that it will be better.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that only slightly over a quarter of those on the Left (27.5%) think that Israel’s situation will improve in the coming year, while 51% think that it will be worse than in previous years. In the Center, the picture is more balanced: better, 36%; worse, 39%. And on the Right, optimism is the clear winner: better, 60%; worse, 16%.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by date of completing the questionnaire indicates a significant rise in optimism about the coming year after the assassination of Nasrallah, with the share of those who believe the coming year will be better rising from 47% to 59%.

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This “Northern Arrows” flash survey was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet between September 26 and September 29, 2024, with 600 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.58% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by iPanel. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.