The Bismuth Outline for the Draft Exemption Law
Photos by FLASH90
The Bismuth Outline does not establish an equal obligation for conscription. It proposes only limited sanctions and sets low, weak enlistment targets that include legal loopholes, allowing any Haredi man who wishes to continue deferring his service until it becomes a permanent exemption at age 26. The proposal also restores a high exemption age and prohibits vocational training during yeshiva studies, thereby harming not only the people’s army, national security, and the principle of equality, but also Israel’s economy.
Under the current Defense Service Law all Israeli citizens are required to serve in the armed forces. In practice, however, men from the ultra‑Orthodox (Haredi) community serve at extremely low rates. Just about 1.7% of Haredi male high‑school graduates (who remain Haredi in adulthood) have served up to age 24, compared with roughly 88% of other Jewish men (up to age 21).
Since 1998 the Knesset has made repeated attempts to regulate enlistment and exemptions among the Haredi community but none of the laws succeeded in substantially increasing the rates of conscription, and were often struck down by the Supreme Court for violating the principle of equality.
The current legislative round began three years ago, then Defense Minister Benny Gantz, advanced a new bill for Haredi enlistment and exemptions.
The proposed amendment, titled Defense Service Law (Amendment No. 26), which concerns enlistment and exemption arrangements for the Haredi sector, has been under consideration by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee for several years.
It cleared its first reading in 2022 (under the Bennett-Lapid government), and in June 2024 the Knesset applied the “continuity rule,” allowing the bill to be amended and proceed to the second and third readings that are needed for it to pass into law without restarting the legislative process.
Most committee members recognized that the pre‑October 7 version of the bill (which prioritized workforce participation over military enlistment) was now outdated in light of the security crisis the extended mobilization of reserves, and the IDF's immediate need for additional soldiers.
Former Chair Yuli Edelstein held over forty sessions of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on this issue. In June 2025, immediately prior to the conflict with Iran, a new draft was published – reportedly in coordination with Haredi parties – though Edelstein later distanced himself from it, favoring another version supported by the Committee legal advisor Miri Frenkel‑Shor.
Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu then decided to oust Edelstein and replace him with MK Boaz Bismuth as the Committee chair. Bismuth is viewed as more reliable partner with the Haredi parties from the coalition’s perspective. Under Bismuth’s leadership the Committee held consultations and on October 28, 2025, published the so‑called “Bismuth Outline.”
The bill must clear several major hurdles for it to become law:
- Legal approval: The Committee legal advisor, Frenkel‑Shor, and the Knesset’s legal advisor Attorney Sagit Afik, have not yet issued their professional opinions on the Bismuth Outline, but it reportedly lacks the approval of both.
- Committee approval: The coalition holds a 10-7 majority in the Committee, now that Yuli Edelstein who opposes the Bismuth draft, has been removed and replaced by his Likud party. The Haredi party members might also oppose the bill.
- Knesset plenary (second and third readings on the floor): The coalition consists of 68 votes out of the 120 in the parliament (including the Haredi parties that officially left the government over this issue). However, several Likud MKs and some Haredi MKs have stated their objection to supporting such a bill. Meanwhile opposition parties and civil society are expected to continue to reject any solution that does not meet the IDF's stated needs for additional soldiers and the standard of equality.
- Supreme Court petitions: Previous conscription‑exemption laws have been struck down — for example, the 2017 ruling cancelling the “Haredi exemption law.” A similar legal challenge is expected here, given the bill’s weak enforcement mechanisms and the ongoing security situation which is likely to include extending mandatory and reservists service that would further emphasize the principal of equality before the law.
The proposal, according to the official explanation of the bill, seeks to pursue two apparently conflicting goals:
- On the one hand, it seeks to reduce inequality in military service by recruiting more Haredi men.
- On the other, it preserves exemptions for most yeshiva students (under the Torato Umanuto ("Torah is his Vocation") arrangement.
These two aims cannot both be fully realized under the current framework, suggesting that the real purpose may be to recruit only those Haredim who are not registered as full‑time yeshiva students. A further indication of this goal is that unlike in Edelstein’s version, the Bismuth Outline omits biometric supervision tools which would have allowed the differentiation of genuine full‑time learners from those who are registered in yeshivas but do not actually learn there on a full-time basis.
Two major concerns relating to the principal of equality arise from the stated explanation of the bill provided by its authors:
- Given that the exemption clause already expired in June 2023, the bill's re‑introduction of such exemptions reduces equality rather than increasing it.
- Including civil‑security service toward IDF recruitment targets for Haredim creates a uniquely special arrangement for the Haredi sector, undermining the principle of equal burden.
Meanwhile, as noted above, the IDF is preparing to ask the Defense Ministry to advance a law that would extend mandatory service for all other recruits, further exacerbating the inequality.
The proposed law does not establish a general and equal enlistment duty for Haredim comparable to that applied to other sectors. Haredi women (as with national-religious women) would be entitled to request a full exemption from military service. For men, the proposal specifies only minimal and gradually increasing annual enlistment targets, starting at 4,800 recruits and rising each year.
Although this represents an increase over current enlistment numbers — approximately 1,200 Haredi recruits per year throughout most of the decade preceding the war, 1,700 in the 2023 draft year (July 2023–June 2024), and 2,940 in the 2024 draft year (July 2024–June 2025) — the figures remain minuscule relative to the potential.
The pool of draft-eligible Haredi men currently numbers about 100,000, all of whom were under age 26 (the previous exemption age) in June 2023, when the legal validity of the Torato Omanuto (“Torah as vocation”) arrangement expired. The first-year target of 4,800 therefore represents only 5 percent of the eligible population (or roughly 12 percent after deducting the three age cohorts who have already passed age 26). By comparison, the enlistment rate among other Jewish men in Israel stands at around 88 percent.
It should be noted that the figure of 4,800 was set based on the IDF’s declared absorption capacity for 2024. Since then, circumstances have changed: according to IDF statements submitted to the Supreme Court, as of mid-2026 the army will face no absorption limitation, meaning there is no justification for maintaining such a low first-year threshold based on outdated conditions.
Not exactly.
Another clause in the bill establishes a “safety net” under which sanctions — such as the withdrawal of budgetary support — will apply only if enlistment targets are missed by more than 25 percent in the first year, with the permitted deviation decreasing thereafter. This effectively lowers the real targets below even the minimal levels stated. Moreover, as discussed later, the bill empowers an advisory committee to further reduce the required targets.
| Year | Official Enlistment Target | Safety-Net Margin | Adjusted Target (threshold for sanctions) | Adjusted Target excluding civil-security service (Haredim + former Haredim) | Share of the draft-eligible pool (excluding men over age 26 who will receive an exemption) |
| Year 1 - 2026 | 4,800 | 25% | 3,600 | 3,240 | 4% |
| Year 2 - 2027 | 5,760 | 20% | 4,608 | 4,147 | 5% |
| Year 3 - 2028 | 6,480 | 20% | 5,184 | 4,666 | 6% |
| Year 4 - 2029 | 7,920 | 10% | 7,128 | 6,415 | 8% |
| Year 5 - 2030 | 8,500 | 10% | 7,650 | 6,885 | 9% |
The bill also mentions a short six-month period during which the full target must be met, but it does not specify how many recruits this entails. In light of the other figures presented, it is doubtful that this number would be significant.
The definition of those counted toward the enlistment targets is very broad and does not correspond to the actual needs of the (IDF):
- Not necessarily combat soldiers:
The enlistment targets do not specify age, and unlike the Edelstein Outline, they do not limit recruits to combat or front-line support roles. In practice, all recruits could be relatively older—ages 24–26—often already married with children (the average age of marriage among Haredi men is 23, and of their first child, 24.5). They are promised postings close to home and will not replace regular combat soldiers whose service has been extended, nor reserve soldiers called up for combat duty.
It is important to note that the outline stipulates that in the fifth year, the number of recruits will equal half the number of 18-year-old men in the Haredi age cohort. However, these are not the actual 18-, 19-, or 20-year-olds (almost none of whom will enlist); rather, this figure serves only as a numerical reference, filled by older age groups. Those 50 percent of the 18-year-old cohort will in reality represent only about 12 percent of the total draft-eligible pool (after deducting those over 26 and existing recruits). - Not necessarily soldiers:
Instead of adding the civil–security service participants in addition to military recruits, the targets include them—capped at 10 percent. This means that about 500 of those counted as “recruited” for the targets will in fact serve in organizations such as Magen David Adom, ZAKA, or similar civilian frameworks. Consequently, the actual number of soldiers joining the standing army will be smaller still. Moreover, these positions will not replace any regular combat soldiers whose terms have been extended or reservists currently serving. - Not necessarily Haredim:
The definition of “Haredi” remains overly inclusive. Anyone who attended a Haredi high school for just two years (for example, up to the start of 10th grade) is counted as Haredi, even if by the time of enlistment he no longer identifies as such. Between 2018 and 2022, about 70 percent of those classified as Haredim under this criterion were no longer part of the Haredi community in practice.
The result is that even if the Haredi sector meets its (already reduced) enlistment targets, the actual number of men who are still Haredi at the time of their enlistment and who will serve in the army is expected to reach only about 1,000–1,500 in the first year (or less). These recruits will not necessarily serve in combat units and thus will provide little real relief for regular and reserve soldiers whose service continues to be extended. When the “safety net” mechanism allowing further downward adjustments is applied, the actual figures are likely to drop even more.
Yes – and more.
IDF officers provided testimony to the Committee stating that between 10,000 and 20,000 new combat soldiers are needed immediately to fill losses and relieve reserves. 921 soldiers have tragically been killed in battle, over 6,000 injured, and many thousands more suffer psychological trauma. Meanwhile, the IDF's operational needs are still high, despite the ceasefire in Gaza, and the military is expected to continue to rely heavily on reservists while extending initial mandatory service from 32 to 36 months.
Increasing recruitment of Haredi men would significantly decrease the burden on reservists, their families, and the economy. Research by the IDI shows that integrating Haredim into the IDF at similar levels comparable to other Jewish Israel could completely eliminate the need for operational reserve duty (besides regular training for operational readiness) by the year 2045 and save the economy 8‑10 billion NIS annually by 2050. An increase in manpower for the standing army (those in their mandatory service) would also eventually lead to a reduction in the number of months all soldiers need to serve.
The bill sets the exemption age at 26, identical to the legal situation before the previous exemption clause expired, and contrary to the 2022 proposal, which sought to lower it to a younger age. Such a high exemption age imposes serious harm on Israel’s economy.
It effectively “imprisons” yeshiva students for many years. When they eventually leave yeshiva – after age 26 – many are already married with children and in immediate need of income. They then struggle to integrate into quality employment or long-term vocational training, condemning them to low-paying jobs.
The bill also prohibits vocational training during the deferment period.
While some argue that lowering the exemption age could drive young men out of yeshiva and reduce the pool of potential Haredi recruits, the data show otherwise. The majority of Haredi men who do enlist do so at a young age, before 21–22, or later under post-exemption frameworks. According to an IDI survey, 70 percent said their decision to serve would not have changed even if the exemption age were lower.
Lowering the exemption age does challenge the sense of fairness, as it allows young Haredi men who do not enlist to enter the workforce earlier. However, this issue should be addressed through meaningful sanctions, not by blocking their integration into the labor market, which would only harm future growth and the economy at large.
The sanctions that would in fact apply under the proposed law to yeshiva students who did not enlist would take effect only if two cumulative conditions are met:
- The yeshiva student received a draft notice but did not enlist and does not hold an exemption.
- The collective enlistment targets for that period were not met.
The proposed law does not address how the Minister of Defense (or the IDF) will decide who receives draft notices, what criteria will be used for such decisions, and how it will be ensured that certain Haredi youths are not discriminated against compared with others.
In effect, this creates a loophole from the personal sanctions: if the Minister of Defense simply chooses not to issue any draft notices, the personal sanctions will vanish altogether. With a single decision by a political leader, all individual penalties could effectively cease to exist, leaving only the institutional sanction—reductions to yeshiva budgets—for failure to meet enlistment targets.
This raises the question of whether there will be any individuals actually subject to sanctions or whether this will remain an undefined category, with draft notices sent only to those already expected to enlist, and only temporarily, as long as the collectively engineered targets are not met.
Below are the sanctions that would apply if, in practice, there were a group of yeshiva students who did receive draft notices but failed to enlist:
- Immediate sanctions:
- Travel bans
- Driver’s license restrictions until age 23
- Loss of preference for civil‑service jobs
- Revocation of eligibility for income tax credit points (although this measure is largely irrelevant, since the average yeshiva student does not reach the taxable income threshold in any case).
These penalties mostly fall into the hands of the yeshiva heads, reinforcing their ability to control the students and keep them in the yeshivot. Even today, regardless of the draft issue, yeshiva heads forbid young, unmarried students from obtaining a driver’s license, and the Torato Omanuto arrangement—if reinstated—would likewise prevent them from leaving the yeshiva for studies or employment at a young age. These sanctions are therefore unlikely to generate any real motivation for enlistment. Setting the sanction age threshold at only 23 is also problematic; behavioral change requires time. The commander of the IDF Manpower Directorate emphasized the need for sanctions that directly affect the individual so as to incentivize them to enlist.
- Sanctions after one year:
After one year of failing to meet the reduced enlistment targets, more sanctions are introduced. These include institutional sanctions — reductions in yeshiva budgets for students who are legally obligated to enlist but have not done so — as well as personal sanctions such as- The denial of participation in subsidized housing programs
- The revocation of discounts for daycare, National Insurance, and public transportation (cancelling the special “youth discount” granted to Haredi men aged 18–26).
- Sanctions after two consecutive years:
After two consecutive years of failing to meet the reduced targets, an additional sanction is imposed- The denial of financial assistance for purchasing public housing.
- Sanctions after three consecutive years:
After three consecutive years of non-compliance, the entire framework is also subject to review to assess its effectiveness in achieving enlistment targets.- The exemption from property purchase tax on housing is revoked.
- After four consecutive years:
No new sanctions are imposed. Instead, the law provides only for a general review and authorizes the Minister of Defense to establish further rules or incentives at his discretion.
Crucially, all existing sanctions (including enforcement orders, fines, and amnesty for draft‑evaders) would be lifted upon enactment of the law so the “clean‑slate” effect risks undermining accountability.
It should be noted that the overall structure of the law – which imposes personal, in addition to institutional, sanctions without establishing an individual duty to enlist – raises legal difficulties and contradicts the principles of proper administrative conduct. Responsibility for meeting enlistment targets lies with the Minister of Defense, who grants deferments and exemptions, and these targets are defined in relation to the community as a whole rather than to individual citizens. The boundaries of this “community” are themselves unclear, yet individuals are the ones who bear the consequences. At the very least, the law should include explicit criteria by which the authorized Minister of Defense determines who is entitled to a deferment or exemption and who must enlist. Such broad discretionary power should not be vested in a single individual without clear, defined criteria.
A July 2025 IDI survey shows an exceptionally broad consensus on the fairness of imposing sanctions on draft-eligible Haredim who do not enlist. 85% of non-Haredi Jewish respondents (and 3.5% of Haredim) support the imposition of sanctions and the denial of benefits to Haredi men who avoid military service, including 73 percent of Likud voters and 77 percent of Religious Zionist Party voters.
One in seven non-Haredi Jews believes that all sanctions should take effect immediately and be lifted only once enlistment targets are met, while another 16% think they should be imposed after one year.
Support is strong for all types of sanctions on draft evaders. Between 83% and 86% support economic sanctions such as cancelling discounts on property tax, public transport, and housing, as well as cutting yeshiva budgets and denying scholarships or public-sector employment to those avoiding service. Between 71% and 75% support other financial measures such as heavy monetary fines, cancelling daycare subsidies, and the complete termination of yeshiva funding, as well as travel bans.
Even for harsher measures – such as revoking the right to vote in elections (a sanction opposed by IDI) – a majority of 62% support such a step (and 65% support revoking driver’s licenses).
Even among voters for Likud and Religious Zionist Party, there is majority support for every category of sanction, including revocation of voting rights (52% and 51% respectively). Support is especially strong for economic penalties such as eliminating discounts on property tax, transport, and housing, cutting yeshiva budgets, ending academic scholarships and vocational grants, and denying public-sector employment—ranging from 69% to 75% among Likud voters and 77% to 85% among Religious Zionism voters.
The proposed law guarantees the establishment of special recruitment tracks, screening and placement systems, and pre-military preparatory programs exclusively for Haredim. It also promises to preserve the Haredi way of life—a commitment not granted to any other group within the IDF.
Such a commitment is welcome, but it should have been formulated equally for all population groups and balanced against the fundamental values of statehood, liberty, equality, and the principle of a people’s army.
While the proposal includes a statement on the IDF’s obligation to integrate women, it omits the commitments included in the previous Edelstein Outline: not to reduce the number of military frameworks open to women, to promote women’s representation at all command levels, and to provide parliamentary oversight and reporting on these matters.
In addition, the law provides for the establishment of an 'advisory committee' to examine the IDF’s compliance with its obligations to develop tailored Haredi tracks and maintain the special service conditions of Haredi soldiers. This committee is composed predominantly of members with religious-Haredi orientation: a retired major general (appointed by the Chief of Staff) as chair, a retired lieutenant colonel who is a yeshiva graduate, a retired military rabbi, a retired rabbinical court judge, and a retired Colonel from the IDF’s Planning and Force-Building Directorate.
The committee’s powers include the authority – subject to approval by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee – to lower the minimum annual enlistment targets in any given year if it determines that the army has not fulfilled its commitments to the Haredi sector. No limit is set on the extent of this reduction, meaning that in practice the enlistment targets could be reduced to zero. This provision effectively creates an loophole from the requirement to meet recruitment goals.
It appears that this authority undercuts the very purpose of the law, as it ties the army’s duty to uphold its commitments to a clause that could simultaneously nullify the targets themselves.
- Legislate a genuinely conscription law aimed at enlisting all Haredi men: universal service with only limited exemptions for a small number of outstanding scholars.
- Institute immediate, meaningful sanctions on each individual who does not comply to ensure real compliance and relieve the burden on the serving majority.
- Recognize cultural and religious diversity within military service — but do so without sacrificing the principle of equality for sectors and genders who are contributing to defending Israel.
