The Shin Bet's Involvement in Combating Serious Crime in Israel
The government has decided to divert approximately NIS 500 million from the budget of a program to reduce disparities in Arab society and transfer the funds to the Shin Bet and the Israel Police to address crime and violence in Arab society. Is the Shin Bet – an agency whose mandate is to protect the security of the state and its institutions –suited for this task, and what might the consequences of its involvement be?
Photo by Avshalom Sassoni/Flash90
Israel is in the midst of an unprecedented law-enforcement crisis. In 2025, 309 Israeli citizens were murdered – twice the number of murder victims recorded just before the current government took office. In Arab Israeli society, a record 241 people were murdered in 2025 (civil society organizations cite an even higher figure). According to The Abraham Initiatives organization, 144 people were murdered in incidents of violence and crime in Arab society in the first half of 2026 alone.
Israel Democracy Institute surveys underscore the severity of Israel's personal safety crisis. According to an Israel Democracy Institute survey on policing and domestic security conducted in late 2025, 80% of Arab Israeli respondents said they feared that they or members of their families would be harmed by serious violence or gunfire in the course of a criminal dispute.
Against the backdrop of criticism over the state authorities' failure to address this situation, last week the government approved Government Decision No. 4387, intended to transfer hundreds of millions of shekels to the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) to address crime and violence in Arab society, at the expense of funds earmarked for reducing disparities in Arab society in education, welfare, and the economy.
What Does the Government Decision Stipulate About Transferring Funds to the Shin Bet to Combat Serious Crime?
On July 15, the government approved a decision diverting approximately NIS 500 million to the Shin Bet and the Israel Police to address crime and violence in Arab society. The money comes from the five-year plan to reduce disparities – a budget allocated by the previous government (the 36th Government) for reducing these disparities in Arab society, including in social development and education, higher education, welfare and social security, health, transportation, economic development, and employment promotion.
According to the decision, most of this amount is expected to go to the Shin Bet to implement two main goals. The first is to bolster the Service's technology systems for intelligence and operations, as part of the response to crime and violence in Arab society. The second is to establish a unit within the Service "to address the phenomenon of weapons smuggling across the borders and trade” in such weapons, which will operate in the area of the communities of Sheizaf, Bir Hadaj, Revivim, and Kfar Retamim in the Negev (an area that is not adjacent to the border). The decision further provides that personnel and additional funds – NIS 35 million – will be allocated, for the implementation of the Shin Bet's tasks, from the budgets of the Israel Police, the Israel Prison Service, and Israel Fire and Rescue Services.
According to the decision, an inter-office team consisting of directors-general of several government ministries will oversee the police's activity in fighting crime in Arab society, and the Security Cabinet will oversee the Shin Bet's activity and approve changes to the areas in which the Service operates in the field of weapons smuggling.
This budget comes on top of NIS 113.5 million that was already allocated to the Shin Bet by a government decision at the end of 2025, also from the budget originally intended to reduce disparities in Arab society, for establishing a "joint Shin Bet-Israel Police unit that would address, among other things, weapons smuggling at the borders and trade in such weapons," and for technology for intelligence and operational needs in the Service.
What Role Can the Shin Bet Play in Addressing Serious Crime Under Israeli Law?
The vast majority of serious criminal activity is unrelated to the Shin Bet's statutory functions. Under the General Security Service Law, the Service's mission is to protect state security and the institutions and order of the democratic regime against threats of terrorism, sabotage, subversion, espionage, and the disclosure of state secrets. It is also charged with safeguarding and promoting other state interests vital to Israel's national security.
At the same time, in recent years the Shin Bet has shown greater willingness to become involved in certain aspects of the fight against serious crime under the broad heading of "protecting symbols of state authority." This has included, for example, investigating attacks on heads of local authorities and police stations (even in cases without an overt security dimension – possibly beyond its mandate), as well as matters relating to the manufacture and smuggling of weapons that could also make their way to terrorist organizations. Yet it is very difficult to link a mandate focused on state security to involvement in activity that is plainly criminal in nature, since it is not the Shin Bet's role to prevent and investigate crime in Israel – that is what the police are for.
The government decision states that the government is assigning the Shin Bet the task of providing "complementary and urgent measures to address crime and violence in Arab society." As noted, as a matter of principle, it is not the Shin Bet's role to address crime and violence committed by Israeli citizens; in any event, section 7(b)(6) of the General Security Service Law allows the government to assign the Shin Bet additional functions within the scope of its mandate, subject to the approval of the Knesset Service Affairs Committee. The government decision contains no such determination and makes no reference to the need for parliamentary approval.
In addition, the decision lacks material details regarding how the Shin Bet will cooperate and share information with the Israel Police, which, to the best of our knowledge, is responsible for law enforcement in the focus areas designated for Shin Bet activity under the government decision. Under the General Security Service Law, the transfer of information held by the Shin Bet to other bodies (such as the Israel Police) must be carried out in accordance with rules to be set out in writing by the Prime Minister, with the approval of the Ministerial Committee for Shin Bet Affairs and the Knesset Service Affairs Committee – a process that the government decision does not address at all.
Equally important, the government decision expands the Shin Bet's sphere of activity only with respect to one specific population group. It is not deploying the Shin Bet to address a certain type of offense or offenses of a particular degree of severity; rather, it deploys the agency against criminal activity committed only by Arab citizens of Israel. This could also lead to the creation of an entire separate system based on the identity of the offender.
Can Shin Bet Involvement Help Combat Serious Crime?
Has the Shin Bet's involvement to date in serious-crime cases, including those targeting "symbols of state authority," helped reduce crime? To the best of our understanding, it is unclear how helpful this involvement has actually been, and the evidence is conflicting. The Shin Bet is a preventive security agency; it is not meant to collect the evidence and testimony needed to secure a conviction in a criminal trial. That is the role and expertise of the police.
In principle, assigning the Shin Bet responsibility for conducting criminal investigations entails an inherent contradiction: on the one hand, the Shin Bet would be expected to conduct investigations intended to lead to prosecution and combat criminal activity; on the other, its methods are not supposed to be disclosed in court and, by design, do not produce admissible evidence or lead to convictions.
In practice, it is also by no means certain that the Shin Bet has any unique professional capabilities for addressing serious crime in comparison to police investigators. Some believe that the Shin Bet has only limited familiarity with the structure of crime in Arab society, the organizations involved, and local dynamics on the ground – and, of course, it lacks information accumulated over years on the subject.
In fact, the use of such intrusive tools could deepen the Arab public's mistrust of law-enforcement authorities and thus produce precisely the opposite result, since lack of public cooperation is one of the factors that makes crime more difficult to combat.
Moreover, the Shin Bet has many tasks and its resources are stretched thin. Redirecting its activity could impair its core security missions, and there is also concern that training effective investigators in a field new to the Service would take a long time.
What Are the Potential Consequences of Shin Bet Involvement in the Effort to Combat Serious Crime?
Expanding the Shin Bet's activities to combat serious crime that is not directly related to security threats poses a challenge to the values of democratic government. It could result in serious infringements of rights, because the Shin Bet has broad powers that allow it to conduct covert searches of a person's home and vehicle without that person's presence or knowledge and without a court order, interrogate suspects under special procedural rules, and carry out arrests subject to limited judicial oversight.
The Shin Bet is also authorized to collect communications data that provide it with extensive information about Israeli citizens. Expanding its role into the field of crime would, in practice, greatly expand the use of the database, so that it would include a very large number of citizens – both those involved in crime and those merely connected to someone who is involved. The result would be a grave infringement of the right to privacy, which is protected by Israel's Basic Laws. Accordingly, using Shin Bet powers to assist in the fight against crime would cross an unmistakable red line in terms of infringing citizens' rights and the rights of suspects.
This conclusion is particularly relevant in light of the wording of the government decision that was adopted, which does not define the Shin Bet's tasks clearly enough. Indeed, the decision states that the Shin Bet is required to provide "complementary and urgent measures to address crime and violence in Arab society," and for this purpose is asked "to bolster the Service's technology systems for intelligence and operations." This vague wording further heightens the concern about a significant infringement of the rights of Israeli citizens.
Equally important, diverting funds to the Shin Bet would echo a perspective that views crime within Arab society as a threat to be addressed with tools designed for security threats. This conceptual shift – which involves viewing significant segments of a community of Israeli citizens as "enemies of the state" – represents a serious departure from the principles of democratic government.
Can Shin Bet Involvement Be Justified Given the Grave Situation We Face Today?
The situation on the Israeli street is worse than ever, with physical and emotional injuries, loss of life, and extensive property damage throughout the country. The level of serious crime demands a substantial response, since a properly functioning society cannot tolerate the degree of violence currently threatening innocent citizens.
That being said, expanding the Shin Bet's involvement in combating serious crime is a step fraught with risks, including the risk of severe, disproportionate, and even unnecessary harm to the rights of the Arab Israeli public as a whole. Involving a security agency whose work is based on secrecy in law-enforcement activity against Israeli citizens creates a long list of problems regarding the safeguarding of their rights, and its effectiveness is questionable.
So What Can and Should Be Done?
Combating serious crime lies at the core of the police's work and responsibility. Referring this problem to another organization, however efficient and effective, cannot serve as a substitute for the police discharging that responsibility. The national plan to combat crime and violence in Arab society, implemented by the previous government, strengthened the Israel Police's operational and financial enforcement capabilities and interministerial cooperation, and consequently led to some reduction in serious crime. The question, then, is why this plan has been abandoned in recent years, and why the funds in question are not now being invested in the police itself to strengthen its organizational capacity and the technological capabilities at its disposal. Moreover, it is hard to understand why the government is deciding to transfer funds to the Shin Bet for the purpose of addressing criminal activity specifically out of the Israel Police's own budget.
At the same time, it is important to consider how to advance the many relevant legislative initiatives currently "stuck" in proceedings in the Knesset and the government (for example, the bill to address weapons offenses, the Combating Criminal Organizations Law, the forfeiture bill, the security services bill, and others).
As part of the fight against crime, it is also essential to address the root causes of the problem, rather than cutting and undermining the very budget intended to help do so. The funds now being transferred to the Shin Bet are being taken from programs that promote employment and create prospects for young Arab men and women, which could directly undermine efforts to prevent and reduce crime.
Even if it is ultimately decided that a radical solution is needed – involving the Shin Bet in providing the police with limited, targeted assistance in finding an initial lead concerning suspects – this should be considered only as part of a comprehensive framework that brings to bear the full range of tools available to the state, assesses their potential impact, and advances effective, independent judicial oversight of their use. To the best of our knowledge, no such plan has been presented or discussed.
Israel is in the midst of an unprecedented law-enforcement crisis. In 2025, 309 Israeli citizens were murdered – twice the number of murder victims recorded just before the current government took office. In Arab Israeli society, a record 241 people were murdered in 2025 (civil society organizations cite an even higher figure). According to The Abraham Initiatives organization, 144 people were murdered in incidents of violence and crime in Arab society in the first half of 2026 alone.
Israel Democracy Institute surveys underscore the severity of Israel's personal safety crisis. According to an Israel Democracy Institute survey on policing and domestic security conducted in late 2025, 80% of Arab Israeli respondents said they feared that they or members of their families would be harmed by serious violence or gunfire in the course of a criminal dispute.
Against the backdrop of criticism over the state authorities' failure to address this situation, last week the government approved Government Decision No. 4387, intended to transfer hundreds of millions of shekels to the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) to address crime and violence in Arab society, at the expense of funds earmarked for reducing disparities in Arab society in education, welfare, and the economy.
What Does the Government Decision Stipulate About Transferring Funds to the Shin Bet to Combat Serious Crime?
On July 15, the government approved a decision diverting approximately NIS 500 million to the Shin Bet and the Israel Police to address crime and violence in Arab society. The money comes from the five-year plan to reduce disparities – a budget allocated by the previous government (the 36th Government) for reducing these disparities in Arab society, including in social development and education, higher education, welfare and social security, health, transportation, economic development, and employment promotion.
According to the decision, most of this amount is expected to go to the Shin Bet to implement two main goals. The first is to bolster the Service's technology systems for intelligence and operations, as part of the response to crime and violence in Arab society. The second is to establish a unit within the Service "to address the phenomenon of weapons smuggling across the borders and trade” in such weapons, which will operate in the area of the communities of Sheizaf, Bir Hadaj, Revivim, and Kfar Retamim in the Negev (an area that is not adjacent to the border). The decision further provides that personnel and additional funds – NIS 35 million – will be allocated, for the implementation of the Shin Bet's tasks, from the budgets of the Israel Police, the Israel Prison Service, and Israel Fire and Rescue Services.
According to the decision, an inter-office team consisting of directors-general of several government ministries will oversee the police's activity in fighting crime in Arab society, and the Security Cabinet will oversee the Shin Bet's activity and approve changes to the areas in which the Service operates in the field of weapons smuggling.
This budget comes on top of NIS 113.5 million that was already allocated to the Shin Bet by a government decision at the end of 2025, also from the budget originally intended to reduce disparities in Arab society, for establishing a "joint Shin Bet-Israel Police unit that would address, among other things, weapons smuggling at the borders and trade in such weapons," and for technology for intelligence and operational needs in the Service.
What Role Can the Shin Bet Play in Addressing Serious Crime Under Israeli Law?
The vast majority of serious criminal activity is unrelated to the Shin Bet's statutory functions. Under the General Security Service Law, the Service's mission is to protect state security and the institutions and order of the democratic regime against threats of terrorism, sabotage, subversion, espionage, and the disclosure of state secrets. It is also charged with safeguarding and promoting other state interests vital to Israel's national security.
At the same time, in recent years the Shin Bet has shown greater willingness to become involved in certain aspects of the fight against serious crime under the broad heading of "protecting symbols of state authority." This has included, for example, investigating attacks on heads of local authorities and police stations (even in cases without an overt security dimension – possibly beyond its mandate), as well as matters relating to the manufacture and smuggling of weapons that could also make their way to terrorist organizations. Yet it is very difficult to link a mandate focused on state security to involvement in activity that is plainly criminal in nature, since it is not the Shin Bet's role to prevent and investigate crime in Israel – that is what the police are for.
The government decision states that the government is assigning the Shin Bet the task of providing "complementary and urgent measures to address crime and violence in Arab society." As noted, as a matter of principle, it is not the Shin Bet's role to address crime and violence committed by Israeli citizens; in any event, section 7(b)(6) of the General Security Service Law allows the government to assign the Shin Bet additional functions within the scope of its mandate, subject to the approval of the Knesset Service Affairs Committee. The government decision contains no such determination and makes no reference to the need for parliamentary approval.
In addition, the decision lacks material details regarding how the Shin Bet will cooperate and share information with the Israel Police, which, to the best of our knowledge, is responsible for law enforcement in the focus areas designated for Shin Bet activity under the government decision. Under the General Security Service Law, the transfer of information held by the Shin Bet to other bodies (such as the Israel Police) must be carried out in accordance with rules to be set out in writing by the Prime Minister, with the approval of the Ministerial Committee for Shin Bet Affairs and the Knesset Service Affairs Committee – a process that the government decision does not address at all.
Equally important, the government decision expands the Shin Bet's sphere of activity only with respect to one specific population group. It is not deploying the Shin Bet to address a certain type of offense or offenses of a particular degree of severity; rather, it deploys the agency against criminal activity committed only by Arab citizens of Israel. This could also lead to the creation of an entire separate system based on the identity of the offender.
Can Shin Bet Involvement Help Combat Serious Crime?
Has the Shin Bet's involvement to date in serious-crime cases, including those targeting "symbols of state authority," helped reduce crime? To the best of our understanding, it is unclear how helpful this involvement has actually been, and the evidence is conflicting. The Shin Bet is a preventive security agency; it is not meant to collect the evidence and testimony needed to secure a conviction in a criminal trial. That is the role and expertise of the police.
In principle, assigning the Shin Bet responsibility for conducting criminal investigations entails an inherent contradiction: on the one hand, the Shin Bet would be expected to conduct investigations intended to lead to prosecution and combat criminal activity; on the other, its methods are not supposed to be disclosed in court and, by design, do not produce admissible evidence or lead to convictions.
In practice, it is also by no means certain that the Shin Bet has any unique professional capabilities for addressing serious crime in comparison to police investigators. Some believe that the Shin Bet has only limited familiarity with the structure of crime in Arab society, the organizations involved, and local dynamics on the ground – and, of course, it lacks information accumulated over years on the subject.
In fact, the use of such intrusive tools could deepen the Arab public's mistrust of law-enforcement authorities and thus produce precisely the opposite result, since lack of public cooperation is one of the factors that makes crime more difficult to combat.
Moreover, the Shin Bet has many tasks and its resources are stretched thin. Redirecting its activity could impair its core security missions, and there is also concern that training effective investigators in a field new to the Service would take a long time.
What Are the Potential Consequences of Shin Bet Involvement in the Effort to Combat Serious Crime?
Expanding the Shin Bet's activities to combat serious crime that is not directly related to security threats poses a challenge to the values of democratic government. It could result in serious infringements of rights, because the Shin Bet has broad powers that allow it to conduct covert searches of a person's home and vehicle without that person's presence or knowledge and without a court order, interrogate suspects under special procedural rules, and carry out arrests subject to limited judicial oversight.
The Shin Bet is also authorized to collect communications data that provide it with extensive information about Israeli citizens. Expanding its role into the field of crime would, in practice, greatly expand the use of the database, so that it would include a very large number of citizens – both those involved in crime and those merely connected to someone who is involved. The result would be a grave infringement of the right to privacy, which is protected by Israel's Basic Laws. Accordingly, using Shin Bet powers to assist in the fight against crime would cross an unmistakable red line in terms of infringing citizens' rights and the rights of suspects.
This conclusion is particularly relevant in light of the wording of the government decision that was adopted, which does not define the Shin Bet's tasks clearly enough. Indeed, the decision states that the Shin Bet is required to provide "complementary and urgent measures to address crime and violence in Arab society," and for this purpose is asked "to bolster the Service's technology systems for intelligence and operations." This vague wording further heightens the concern about a significant infringement of the rights of Israeli citizens.
Equally important, diverting funds to the Shin Bet would echo a perspective that views crime within Arab society as a threat to be addressed with tools designed for security threats. This conceptual shift – which involves viewing significant segments of a community of Israeli citizens as "enemies of the state" – represents a serious departure from the principles of democratic government.
Can Shin Bet Involvement Be Justified Given the Grave Situation We Face Today?
The situation on the Israeli street is worse than ever, with physical and emotional injuries, loss of life, and extensive property damage throughout the country. The level of serious crime demands a substantial response, since a properly functioning society cannot tolerate the degree of violence currently threatening innocent citizens.
That being said, expanding the Shin Bet's involvement in combating serious crime is a step fraught with risks, including the risk of severe, disproportionate, and even unnecessary harm to the rights of the Arab Israeli public as a whole. Involving a security agency whose work is based on secrecy in law-enforcement activity against Israeli citizens creates a long list of problems regarding the safeguarding of their rights, and its effectiveness is questionable.
So What Can and Should Be Done?
Combating serious crime lies at the core of the police's work and responsibility. Referring this problem to another organization, however efficient and effective, cannot serve as a substitute for the police discharging that responsibility. The national plan to combat crime and violence in Arab society, implemented by the previous government, strengthened the Israel Police's operational and financial enforcement capabilities and interministerial cooperation, and consequently led to some reduction in serious crime. The question, then, is why this plan has been abandoned in recent years, and why the funds in question are not now being invested in the police itself to strengthen its organizational capacity and the technological capabilities at its disposal. Moreover, it is hard to understand why the government is deciding to transfer funds to the Shin Bet for the purpose of addressing criminal activity specifically out of the Israel Police's own budget.
At the same time, it is important to consider how to advance the many relevant legislative initiatives currently "stuck" in proceedings in the Knesset and the government (for example, the bill to address weapons offenses, the Combating Criminal Organizations Law, the forfeiture bill, the security services bill, and others).
As part of the fight against crime, it is also essential to address the root causes of the problem, rather than cutting and undermining the very budget intended to help do so. The funds now being transferred to the Shin Bet are being taken from programs that promote employment and create prospects for young Arab men and women, which could directly undermine efforts to prevent and reduce crime.
Even if it is ultimately decided that a radical solution is needed – involving the Shin Bet in providing the police with limited, targeted assistance in finding an initial lead concerning suspects – this should be considered only as part of a comprehensive framework that brings to bear the full range of tools available to the state, assesses their potential impact, and advances effective, independent judicial oversight of their use. To the best of our knowledge, no such plan has been presented or discussed.