Yes, They Will Multiply – The 2040 Edition

Photo by Tal Gal/Flash90

In recent weeks, harsh claims have appeared in various forums regarding the State of Israel’s treatment of Haredi society. This argument claims that powerful institutions, including government bodies, research institutes, and nonprofit organizations, have joined forces in a war against the Haredi community, alleging their aim is to stoke hatred, reduce the birth rate, and fatally undermine the very possibility of maintaining a Haredi way of life in the Land of Israel. Some have even used harsh language insinuating that the policies proposed today are meant to echo the evil intentions of some of the Jewish people's greatest foes who openly stated that they were motivated by 'concerns' that "lest they multiply." 

These are serious accusations. Yet they turn the reason for the intense focus on Haredi society on its head. It is not some concealed hatred of Haredi life that preoccupies government ministries, economic experts, and research institutes. The reason is far simpler: the future of the State of Israel depends to a great extent on the relationship that takes shape between Haredi society and the state, and between Haredim and their fellow citizens.

According to the official projection of Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, among others, within a generation, Haredi society will account for approximately one-fifth of the country’s population, and perhaps even more.

There is broad agreement that the State of Israel can and should be home to a large, prosperous Haredi society that is secure in its identity. No one should have to apologize for the number of children they have, for their faith, or for their desire to give Torah study a central place in their lives. But as a group grows, so too does the impact of its institutions and way of life on the country as a whole—and so too does its responsibility for the country’s future.

Twenty Years of Gradual Integration

For nearly two decades, the state has developed a policy of gradual integration of Haredim through encouragement and accommodation: employment centers, separate and tailored educational tracks, vocational training, employer incentives, scholarships, and financial incentives. The premise was that, if barriers were removed and appropriate frameworks found, integration would proceed gradually without compromising the Haredi way of life.

While these policies yielded labor market and educational improvements, the overall metrics in employment, education, and military service remained low and did not change at the pace required.

A review published by the Ministry of Finance’s Chief Economist Department in July 2026 found that participation in higher education among Haredi men was indeed rising, but “at a slower pace than that recorded among young Arabs,” and that “the gaps between population groups in rates of integration into higher education remained significant.” Such sentiments have been reflected in the research of the Israel Democracy Institute and echoed by the Knesset Research and Information Center, State Comptroller, and many other official sources. Put simply, the state’s professional bodies recognize that the moderate approach produced certain gains, but not change at the pace or on the scale required.

When a policy pursued for many years and backed by substantial resources fails to produce change at the necessary pace, professionals have a duty to reexamine its underlying assumptions.

The Nature of a Welfare State

The premise of the welfare state rests on trust and mutual responsibility: those who are able to contribute finance the system, and the system assists those who cannot support themselves.

Nitza Kasir, Vice President for Research at the National Insurance Institute, who at the time served as Deputy Chair of the Haredi Institute for Policy Research, wrote:

“The welfare state rests on the ethos that every person is responsible for striving to be economically self-sufficient through personal effort. This is the unwritten ‘social contract’ on which the welfare state is founded.”

She later added:

“The Haredi public is not a full partner in the ‘social contract’ among all Israeli citizens, raising concern that the fabric of partnership on which the welfare state rests may unravel.”

Kasir recognizes that the Haredi community has the right to choose a different way of life, but this does not eliminate the question of who bears the cost of that way of life, or what happens when that community’s share of the population grows rapidly.

The result of choosing to work little or no hours is substantially lower tax revenues alongside higher reliance on social services. Indeed, Kasir explains that this could undermine the welfare state’s ability to continue providing services to all citizens.

The Social Contract Extends Beyond the Welfare State

Another key dimension is security.

Military security is a quintessential public good: everyone benefits from its protection, but not everyone bears the burden to the same degree.

A study by Gilad Cohen Kovacs and Gilad Malach of the Israel Democracy Institute estimated the net amount of funding allocated to Haredi society in the sphere of military security alone is approximately NIS 14.9 billion per year. The estimate includes both the gap in tax-based financing of the defense budget and the economic costs borne by those who serve, their families, and their employers. The assumptions underlying the estimate may be debated and examined, and alternative methods of calculation may be proposed. But the suggestion that these figures are fabricated is not a research-based response, nor does it negate the basic fact: a group that does not participate to any significant degree in either financing or providing security benefits from a public good whose cost falls disproportionately on others. As the security burden and its cost continue to soar, the need to redress that imbalance only increases.

Not everyone must contribute to the social contract surrounding Israel's national security in the same way or to the same extent. But a society cannot endure over time when a growing group receives a broad array of rights, exemptions, and subsidies while the obligations involved in sustaining the state fall mainly on other groups.

Freedom Does Not Entail a Right to Unlimited Subsidies

This also provides the answer to the claim that discussion of tax credits, allowances, or services for large families constitutes a “war on the Haredi birthrate.”

Reviewing tax credits is not a quota limiting the number of children a family may have, and reducing subsidies is not a law restricting family size. It is true that economic policy affects incentives and may therefore also affect family decisions. But it is a long way from there to the claim that this is an attempt to “eradicate any possibility of Haredi life in the Land of Israel.”

The legitimate question is whether the state is obligated to design its tax and welfare systems so that they systematically reduce the economic cost of choosing to have a large family, work part time, and forgo training for the labor market, even when that cost is shifted to other citizens. Religious freedom and family autonomy are fundamental rights. The right to have other citizens finance the consequences of those choices without limit is not a fundamental right.

The civic contract does not require anyone to relinquish their faith, dress, community, or Torah study. It requires the state to respect Haredi distinctiveness, but it also requires Haredi society to see itself as a partner in responsibility for the country as a whole, rather than solely for its own community.

May Its Numbers Grow—and May Its Responsibility Grow With Them

The Haredi community – to which I am proud to belong – is an integral part of the country, and its success is in the interest of all Israel’s citizens. Precisely for that reason, we must not settle for slogans of “hatred” and “persecution” whenever a demand is made for fairer participation.  As Haredi society grows, its future can no longer be separated from the future of Israel’s economy, security, welfare system, and democracy.

“Lest they multiply” is not the policy being proposed. No one is asking the Haredi community to shrink or disappear. On the contrary: may its numbers grow; may it flourish and prosper. But as its numbers grow, so too must its responsibility grow. Responsibility for supporting its families, educating its children, safeguarding the citizens of the state, and sustaining a fair and sustainable civic contract among all parts of Israeli society.

This article was published in JNS.