Deep Divisions Between Israelis on a Diplomatic Agreement with Hezbollah; On a Hostage Deal with Hamas
Israelis are deeply divided on how to move forward in the conflict in Lebanon. While 54% of Jewish Israelis support continued fighting against Hezbollah, 88% of Arab Israelis are in favor of pursuing a diplomatic solution. Concurrently, 56% of the general Israeli public and 53.5% of Jewish Israelis think greater flexibility is possible in Israel's position toward Hamas, making it easier to reach a deal for the hostages.
Photo by Avshalom Sassoni/Flash90
The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute between October 28 and November 3, 2024. It was based on a representative sample of the population in Israel aged 18 and above, comprising 600 Jewish interviewees and 150 Arab interviewees.
Topics covered in this report:
- The national mood
- The functioning of the IDF Home Command
- Israel’s response to the Iranian missile attack
- The southern front after the assassination of Sinwar
- The northern front: What next?
- Which countries are friendly to Israel, and which are hostile?
- Harris or Trump?
Presumably due to Israel’s military successes in Lebanon, and perhaps due to the repulsion of the Iranian missile strike with relatively minor damage, we found a substantial increase in optimism among the Israeli public this month about the future of national security, and a slight increase in optimism about the future of democratic rule.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security (total sample; %)
The familiar disparities between Jews and Arabs remain: Regarding national security, a small majority of Jews (53%) now look with hope toward the future, compared to much smaller shares in previous surveys (July, 30%; August, 43%), and there has also been an increase in optimism about the future of democratic rule relative to previous months. By contrast, only a small minority of Arabs have expressed optimism regarding both issues in all these surveys. Moreover, while there has been no significant increase in the share of Arabs who are optimistic about the future of national security, there has actually been a decline in the share who are optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel.
Share of optimists by nationality (%)
Among Jews, the levels of optimism remain low in both cases among those on the Left and in the Center, compared with a majority of optimists on the Right. Moreover, in all three camps, there is greater optimism about the future of national security than about the future of democratic rule.
Share of optimists by political orientation (Jews; %)
It is possible that the improvement in mood regarding the future of national security is connected (among other factors) to the functioning of the IDF Home Front Command. We asked: “On a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent, what grade would you give the IDF Home Front Command for its functioning in managing the defense of the home front in Israel until now?” We found that a very large majority of Jewish respondents rate the Home Front Command’s performance highly. Among Arab respondents, too, the largest share gave the Home Front Command very good grades, though this share was smaller than the equivalent proportion of Jews.
What grade would you give the IDF Home Front Command for its functioning in managing the defense of the home front in Israel until now? (%)
In the Jewish sample, we found some differences between age groups, though in all of them, the majority give the IDF Home Front Command high grades, with the older respondents more complimentary than the younger: 18–34, 76%; 35–54, 80.5%; 55+, 90%. A breakdown by area of residence did not produce significant differences between residents of the various regions of Israel, with more than 70% in each awarding high grades.
The Israeli public, and especially the Jewish public, are divided between the opinion that the Israeli response to the Iranian missile attack was appropriately strong, and that it was too weak, while only a small minority think it was too strong. Moreover (for some reason), the share of Arab respondents who think the response was too weak is significantly larger than the share who think it was appropriately strong.
In your opinion, was Israel’s response last week to the Iranian missile attack appropriately strong, too strong, or too weak? (%)
We found sizable differences in the Jewish sample between the Left and the Center, on the one hand, and the Right on the other hand. On the Left and in the Center, the largest proportion of respondents think that the response was appropriately strong (46% and 48%, respectively), while a large minority hold that the response was too weak (Left, 28%; Center, 32%). On the Right, however, the largest share of respondents (51%) think the response was too weak, and 41% that it was appropriately strong.
We analyzed responses by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections. We found a surprising degree of agreement, for which we have no satisfactory explanation, between the Zionist right-wing parties—the Likud and Religious Zionism, the majority of whose voters think that Israel’s response to the Iranian missile attack was too weak (50.5% and 56%, respectively)—and the Arab parties Ra’am and Balad, whose voters are even more of the opinion that Israel’s response was too weak (54% and 67%, respectively).
Does the assassination of Sinwar mean the end of Hamas? We asked: “In your opinion, has the assassination of Yahya Sinwar brought Israel closer to achieving its goal of toppling Hamas’s rule over the Gaza Strip?” A clear majority of Jews (62.5%) responded in the affirmative to this question, compared with only around a fifth of Arabs (21%).
Here, too, we found considerable differences between political camps in the Jewish sample. While only around a half (or even less) of those on the Left and in the Center think that the Sinwar assassination advanced the goal of toppling Hamas, a large majority of those on the Right hold this opinion (71%).
Agree that the assassination of Yahya Sinwar has brought Israel closer to achieving its goal of toppling Hamas’s rule over the Gaza Strip (%)
Does the current situation allow Israel to take a more flexible stance? The majority of the public think that Israel can indeed allow itself to be more flexible in its position toward Hamas, in order to make it easier to reach a deal for the release of the hostages (56%). This majority is smaller among Jews (53.5%) and larger among Arabs (67%).
We did not find a significant link between assessments of whether the assassination of Sinwar marks a turning point toward toppling Hamas and opinions regarding Israel being able to take a more flexible stance in order to advance a deal for the release of the hostages. A certain majority of both those who agree and disagree that the assassination of Sinwar brought the goal of toppling Hamas closer think that Israel can allow itself to be more flexible (54.5% and 60%, respectively). That is, an even larger share of those who do not view the assassination of Sinwar as a critical step toward defeating Hamas, than of those who do, support greater flexibility on Israel’s part in order to reach a deal for the release of the hostages. Seemingly, the key factor in responses to both these questions is not how the assassination of Sinwar is viewed, but political orientation: The Left and Center are less of the opinion that the assassination marks a turning point than the Right, but more supportive of Israel taking a more flexible stance.
Continue the fighting or seek a diplomatic agreement? We asked: “In the current situation, on what should Israel focus its efforts in Lebanon?” We found that the Israeli public as a whole is divided between those who support focusing on reaching a diplomatic agreement and those in favor of continuing the fight against Hezbollah.
In the current situation, on what should Israel focus its efforts in Lebanon? (total sample; %)
However, this finding obscures certain discrepancies: A majority of Jewish respondents (54%) support continuing the fighting, while a minority—albeit sizable (38%)—support reaching a diplomatic agreement. By contrast, an overwhelming majority of Arabs (88%) are in favor of seeking a diplomatic solution, while only a very small minority (6.5%) prefer continuing the fighting.
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals, as expected, considerable differences. Around three-quarters of those on the Left support seeking a diplomatic agreement, while just a fifth support continuing the fighting. In the Center, 57% prefer focusing on reaching a diplomatic agreement, while 29% prefer continuing the fighting. By contrast, a large majority on the Right support a continuation of the fighting (72%), and only a minority (22%) are in favor of focusing on a diplomatic agreement.
When will evacuees from Israel’s north be able to return to their homes? Once again, the public is divided: 40% think that it will be at least half a year before the evacuees from the north are able to return home, while 44.5% think that this will happen within the next six months.
Jews are more pessimistic than Arabs on this issue: 41.5% of Jews think that at least half a year will pass before the northern evacuees can return home, compared with 32% of Arabs.
In your estimation, how long will it be before the evacuated residents of northern Israel can return to their homes? (%)
The “day after” in South Lebanon: We asked: “Who should have military control of South Lebanon after the war?” In the total sample, around a third of respondents (34.5%) think that a multinational military force should control South Lebanon, around a quarter (27%) that control should be held by the Lebanese army, and another quarter (26%) that Israel should maintain permanent military control of South Lebanon. A tiny minority (2%) think that a weakened Hezbollah should control the area militarily. However, this finding obscures a substantial difference on this issue between Jews and Arabs: The majority of Arabs (55%) are in favor of the Lebanese army having control after the fighting is over, while the largest share of Jews (though not the majority, at 37.5%) would prefer a multinational military force.
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals, once again, large differences between those on the Right, who tend more than the other two camps to support continued Israeli control and less to support control by the Lebanese army, and those on the Left and in the Center, who tend more to support control by a multinational military force, and less to support continued Israeli control of areas in which the fighting has ended.
Who should have military control of South Lebanon after the war? (%)
After a considerable period of time, and in different circumstances from the past due to the war, we revisited the question of how the Israeli public views the attitudes toward Israel of different countries around the world. Only two countries are seen as friendly to Israel by both Jews and Arabs: the United States (77% of Jews and 87% of Arabs) and Germany (71% of Jews and 76% of Arabs). In all other cases, there are sizable differences between the views of Arab respondents, who tend more to see countries as friendly to Israel, and the views of Jewish respondents, who tend to see the world as more hostile. Thus, Britain is in third place in the friendliness rankings (Jews, 34%; Arabs, 76%), followed by Saudi Arabia (Jews, 13.5%; Arabs, 69%), Jordan (Jews, 11%; Arabs, 71%), and Egypt (Jews, 8%; Arabs, 70%). The states viewed as especially hostile are Russia (Jews, 78%; Arabs, 29%), Qatar (Jews, 67%; Arabs, 23%), France (Jews, 62%; Arabs, 13%), and China (Jews, 57%; Arabs, 26%).
In your opinion, is each of the following countries friendly or hostile toward Israel today? (total sample; %)
Comparing the present findings with those from the last time this question was asked, in 2019, reveals several differences. First, the only country for which there has been an increase in the share of those who view it as friendly to Israel is Germany (from 58% to 72%). For all the other countries—with the exception of Britain, which has remained relatively stable (44.5% then and 41% now)—the Israeli public now sees them as less friendly and/or more hostile. Even the share of respondents who view the United States as friendly has declined significantly, from a sweeping 95% in 2019 to 79% in the current survey. Russia is considered to be hostile by a much larger proportion of the Israeli public today (69.5%) than in 2019 (only 21.5%). The same is true of China, which was viewed as hostile by 8% of the Israeli public in 2019, an opinion now held by the majority of Israelis (52%). The share of respondents who see Egypt as friendly has not changed a great deal (22% in 2019, 18% now), but the proportion who view it as hostile has risen considerably, from 32% to 44%.
We asked: “In terms of Israel’s interests, which of the two candidates for the US presidency would be better?” Almost two-thirds of the total sample think that Former President Donald Trump would be better for Israel’s interests, compared with just 13% for Vice President Kamala Harris, while 15.5% believe there is no difference between the two.
In terms of Israel’s interests, which of the two candidates for the US presidency would be better? (total sample; %)
In the Jewish sample, the gap is even larger: 72% think that Trump would be better for Israel’s interests, compared with just 11% who think that Harris would be preferable. Among Arabs, the largest share of respondents (46%) say that there is no difference between the two candidates, while the remainder are divided, with a slight advantage for Trump (27%) over Harris (22.5%).
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found a clear preference on the Left for Harris (42%) over Trump (29%), but the reverse is true in the Center and on the Right (Center: Trump, 52%; Harris, 14%; Right: Trump, 90%; Harris, 3%).
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by age reveals dramatic differences. In the 18–34 age group, an overwhelming majority think that Trump would be better for Israel’s interests (90%, versus 2% for Harris). In the 35–54 age group, 71% think that Trump would be better, compared with just 10.5% for Harris. Among those aged 55 and above, 55% think Trump would be the better option, compared with 22% for Harris. In the Arab sample, respondents who think that there is no difference between the two candidates constitute the largest share of each age group.
Breaking down the total sample by gender finds identically low levels of preference for Harris as the best candidate for Israel’s interests among both women and men. However, men expressed greater support for Trump as the better option than did women.
In terms of Israel’s interests, which of the two candidates for the US presidency would be better? (total sample; %)
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The October 2024 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between October 28 and November 3, 2024, with 600 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.58% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.