Ultra-Orthodox Draft Challenges and Objectives
As the IDF issues the first batches of draft orders for ultra-Orthodox men, the following outlines the challenges, opportunities and objectives of an amended conscription law.
Photo by: Chaim Goldberg/Flash90
Last week, the IDF issued the first 1,000 out of the 3,000 draft orders intended for Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) men, an action taken as a result of the expiration of the exemption clause in the Security Service Law in June 2023. As detailed by IDF representatives to the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the objective of these orders is to enlist 3,000 young ultra-Orthodox individuals into the IDF over the coming year. This is in addition to approximately 1,800 recruits who have graduated from the Haredi education system who enlisted in previous years, according to IDF records. The Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee has simultaneously commenced discussions on the sections of the proposed Security Service Law amendment carried over from the previous Knesset, beginning with the "objective" section of the law.
The following outlines the challenges and opportunities in the issuance of the draft orders and the amendment of the "objective" section:
The IDF made a welcomed decision to begin issuing draft orders to young ultra-Orthodox men eligible for conscription. This marks the beginning of a process that will strengthen social cohesion in Israel, reduce inequality and discrimination in the current conscription policy, and assist the IDF in building its manpower in alignment with its significant security needs.
However, it should be noted that these orders should only mark the beginning of the process in the 2024 draft year, both in terms of the scope of the call-up of ultra-Orthodox men to the IDF and the identity of the ultra-Orthodox being summoned for service.
According to the IDF's plan, as noted, they intend to recruit 3,000 ultra-Orthodox individuals in addition to the 1,800 soldiers from the ultra-Orthodox education system who enlist each year, according to the IDF's count (many of whom no longer lead an ultra-Orthodox lifestyle). The IDF aims for a similar number for the 2025 recruitment year.
The recruitment target set by the IDF is too low and needs to significantly increase both during the 2024 recruitment year and even more so in the 2025 recruitment year. The IDF must align its sorting and absorption capabilities with the principle of equality—that is, an equal burden of service for all those eligible to enlist, from all population groups—and the needs of the IDF. The immediate needs of the military for combatants and combat support personnel, including border protection, are estimated between 10,000 to 20,000 men and women. This need is also reflected in the IDF's efforts to extend compulsory service by six months, extend the age at which one completes reserve service, and the Knesset's efforts to recall discharged reservists who have already been exempted for various reasons. These needs will not be met with only 3,000 recruits from the Haredi community, and the principle of equality does not allow for the continued increase of the burden on the serving population. At the same time, the ultra-Orthodox are not called up en masse for service. In order to actually recruit 3,000 individuals for combat and combat support roles, a far more significant number of draft orders must be issued to allow for appropriate identification and selection processes, and the target number must undoubtedly increase.
The IDF announced its intention to recruit 50% of the new 3,000 ultra-Orthodox soldiers from the 18-21 age group, 40% from the 22-23 age group, and 10% from the 24-25 age group. If the group in question includes ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students, including those from dropout yeshivas who were recently in a deferred service status due to the "Torato Umanuto" arrangement (approximately 63,000 young men), and the new recruitment cycle of nearly 14,000 ultra-Orthodox young men who have now reached (or will reach during the recruitment year) the age of 18, these percentages are minimal.
According to calculations made by Gabriel Gordon from the Israel Democracy Institute:
- The planned recruitment rate for the three age groups of 18-20 is approximately 4% of this total age group in yeshivas.
- The planned recruitment rate for the three age groups of 21-23 is approximately 5%.
- The planned recruitment rate for the two age groups of 24-25 is approximately 3%.
The IDF's published plan is first to draft ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students who have violated the "Torato Umanuto" arrangement by working reported jobs to the tax authorities beyond the limited conditions allowed, as well as those who travelled abroad, and generally - to avoid drafting yeshiva students obligated to the yeshiva as much as possible. Torato Umanuto refers to a status in which a Haredi student's profession is officially the study of Torah.
With this decision, the IDF is attempting to increase the likelihood of voluntary enlistment of yeshiva students and to lower the flames of ultra-Orthodox opposition to this recruitment. Additionally, a large group of yeshiva students work alongside their studies, contrary to the "Torato Umanuto" arrangement, according to a study by IDI's Gabriel Gordon.
However, the army's decision to limit itself to drafting Haredi youth who are employed comes at significant costs. The Supreme Court's ruling from June 2024 emphasized that there cannot be discrimination between Haredi yeshiva students and non-Haredi draftees, which also applies to discrimination among yeshiva students themselves, based on the assumption that yeshiva students obligated to study should not be drafted. Valid legal instructions no longer back this assumption. Even if this discrimination can be narrowly justified for the initial preparation of the army, it certainly cannot be justified in the long term, and the military must prepare in the 2024 draft year for a non-discriminatory expansion of recruitment to the entire age cohort, as determined by the Supreme Court:
"There is no dispute that following the expiration of Chapter C1, the provisions of the Security Service Law apply equally to yeshiva students and other potential recruits... Although the administrative authority has discretion in enforcing the law's provisions, it must exercise it in a manner that upholds the principle of equality... Selective enforcement is improper... It embodies severe harm to the rule of law and the principle that all individuals are equal before the law... The severity of selective enforcement is heightened when it comes to enforcing conscription duty on individuals: a duty that significantly restricts their fundamental rights and may require them to put their lives and bodily integrity at risk in the defense of the state's security" (Supreme Court Case 6198/23, Paragraph 53).
Additionally, the primary focus of issuing draft orders in the initial stages should be among young, unmarried ultra-Orthodox draftees who are more suitable for bearing the burden of demanding and significant combat and combat-support roles. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance recently presented further opposition to focusing recruitment on working ultra-Orthodox individuals in the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, based on economic motivations concerning the impact on employment in the economy.
The objective section in the Security Service Law (Amendment No. 26) from 2022, which was carried over to the current Knesset, was formulated as follows: "The purpose of this chapter is to reduce inequality in conscription for regular service, including by integrating ultra-Orthodox individuals into national-civil service, and to promote their integration into the labor market and their contribution to the national economy, all while recognizing the importance of Torah study."
In the bill’s explanatory notes, three objectives were listed: reducing inequality in conscription, viewing national civil service as a worthy alternative to regular service, and raising the weight of the employment objective to be equivalent to the equality objective.
The primary objective of any law on this subject should be the conscription of members of the ultra-Orthodox community into the IDF. The employment objective is essential in itself but is not relevant to this law. The status of national civil service should also be derived from the main objective.
It is proposed that the wording of this section be changed so that the main objective of the law will be to regulate the conscription of ultra-Orthodox individuals, taking into account the changes in reality and the legal situation since 2022. This reality includes, unfortunately, the events of October 7, the severe war, the security situation, and the human resources needs arising from them. The legal situation includes the expiration of the exemption clause in the Security Service Law and the equality in the law regarding the conscription obligation currently applying equally to all Jewish men in the population.
26B. The purpose of this chapter is to ensure the conscription of young ultra-Orthodox individuals into security service in light of the principle of equality and against the backdrop of the security needs of the State of Israel (while providing additional and unique tools to ensure this objective is achieved appropriately for the relevant sector), and prioritizing the needs of the army over national-civil service; to regulate the granting of exemptions to a limited group of outstanding Torah scholars (in recognition of the importance of Torah study), and to establish appropriate economic penalties against those who do not fulfill their conscription obligation according to law.
- Principle of Equality: When the objective section in the existing bill was formulated, the exemption chapter in the Security Service Law was in force (until June 2023), and thus, the legal situation was one of inequality in the law regarding the conscription issue. Against this backdrop, the law aimed to reduce this inequality. Since the current legal situation is one of equality before the law and the law seeks to regulate the conscription of yeshiva students in a manner different from their counterparts, there is concern that the law might reduce the principle of equality rather than inequality.
- Labor Market: When the objective section was formulated, the working assumption was to waive the conscription of most ultra-Orthodox individuals and prioritize their entry into the labor market over their conscription. Thus, the emphasis that the law's aim includes the integration of ultra-Orthodox individuals into employment and the national economy. The current law, post-Oct. 7th, aims to regulate the conscription of ultra-Orthodox individuals according to the principle of equality and the IDF's personnel needs. Therefore, it is proposed that references to the labor market be deleted from the objective section. The issue of ultra-Orthodox employment is essential and central to the Israeli economy but is not the concern of this law.
- National-Civil Service: The underlying assumption of the existing bill is that national-civil service is equivalent to military service. This proposal also suggests including military and civil service targets and counting national-civil service participants toward meeting the conscription targets. Even in 2022, it was incorrect to see these two forms of service as equivalent, and indeed so after October 7 and in light of urgent security needs. Therefore, it is proposed to emphasize in the objective section that any reference to national civil service will be made only after meeting the army's needs.
- Recognition of the Value of Torah Study: The objective section in the existing bill emphasizes a general recognition of the value of Torah study, formulated as a supreme principle "all while recognizing the importance of Torah study." While this value is essential and central in a Jewish state, when discussing military service, it is proposed to explicitly state that exemptions recognizing the importance of Torah study will be granted only to a limited group of outstanding Torah scholars. This prevents a broad interpretation that would render the regulation of yeshiva students' conscription meaningless.
- Penalties: Given the expected difficulties in the actual conscription of yeshiva students and the unequivocal declarations of ultra-Orthodox leadership opposing conscription, and in light of the legislative history in Israel on this issue that has not advanced the conscription of ultra-Orthodox individuals, it is proposed to include the determination of economic sanctions as one of the law's objectives.