The Majority of the Israeli Public Supports Establishing a State Commission of Inquiry into the Events of October 7
Photo by Yossi Zamir/Flash90
Ever since the tragic events of October 7, there have been calls from various sectors to establish a commission of inquiry. A survey conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute via the Viterbi Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research in July 2024 examined public opinion regarding the need for such an inquiry, what would be the most appropriate inquiry mechanism, when an inquiry should be held, and what aspects it should focus on.
The survey found that there is broad public consensus (90%) that an inquiry should be held into the events of October 7, with a majority in favor of this outcome in all population groups—Jewish and Arab; Right, Center, and Left; and secular, traditional, national religious, and Haredi.
Of the various inquiry mechanisms presented to the survey respondents, a state commission of inquiry (that is, one headed by a judge and whose members are appointed by the president of the Supreme Court) is the most broadly favored (67%). Only 13% support establishing a government commission of inquiry (for which members are appointed by the government), and 8% would be satisfied with an inquiry by the State Comptroller’s Office and internal inquiries held by defense agencies and government ministries (see here for more information on the differences between a government commission of inquiry and a state commission of inquiry).
If it is decided to establish an inquiry into the events of October 7, what do you think would be the most suitable mechanism for such an inquiry? (total sample; %)
Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that a large majority of those on the Left and in the Center support establishing a state commission of inquiry (97% and 81%, respectively), with only a small minority favoring a government commission of inquiry (3% and 9%, respectively). On the Right, too, a majority (albeit smaller) expressed a preference for establishing a state commission of inquiry (56%), while only 21.5% support holding a government commission of inquiry.
A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity finds that a large majority of secular, traditional non-religious, and traditional religious respondents support establishing a state commission of inquiry (88%, 66%, and 64%, respectively), rather than a government commission of inquiry (5%, 12%, and 15%, respectively). In the national religious public, the picture is somewhat different: while the option of establishing a state commission of inquiry gained the largest share of support (42%), this is not much higher than the level of support for a government commission of inquiry (31%). The only group in which there is greater preference for a government commission rather than a state commission is that of the Haredim (47% compared with 22%, respectively).
If it is decided to establish an inquiry into the events of October 7, what do you think would be the most suitable mechanism for such an inquiry? (Jews, by religiosity; %)
Despite the broad public consensus regarding the need to investigate the events of October 7, there is much less agreement about the timing of such an investigation. In the total sample, the majority (56%) support establishing some form of inquiry “as soon as possible,” while 40% prefer that this happens “only when the war is over.”
Unsurprisingly, a breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by voting pattern reveals that a majority of voters for right-wing parties support holding an inquiry only after the war (though more than a third of voters for the Likud and Religious Zionism parties are in favor of setting up an inquiry as soon as possible). By contrast, a large majority of voters for parties in the Center and on the Left support establishing an inquiry as soon as possible (71% and 94%, respectively).
If it is decided to establish an inquiry into the events of October 7, when do you think it should be established? (total sample, by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections; %)
It should be noted that until now, commissions of inquiry into defense-related events have only been established in Israel after the conclusion of those episodes. However, in those cases (for example, the Yom Kippur War, the Sabra and Shatila massacre, and the Second Lebanon War), the events themselves lasted for much shorter periods of time, while the current military conflict in Gaza and on the northern border has been going on for an extended period, and the findings and recommendations of a commission of inquiry into it may have immediate relevance.
What should such an inquiry investigate? The possibilities we presented in the survey reflect the ever-present tension between the main purpose of such public inquiries—to establish the facts of what occurred and to make recommendations for steps that would prevent the same thing happening again—and the public’s interest in determining the personal responsibility of relevant officials. These options were as follows: conducting a factual investigation of the events and of the contributing factors to the defense failure; drawing conclusions and formulating systemic recommendations for the future; determining the personal responsibility of officials in the defense establishment; and determining the personal responsibility of political officials. The first two of these tasks (investigating the facts and drawing conclusions) are seen by the public as more important than determining the personal responsibility of defense officials and political officials (94% and 93%, compared with 89.5% and 86%, respectively).
In the Jewish public, there is almost total agreement that conducting a factual investigation of the events and of the contributing factors to the defense failure and drawing conclusions and formulating systemic recommendations for the future are the two main issues that an inquiry should focus on, with no significant differences between the different political camps. However, the data show that the Left and Center attribute more importance than do the Right to determining the personal responsibility of political officials (96% and 90%, compared with 82%, respectively). Among Haredim, the size of the majority who consider it important for an inquiry to determine the personal responsibility of political officials is smaller than the equivalent majority in other groups (Haredim, 55%; secular, 95%; traditional non-religious, 93%; traditional religious, 74%; national religious, 85%).
In the Arab public, conducting a factual investigation of the events and of the contributing factors to the defense failure and determining the personal responsibility of political officials are seen as more important tasks than determining the personal responsibility of officials in the defense establishment and drawing conclusions and formulating systemic recommendations for the future (86% and 83%, compared with 79% and 78%, respectively).
Relative importance of the possible tasks for an inquiry into the events of October 7 (total sample; %)
These preferences expressed by the public are in alignment with the purpose of commissions of inquiry. According to the law, state commissions of inquiry are to be established on matters “of critical and immediate public importance that require investigation.” State commissions are required to investigate the matter in question and to submit a report on the facts to the government. However, if the commission finds it appropriate, it is also entitled to append recommendations to its factual report. Commission recommendations may address two aspects: (1) the systemic aspect, including recommendations that stem from conclusions reached and that propose institutional, legal, and procedural changes designed to prevent similar events occurring again in the future; and (2) the personal aspect, with regard to which the precedent established by the Agranat Commission has become an accepted norm—that a state commission is entitled to examine both professional defense officials and political officials, and make individual recommendations regarding officials in each of these arenas.
Thus, one of the options available to a commission of inquiry in order to cope with the broad array of issues it is required to address while also reaching conclusions as soon as possible is to publish partial reports and interim recommendations. This was the approach taken by the Agranat Commission, which published an interim report around four months after it was established. Another possibility is to restrict from the start the mandate of the commission to certain essential subjects, and to divide up the work among several sub-commissions that can operate in parallel and to which members with appropriate expertise can be appointed.
Our survey findings show that the public’s expectations of a commission of inquiry explicitly include attributing personal responsibility to defense officials and political officials. In the past, commissions have not shied away from making such attributions of responsibility to civil servants and political leaders, but while there have been recommendations made for officials in the professional and the political arena (including ministers) to be removed from office or prevented from being appointed to certain positions, when it comes to the prime minister, commissions have left such conclusions to the Knesset or to the court of public opinion. This was the case, for example, with the recent state commission of inquiry into the Mount Meron disaster, which recommended that MK Amir Ohana not be appointed in the future to the office of minister of internal security, but which refrained from making any operational recommendation regarding Prime Minister Netanyahu. (“We decided not to issue any operational recommendation in the matter of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. The role of prime minister is essentially an elected position, with special characteristics, and thus as stated we make no recommendation in this regard.”)
Past experience shows that reports published by commissions of inquiry which included harsh criticism of political officials did not lead directly to the resignation of the prime minister or, indeed, any ministers; nor did they lead to no-confidence motions against the government in the Knesset. This is due to the absence in Israel of a political culture of public accountability.
The survey shows that the Israeli public considers it essential to establish an inquiry into the events of October 7, and that the majority of Israelis think that a state commission of inquiry is the most suitable mechanism for this purpose. The survey findings indicate that the public has high expectations for such a commission of inquiry, which is unlikely to be able to meet all of these expectations fully. The large number of tasks and issues that the commission is likely to face will make its mission a long, difficult, and complex one. The commission’s limited ability to complete its work quickly could harm the effectiveness of its conclusions and recommendations in terms of learning and applying lessons, and thus could reduce the relevance of any recommendations it might make regarding serving public officials. Past experience has shown that sometimes, if a particular individual no longer holds the same office, then the commission of inquiry refrains from issuing operational recommendations in their regard. When drawing up the mandate for the inquiry that is established, if and when this happens, and when setting its work agenda, it will be important to take these matters into consideration.
At the same time, history also shows that even if the public, or parts of it, are frustrated or disappointed by the results and recommendations of a commission of inquiry, an independent quasi-judicial body investigates the facts is still of great importance, and that its recommendations draw attention to the appropriate norms for public service. In the case of the events of October 7, it is particularly important that a state commission of inquiry be established: internally, its work will be vital in order to address the national trauma inflicted by those events; and externally, such an inquiry will demonstrate that Israel is a democratic state that is able to subject its failures , its policies and its leaders to examination by an independent and critical body.
The survey was carried out as part of the July 2024 Israeli Voice Index by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between July 30 and August 4, 2024, with 600 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.58% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.