Israelis Divided on Whether Netanyahu Can Fully Function as Wartime Prime Minister While Testifying on Trial
48% of Israelis think PM Netanyahu cannot fully function as a wartime prime minister while testifying on trial, a large majority of Israelis think Trump will prioritize Israel's security, and a clear majority of Jewish Israelis (61%) think the main reason behind the ICC's decision to issue arrest warrants is the Court's longstanding anti-Israel bias.
Photo: GPO/Kobi Gideon
The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute between November 25–28, 2024. It was based on a representative sample of the population in Israel aged 18 and above, comprising 600 Jewish interviewees and 150 Arab interviewees.
Topics covered in this report:
- The national mood
- Where is it safer for Jews/Arabs to live?
- Allocating resources to provide protective structures in Arab localities
- ICC arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant
- The future of the Gaza Strip: Jewish settlements and a military government?
- Is Israel’s leadership doing its utmost to secure the release of the hostages?
- The Trump administration and Israel’s security
- Netanyahu’s ability to function as a wartime prime minister while giving testimony at his own trial
- Advancing the judicial reform: Is now the right time?
In the total sample, there is a certain decline this month in the share of optimists, regarding both the future of national security and the future of democratic rule. This decline stems from a fall in optimism in the Jewish public relative to October (from 53% to 44% regarding the future of national security, and from 43% to 38.5% regarding the future of democratic rule). Among Arab respondents, this month has actually seen a slight increase in optimism.
It should be noted that this month’s survey was conducted before the ceasefire in Lebanon was announced, a fact that may have negatively influenced the results. It is also possible that the October findings were unusually optimistic, as the November findings in the Jewish sample are almost identical to those from August.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security (total sample; %)
Given the consistently modest level of optimism about the future of national security, we asked our Jewish respondents where it is safer for Jews to live today, and our Arab respondents where it is safer for Arabs to live. In the Jewish sample, a large majority said that Israel is the safest place for Jews, though we found considerable differences between political camps: While the largest share of respondents in all three think that Israel is the safest place to live, these form a majority on the Right and in the Center, but only a minority on the Left (Right, 83%; Center, 60%; Left, 45%). In the Arab sample, the share of respondents who think that Israel is the safest place for Arabs to live is much smaller than the equivalent share of Jews. In fact, the largest proportion of Arabs believe that it is safest for Arabs to live elsewhere (38%), with only around a quarter saying that Israel is safer, and another quarter who hold that both options are equally safe.
We looked at whether there is a link between responses to this question and the level of optimism/pessimism about the future of national security. In the Jewish sample, we found a large disparity between optimists and pessimists: Though the majority of both groups think that Israel is the safest place for Jews to live, this majority is much larger among optimists (87.5%) than among pessimists (58%).
In the Arab sample, we found opposing opinions among the optimists and the pessimists about the future of Israel’s national security: 44% of the optimists think that Israel is the safest place for Arabs to live, while an identical percentage of pessimists think that the safest option is to live elsewhere.
Where is it safer to live today, by optimism/pessimism about the future of Israel’s national security (%)
Against the backdrop of the responses to the previous two questions regarding security and safety, and also given the considerable number of residents killed and wounded in Arab localities during the war, we asked: “In light of the fact that the level of provision of protective structures in Arab localities is much lower than in Jewish localities, should the state invest more resources in providing protective structures in Arab localities at the current time?” In the total sample, a small majority (52%) think that there should be greater investment in protective structures in Arab localities. However, there is a substantial disparity between Jewish and Arab opinions on this issue: An overwhelming majority of Arabs (around 90%) think that the state should invest in protection for Arab residents, while the Jewish sample is divided (44.5% in favor and 45.5% against).
Should the state invest more resources in providing protective structures in Arab localities at the current time? (%)
In the Jewish sample, we found significant differences between political camps: A large majority on the Left and a small majority in the Center think that the state should invest more resources in providing protective structures in Arab localities (82% and 54%, respectively), while a majority of those on the Right hold the opposite view (58%).
In the Arab sample, a large majority of both optimists about the future of national security (81%) and of pessimists (89%) think that the state should invest more resources in providing protective structures in Arab localities.
A clear majority of Jewish respondents (61%) think that the main reason behind the decision by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague to issue these arrest warrants is the Court’s longstanding anti-Israel bias. In the Arab sample, the most commonly selected reason (50%) was the way in which Israel and the IDF have conducted the war (the share of Arabs who opted for the “don’t know” response was unusually high, at around a fifth). These distributions of responses are very similar to those we found in May, when the ICC began this process. That is, the arguments given by the Court have not resonated with the Jewish public in Israel, with only a tenth attributing its decision to the way Israel has conducted the war.
Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals large differences: On the Left, the most common opinion is that Israel has been ineffective in its PR efforts abroad. In the Center, the most common response (though not by a majority) is that the arrest warrants are due to the ICC’s longstanding bias against Israel, and this view is also held by a large majority on the Right. In addition, the Left attributes greater weight to the way in which Israel has conducted the war (in this regard, the Center is closer to the Right than to the Left).
The International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague issued arrest warrants last week against Netanyahu and Gallant, for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity during the war in Gaza. In your opinion, what is the main reason for this step by the ICC? (%)
In light of the public debate surrounding the possibility of renewed Jewish settlement and a military government in the Gaza Strip, we asked our respondents about these issues. Among both Jews and Arabs, the majority are opposed to establishing Jewish settlements, though this majority is overwhelming in the Arab sample (88.5%) and small in the Jewish sample (52%). Analyzing the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found significant differences: On the Left and in the Center, a large majority of respondents are opposed to renewed Jewish settlement in Gaza, while on the Right, a majority support it.
Regarding the establishment of a military government in Gaza, we found that a large majority of Arabs are opposed to such a step, while among Jews, more are in favor than are against. In the Jewish sample, there is a solid majority on the Left and in the Center who are opposed to setting up a military government, while a clear majority of those on the Right are in favor.
Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found larger shares of respondents who support Jewish settlement than of those who oppose it across all groups, excepting the secular, of whom a majority are opposed (support Jewish settlement: national religious, 68%; Haredim, 64%; traditional religious, 58%; traditional non-religious, 49%; secular, 21%).
The secular are also the outliers in their level of opposition (62%) to establishing a military government in the Gaza Strip, while in all other groups, a majority of respondents are in favor (Haredim, 78.5%; national religious, 72%; traditional religious, 59%; traditional non-religious, 55%).
In the total sample, a majority of 58.5% are opposed to the establishment of Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip, while 36% support it. Similarly, regarding the establishment of a military government in Gaza, the largest share of respondents are opposed (49%), though there is a smaller gap relative to the share who are in favor (42%).
The main reason for supporting the establishment of Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip: We asked only those respondents who support Jewish settlement in Gaza about the main reason for their position. In the Jewish sample, we found that the main reason is “to correct the mistake of the unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005.” Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity, this response was the most common among Haredim and among traditional religious and traditional non-religious respondents. The second most common reason given overall, that “Gaza is part of the Land of Israel,” was the most common among the national religious. The third most popular response, “to provide better protection for residents of the Gaza border region,” was the most commonly given by secular Jews who support Jewish settlement in Gaza.
What is the main reason why you support establishing Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip? (Jews who support establishing such settlements; %)
This month, we repeated a question we asked in March 2024: “In your opinion, given the current circumstances, is Israel’s leadership doing its utmost to secure the release of the hostages?” In the total sample this month, those who think that Israel’s leaders are not doing everything possible are in the majority (57%), while in March the public was more evenly divided on this issue. In fact, the share of respondents who think that the leadership is doing its utmost to bring the hostages home has decreased in both the Jewish and the Arab samples. In addition, in March the majority of Jewish respondents believed that the country’s leadership was doing all it could to secure the release of the hostages, whereas now the majority hold the opposite opinion.
The decline in the proportion of respondents who think that Israel’s leadership is doing its utmost can be seen in all three political camps (Jews). However, while this proportion has remained small since March on the Left and in the Center, these respondents still constitute a majority of those on the Right, albeit a smaller majority than in March.
Certain or think that Israel’s leadership is doing its utmost to secure the release of the hostages (%)
As in March, this month we found that a larger proportion of men than of women in the Jewish sample believe that the leadership is doing its utmost to gain the release of the hostages (men, 48%; women, 39%). In the Arab sample, the picture is reversed, with a larger share of women (29%) than of men (20%) who think that the leadership is doing all it can.
Finally, we examined the relation between the responses to this question and the responses to the question about supporting or opposing Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip. As expected, among those who oppose the establishment of Jewish settlements, a large majority (76.5%) think that Israel’s leadership is not doing its utmost to bring the hostages home. By contrast, 69% of those who support Jewish settlement in Gaza believe that the leadership is indeed making every effort to secure the release of the hostages.
The importance of Israel’s security in the eyes of the incoming US administration: Against the backdrop of the recent election results in the United States, we wanted to assess the extent to which the Israeli public thinks that the Trump administration will attach great importance to Israel’s security when formulating American foreign policy. We asked this question twice during President Trump’s previous term of office (in May 2017 and October 2019), and twice regarding President Biden (in November 2020 and February 2021). Now, in the total sample, around two-thirds responded in the affirmative (with 63% of Jews and 59% of Arabs saying that the Trump administration will attribute importance to Israel’s security very much or somewhat). This is a larger share than found in previous surveys, relating both to the previous Trump administration and to the Biden administration. That is, the Israeli public has very high expectations for the level of interest of the incoming administration in Israel’s security.
Think that Israel’s security will be a central consideration for President Elect Trump when formulating American foreign policy (%)
However, there are large differences within the Jewish sample between the various political camps: On the Left, only 38% think that the Trump administration will attach great importance to Israel’s security, compared with 46.5% in the Center and a large majority of 77% on the Right.
Accelerating the end of the war in Gaza and Lebanon: In the total sample, a small majority think that Trump becoming president will accelerate the end of the war on both fronts. Much lower shares hold this opinion with regard only to the war in the north or in the south, or say that it will not accelerate the end of the conflict on either front. In the Jewish sample, a clear majority of respondents think that the end of the war will be accelerated on both fronts, while in the Arab sample, this is the most common opinion, but not a majority opinion. In both samples, an identically tiny minority think that there will be an acceleration of this process only in Gaza.
In your opinion, will the inauguration of the Trump administration in the United States accelerate the end of the war in Gaza and Lebanon? (%)
On this issue, too, the expectations of the Trump administration are very different across the three political camps (Jews). Only a minority of those on the Left (38%) have hopes that it will accelerate the end of the war on both fronts, compared with majorities in the Center (61%) and on the Right (57%).
At the beginning of December, Prime Minister Netanyahu is due to testify at his own trial, with his testimony possibly lasting for a considerable number of days. We asked our respondents whether Netanyahu can function in an appropriate manner as a wartime prime minister while giving evidence in court. We found that the total sample is divided on this issue (can function, 46%; cannot function, 48%). In the Jewish sample, there is a slight advantage to those who think that Netanyahu can manage this task (49% versus 45%). In the Arab sample, by contrast, a large majority of respondents (61%) think that Netanyahu cannot do both things properly at the same time. On the Left and in the Center (Jews), the majority think that Netanyahu cannot give testimony while functioning as prime minister, while on the Right, where respondents are more invested in Netanyahu remaining in his post, only a minority cast doubt on his ability to perform both tasks simultaneously.
Think that Netanyahu cannot function in an appropriate manner as a wartime prime minister if he is required to testify in the near future (%)
Currently, several laws are being advanced in the Knesset that form part of the government’s proposed judicial reform, which was supposedly taken off the agenda. We returned to a similar question that we asked in May 2024, when signs of the return of the reform began to emerge: “In your opinion, against the backdrop of the continuing war and the need for social cohesion, is it correct or not correct to advance parts of the judicial reform at the current time?” In the total sample, and in both the Jewish and Arab samples, the majority of respondents think that advancing the judicial reform is not the right thing to do at the moment. However, this majority is smaller than it was half a year ago, mainly in the Jewish sample, and hence in the total sample (oppose advancing the reform: total sample—56% now versus 65% in May; Jews—55.5% now versus 66% in May; Arabs—56.5% now and 58% in May).
Is it correct or not correct to advance parts of the judicial reform at the current time? (%)
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a significant rise on the Right in support for advancing the judicial reform in the current survey. There has been a certain increase in the Center, though the level of support remains low, while on the Left there has been no significant change relative to May.
Certain or think that it is correct to advance parts of the judicial reform at the current time (Jews; %)
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The November 2024 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between November 25–28, 2024, with 600 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.58% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute.
The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.