Majority of Israelis Think PM Netanyahu Should Accept Responsibility for Oct 7 and Resign – Now or After the War
Around half of Israelis think that it's unlikely that President Trump will turn away from Israel, if he thinks its policies are not aligned with US interests, while close to 40% think chances are fairly high or high; 73% of the total sample support continuing with the second stage of the hostage agreement and securing the release of all the hostages.
Photo by Maayan Tuaf/GPO
The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute between February 25–28, 2025. It was based on a representative sample of the population in Israel aged 18 and above, comprising 605 Jewish interviewees and 154 Arab interviewees.
Topics covered in this report:
- The national mood—the economy and social cohesion
- Should the prime minister accept responsibility? Should he resign? And if so, when?
- The transition to the second stage of the agreement between Israel and Hamas
- The contribution of various actors to the implementation of the first stage of the agreement
- Trump’s plan for relocating residents of Gaza, and changes to public discourse about the end of the war
- A new IDF chief of staff, and the rehabilitation of the IDF and its image
- The likelihood that the US administration will turn away from Israel, as it has from Ukraine
- Would it be appropriate for Ben-Gvir to return as Minister of National Security?
- The absence of Netanyahu, Levin, and Ohana from the swearing-in ceremony for the new president of the Supreme Court
- Qatar-gate
Each month for the last six years, we have assessed the level of optimism or pessimism among the public regarding two issues: the future of democratic rule in Israel, and the future of national security in Israel. From this month on, we have decided to broaden this assessment, and alternate on a monthly basis between these questions and two other questions regarding issues that also affect the national mood (according to our research): optimism or pessimism about Israel’s economy, and optimism or pessimism about the state of social cohesion in Israel, in the foreseeable future.
In this initial assessment, we found a majority of pessimists and a minority of optimists on both counts, with very similar distributions to those we have found for a long time regarding the future of democratic rule and the future of national security in Israel. This finding indicates that the state of the national mood is an all-encompassing feature that is not necessarily a function of objective data. For example, despite the relatively positive indicators of the Israeli economy, the majority of respondents are pessimistic about the economy and only a minority are optimistic.
Optimism and pessimism about the future of Israel’s economy: Only one-third (33%) of the total sample expressed optimism about Israel’s economic future, while the majority (63.5%) expressed pessimism. The distribution of these two views is similar among both Jews and Arabs, though the proportion of optimists is slightly larger among Jews (35%) than among Arabs (26%).
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that the Left has the lowest proportion of optimists about the future of Israel’s economy (17%), while the Center has a slightly larger share (25%), and the Right, the largest share (45%)—precisely the same order we find regularly with our usual questions about the future of democratic rule and the future of national security.
Confirmation of our earlier claim that the level of optimism or pessimism is not grounded in objective data can be seen in the fact that we found no link between the income of Jewish respondents and their expectations for the economic future in Israel (optimists: below median income, 33%; around median income, 33%; above median income, 36%).
Optimistic about Israel’s economic situation in the foreseeable future (%)
Optimism and pessimism about the future of social cohesion in Israel: When we examined the responses to the question about social unity, we found a similar proportion of optimists as in the previous question (and in the two older questions), albeit slightly lower: In the total sample, a minority of just under a third of respondents (30%) are optimistic, compared to a majority (67%) who are pessimistic. Here, too, the share of optimists is larger among Jews (31.5%) than among Arabs (21%), though it is still small.
A breakdown by political orientation (Jews) reveals that the Left has the lowest proportion of optimists about social cohesion (14%), compared to 23% in the Center and 40% on the Right.
Optimistic about the state of social cohesion in Israel in the foreseeable future (%)
We asked: “Until now, Prime Minister Netanyahu has not accepted any responsibility for the events of October 7, and has not resigned. What do you think the prime minister should do: accept responsibility and resign immediately; accept responsibility, but resign only after the end of the war; accept responsibility, but not resign; or not accept responsibility and not resign?”
In the total sample, the largest share of respondents (48%) think that the prime minister should accept responsibility and resign immediately. Another quarter say that he should accept responsibility but resign only after the end of the war; 14.5% think that he should accept responsibility but not resign; and 10%, that he should neither accept responsibility nor resign. In other words, a clear majority are in favor of the prime minister resigning either now or after the war (72.5%), and fully 87% think that he should accept responsibility for October 7, whether or not he resigns.
What should the prime minister do? (total sample; %)
The share of respondents in favor of the prime minister accepting responsibility and resigning immediately is considerably smaller in the Jewish sample (45%) than in the Arab sample (59%). By contrast, the share of those who think he should accept responsibility but only resign after the war is larger among Jews (26%) than among Arabs (19.5%). That is, the overall share of Jews who support accepting responsibility and resigning either now or at the end of the war is 71%, compared to 78.5% of Arabs.
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals, as expected, very large differences: On the Left, 83.5% are in favor of the prime minister accepting responsibility and resigning immediately, compared to 69% in the Center and just 25.5% on the Right. Overall, the total proportion of respondents who support accepting responsibility and resigning, either now or after the war, is 96.5% on the Left, 89.5% in the Center, and 56.5% on the Right.
We repeated a question from last month: “Should Israel continue with the second stage of negotiations with Hamas, to include a complete cessation of hostilities, withdrawal from Gaza, and release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the release of all the hostages?” As last month, a majority of about 70% of the total sample support continuing with the second stage of the agreement and securing the release of all the hostages, despite the heavy price. And as in January, we found an overwhelming majority who support this course of action in the Arab sample, and a clear majority of support in the Jewish sample.
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that more than half the respondents on the Right support a continuation of the deal, with this share having increased by 5 percentage points relative to January. Many of the surveys we have conducted since October 7 have found that a majority of the public favor a deal for the release of the hostages over continued fighting; however, in most cases, more respondents on the Right were opposed to such a step than supported it. There would thus seem to have been a recent reversal in this state of affairs, as both last month and (even more so) this month, we found that a majority of those on the Right support bringing the hostages home despite the cost. On the Left and in the Center, the share of respondents who support a deal has remained stable and high.
Agree that in light of recent events, Israel should continue with the second stage, to include a complete cessation of hostilities, withdrawal from Gaza, and release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the release of all the hostages (%)
Notably, among those who voted for coalition parties in the 2022 elections, a large proportion of Likud voters support continuing the second stage of the agreement, including the release of all the hostages in exchange for a complete cessation of hostilities, withdrawal from Gaza, and release of Palestinian prisoners (61.5%, versus 32% who oppose this step). Among voters for the other coalition parties, the opponents to this deal outnumber the supporters (Religious Zionism: support, 34.5%; oppose, 54%; Shas: support, 43%; oppose, 53%; United Torah Judaism: support, 36%; oppose, 43%). As expected, among voters for all the opposition parties, a large majority support continuing with the second stage.
We asked: “To what extent have each of the following contributed or not contributed to the implementation of the deal for the release of the hostages until now: Prime Minister Netanyahu; US President Trump; the negotiating team led by the heads of the Mossad and the Shin Bet (Barnea and Bar); IDF pressure in the Gaza Strip; and demonstrations and pressure from the hostages’ families?”
Prime Minister Netanyahu received the lowest share of public recognition, with just 41.5% considering him to have contributed to the implementation of the deal—indeed, he was the only actor who received less than 50%, and who the majority of respondents said had not contributed to the deal (54.5%). The highest level of recognition (by far) was given to President Trump (85.5%). The contribution of the other actors was also considered to be positive, and to a similar extent (military pressure, 69%; negotiating team, 65%; demonstrations and pressure from the hostages’ families, 60%).
To what extent have each of the following contributed or not contributed to the implementation of the deal for the release of the hostages until now? (total sample; %)
Among Jewish respondents, the difference between the low level of recognition afforded Prime Minister Netanyahu and the high level of recognition given to President Trump is very large. Among Arabs, this difference is smaller, and the level of recognition given to the contribution of demonstrations and pressure from the hostages’ families is higher than among Jews, while the level of recognition given to all the other actors is significantly lower than among Jews.
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a similarly overwhelming majority in all three camps who think that President Trump made a significant contribution to the implementation of the deal. After Trump, a very large share of those on the Left recognized the contribution of demonstrations and pressure from the hostages’ families, while smaller (but still large) shares recognized the contribution of the negotiating team and the military pressure by the IDF.
In the Center, the contribution of the negotiating team was recognized by the second largest share of respondents, followed by the demonstrations and pressure from the hostages’ families, and then military pressure in the Gaza Strip. Both on the Left and in the Center, Prime Minister Netanyahu received the lowest level of recognition.
On the Right, a very high proportion of respondents recognized the contribution of pressure by the IDF. The negotiating team and the prime minister received lower and similar levels of recognition (though still high), with demonstrations and pressure from the hostages’ families trailing behind, and cited by less than half of respondents on the Right has having contributed to the implementation of the deal.
Agree that each of the following has contributed to the implementation of the deal for the release of the hostages until now (%)
We asked: “Some people argue that, regardless of its practicability, President Trump’s plan for voluntary emigration by the population of Gaza has started a more relevant discussion of possible solutions for ending the war. Do you agree or disagree with this claim?” In the total sample, a majority of respondents (64%) agree with the argument that the Trump plan has “reinvigorated” debate about solutions. We found very large differences on this question between Jews and Arabs: Around three-quarters of Jews (73%) agree with the statement, while just 23% of Arabs concur.
A breakdown by political orientation (Jews) finds smaller than expected differences between camps, with a majority in all three agreeing that, regardless of its practicability, the Trump plan has started a more relevant discussion of possible solutions for ending the war (Left, 69%; Center, 70%; Right, 77%).
Agree that, regardless of its practicability, Trump’s plan has started a more relevant discussion of possible solutions for ending the war (%)
The new IDF chief of staff, Eyal Zamir, is due to take office shortly. We asked our respondents to assess the likelihood that Zamir will succeed in restoring the IDF’s military capabilities and mending the relationship between the military and political leaderships, which were damaged by the events of October 7.
On both issues, the public has hopes for the incoming chief of staff, though many remain skeptical. The share of those who think that he will be able to improve the IDF’s military capabilities (61%) is larger than the share who think that he will be able to mend relations between the military and political leaderships (50%). Interestingly, an unusually large share of respondents selected the “don’t know” response (19% for restoring military capabilities, and 22% for improving relations between the military and political leaderships).
In your estimation, what is the likelihood that the new chief of staff will succeed in restoring the IDF’s military capabilities / mending the relationship between the military and political leaderships? (total sample; %)
Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found a majority in all three camps who think there is a high likelihood that the new chief of staff will restore the IDF’s military capabilities (Left, 61%; Center, 63.5%; Right, 72%). However, when it comes to improving relations between the political and military leaderships, only a minority on the Left rate his chances as high (34%), compared to half in the Center (50%) and a clear majority on the Right (63%).
In recent weeks, US President Trump has turned away from Ukraine and drawn closer to Russia, in a clear break from the policy of his predecessor President Biden. Might Israel also be subjected to similar treatment? We asked: “What is the likelihood that President Trump will also turn away from Israel, if he thinks that its policies are not aligned with the interests of the United States?”
Around half the public consider the likelihood of this happening to be fairly low or very low, though a sizable minority (close to 40%) rate the chances of Trump turning away from Israel as fairly high or very high.
What is the likelihood that President Trump will turn away from Israel, if he thinks that its policies are not aligned with the interests of the United States? (total sample; %)
The share of respondents who think there is a high likelihood of an American pivot away from Israel is larger in the Jewish sample (40.5%) than in the Arab sample (30%). A breakdown by political orientation (Jews) finds opposite assessments on either side of the political spectrum: On the Left, over half think there is a fairly or very high likelihood of Trump turning away, while around a third think the likelihood is fairly or very low. By contrast, more than half of those on the Right rate the chances of Trump turning away from Israel as fairly or very low, and around a third rate them as fairly or very high. Those in the Center are evenly divided on this issue.
What is the likelihood that President Trump will turn away from Israel, if he thinks that its policies are not aligned with the interests of the United States? (%)
We asked our respondents whether, if the Otzma Yehudit party rejoins the government, it would be appropriate or inappropriate for Itamar Ben-Gvir to return to office as Minister of National Security. A clear majority of 70% of the total sample think that this would be inappropriate. The share of those who hold this view in the Arab sample is close to 80%, higher than the equivalent share of Jews (68%).
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that an overwhelming majority of those on the Left and in the Center are opposed to Ben-Gvir returning to his former post. On the Right, half are opposed to his return, while a minority would support it.
If the Otzma Yehudit party rejoins the government, would it be appropriate or inappropriate for Itamar Ben-Gvir to return to office as Minister of National Security?
Among those who voted for coalition parties in the 2022 elections, it is noticeable that Likud voters are divided on the question of a possible return to the Ministry of National Security for Ben-Gvir (appropriate, 45%; inappropriate, 48%). Among voters for all the other coalition parties, the share who support Ben-Gvir’s reappointment significantly outweighs the share of those who are opposed (Religious Zionism: appropriate, 59.5%; inappropriate, 32%; Shas: appropriate, 48%; inappropriate, 30%; United Torah Judaism: appropriate, 68%; inappropriate, 21.5%). Unsurprisingly, among voters for all the opposition parties, a very large share think that restoring Ben-Gvir to his previous position would be inappropriate.
We asked: “Did Prime Minister Netanyahu, Justice Minister Levin, and Speaker of the Knesset Ohana make the right decision or the wrong decision in not attending the swearing-in ceremony for Justice Yitzhak Amit as the new president of the Supreme Court, despite the fact that they are expected to attend this event?” In the total sample, a majority of respondents (57%) think that Netanyahu, Levin, and Ohana made the wrong decision by failing to attend the event, while 29% say they made the right decision. Breaking down responses by vote in the 2022 elections reveals that a majority of voters for opposition parties think they made the wrong decision, while a majority of voters for coalition parties support their decision to be absent, with the highest level of support found among Religious Zionism voters, and the lowest, among Likud voters.
Did Prime Minister Netanyahu, Justice Minister Levin, and Speaker of the Knesset Ohana make the right decision or the wrong decision in not attending the swearing-in ceremony for Justice Yitzhak Amit as the new president of the Supreme Court? (total sample; %)
We asked: “After the exposure of the working relations between Prime Minister Netanyahu’s advisors and Qatar, what do you think should be done?” The majority of the public support keeping the advisors at arms’ length from the prime minister until this issue has been clarified, while a quarter think they should be left in their posts as long as they have not been found to have broken the law.
In both the Jewish and Arab samples, the share of those who think that the advisors should kept away is more than double the share who think they should be left in their positions. It is worth noting the large proportion of respondents who selected the “don’t know” option, especially in the Arab sample.
A breakdown by political orientation (Jews) reveals a large majority of those on the Left and in the Center in favor of keeping the advisors at arms’ length from Netanyahu as well as the largest share of those on the Right, though not the majority.
After the exposure of the working relations between Prime Minister Netanyahu’s advisors and Qatar, what do you think should be done? (%)
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The February 2025 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between February 25–28, 2025, with 605 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 154 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.56% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by Shiluv I2R. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.