A Large Majority of Israelis Support Proceeding to the Second Stage of the Ceasefire Agreement
More Israelis (43%) think Hamas' interests have been served better in the first stage of the ceasefire agreement than Israel's (21%); however, a majority still supports proceeding to the next stage (70%) if the first stage is completed as agreed; a vast majority of Israelis (72.5%) think the ceasefire agreement was achieved thanks to President Trump's intervention.
The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute between January 28 and February 2, 2025. It was based on a representative sample of the population in Israel aged 18 and above, comprising 604 Jewish interviewees and 151 Arab interviewees.
Topics covered in this report:
- The national mood
- The ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas
- The “day after” in Gaza
- The return of residents to their homes in the north following the ceasefire
- Should the heads of the security agencies resign?
- The preferred mechanism for an inquiry into the events of October 7
- The Levin-Sa’ar proposal for changes to the Judicial Selection Committee
- President Trump and Israel
In the total sample, the share of optimists regarding the future of national security in Israel (41%) is 10 percentage points lower than in December 2024 (when it stood at 51%, the highest it has been for the last two years). In effect, the January 2025 finding represents a return to the level of optimism found in November 2024, though it still remains higher than the level of optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel, which also declined slightly this month (to 35%, from 37% in December).
The drop in optimism regarding national security is particularly evident in the Jewish sample (from 56% in December 2024 to 42% in January 2025). There has also been a fall in optimism in the Jewish sample regarding democratic rule, though to a lesser degree—from 39% to 36%. In the Arab sample, meanwhile, this month saw a rise in optimism in both cases: regarding national security, from 23% in December to 35% in January; and regarding the future of democratic rule, from 27% in December to 34% in January.
As in previous surveys, breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a lower level of optimism on the Left—just 15.5% are optimistic about the future of democratic rule, compared to 24% in the Center and 44% on the Right. When it comes to the future of national security, optimism is slightly higher in all three camps, though it is still lowest on the Left (30%); the Center has a slightly larger share of optimists, though still a minority (35.5%); and around half of those on the Right are optimistic (51%).
In all three camps, there have been small changes relative to last month, with the overall picture remaining the same: Less than half of Israel’s citizens are optimistic about the future of democratic rule and the future of national security.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security (total sample; %)
Assuming that December’s findings were not simply outliers, it is possible that this month’s fall in optimism regarding Israel’s national security stems from a widespread feeling that the first stage of the ceasefire agreement has been in more in Hamas’s interest than in Israel’s. We asked: “In your opinion, whose interests were better served by the first stage of the agreement between Israel and Hamas?” In the Jewish sample (and hence in the total sample as well), the proportion of respondents who think that Hamas’s interests have been better served than Israel’s is more than double that who think the opposite (Jews: Hamas, 47.5%; Israel, 21%). In the Arab sample, the largest share of respondents—slightly over half—think that both sides’ interests were served equally by the agreement.
A breakdown of responses to this question by political orientation (Jews) reveals larger proportions of respondents in the Center and on the Right who think that Hamas has done better out of the agreement at this stage. On the Left, identical shares think either that Hamas has had its interests better served or that both sides have benefitted equally. The proportion of those on the Left who selected the “don’t know” response is much larger than in the other camps. In other words, the prevailing opinion in all camps is that Hamas has gained more from the deal than has Israel, with a similarly large share on the Left estimating that both sides have done equally well.
Whose interests were better served by the first stage of the agreement between Israel and Hamas? (%)
Support for proceeding to the second stage of the ceasefire agreement: We asked: “In your opinion, if the first stage of the agreement between Israel and Hamas is carried out as agreed, should Israel proceed to the second stage, which includes a complete end to fighting, withdrawal from Gaza, and the release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the release of all the hostages?” An overwhelming majority of Arab respondents, and a large majority of Jewish respondents, support continuing with the second stage, if the first stage is completed as agreed.
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a very large majority of those on the Left and in the Center who support proceeding to the second stage, along with around half of those on the Right (51%). It is worth noting that 40% of those on the Right oppose continuing with the second stage, while 9% say they don’t know.
Agree that if the first stage of the agreement is carried out as agreed, Israel should proceed to the second stage, which includes a complete end to fighting, withdrawal from Gaza, and the release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the release of all the hostages (%)
Breaking down the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, we found differences among voters for coalition parties between Likud and Shas voters, on the one hand, of whom more than half support proceeding to the second stage (54% and 55%, respectively), and on the other, voters for Religious Zionism and United Torah Judaism, of whom a minority support continuing to the next stage of the agreement (35.5% and 35%, respectively). As expected, among voters for opposition parties, a large majority support moving on to the second stage.
In the Jewish sample, we found significant differences between men and women: 73% of Jewish women support proceeding to the second stage, compared to just 58% of Jewish men. This finding is consistent with a pattern we identified in previous surveys, according to which Jewish women have expressed greater support for deals for the release of hostages than for continued fighting. There is also a gender difference in the Arab sample, though to a lesser degree, with 94% of Arab women in favor of continuing to the second stage, compared to 89% of Arab men.
This month, we repeated a question we asked in September 2024: “In your opinion, who should control the Gaza Strip after the end of the war?” In the Jewish sample, we found a similar distribution of responses to September: In both surveys, the most common options selected were first, a multinational force, and second, Israel, though this month saw an increase in the share of those in favor of a multinational force controlling Gaza.
By contrast, there was a significant change in responses in the Arab sample: Alongside a decline in support for the Palestinian Authority to control Gaza in the future, there was a sizable increase in support for a weakened Hamas, from just 8% in September to 29% this month—now the most favored response in the Arab sample.
In your opinion, who should control the Gaza Strip after the end of the war? (%)
In the Arab sample, support for Hamas rule in Gaza after the end of the war was found mainly among the younger age group (aged 18–34), while the older age groups tend more to view the Palestinian Authority as the preferred solution.
In your opinion, who should rule the Gaza Strip after the end of the war? (Arabs; %)
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation finds that a multinational force is the preferred solution among those on the Left (55%) and in the Center (66%), while around half of those on the Right think that Israeli control of the Gaza Strip is the best option (51%).
In light of the ceasefire in the north we asked: “Does the security situation following the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon allow or not allow the return of residents to their homes in the north of the country?” A large majority of Arab respondents think that the situation does indeed allow the return of residents, while Jewish respondents are divided on this issue, with similar shares saying that residents are able or are unable to return to their homes.
Does the security situation following the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon allow or not allow the return of residents to their homes in the north of the country? (%)
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a similar state of affairs in all three camps. On the Left and in the Center, the share of those who think that residents can return home is slightly larger than the share who take the opposite view, while on the Right, this picture is reversed (Left: situation allows the return of residents, 42%; does not allow, 38%; Center: allows, 49%; does not allow, 44%; Right: allows, 46%; does not allow, 49%).
Following the recent resignation announcement by IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, we asked whether the heads of the security agencies (the Mossad and the Shin Bet) should follow suit and resign from their positions due to their responsibility for the events of October 7, or should only do so after the heads of the country’s political leadership have taken responsibility and resigned. A clear majority of Jewish respondents—and thus also of the total sample—say that heads of the security agencies should resign, regardless of whether the heads of the political leadership resign or not. Only a minority think that they should resign only after the heads of the political leadership take responsibly and resign, while an even smaller minority say that they should not resign.
Should the heads of the security agencies (the Mossad and the Shin Bet) resign from their positions due to their responsibility for the events of October 7, and if so, when? (total sample; %)
Breaking down responses to this question by political orientation (Jews), we found a large majority on the Right who would like the heads of the security agencies to resign regardless of whether or not the heads of the political leadership resign. Around a half of those in the Center hold the same view, though only a slightly smaller share think they should only resign after the political leadership resigns first. On the Left, the largest share of respondents—around half—think that they should resign only after the heads of the political leadership step down.
This month, we once again sought our respondents’ opinion on what is the most appropriate mechanism for an inquiry into the events of October 7. In the total sample, as on the previous occasion we asked this question in July 2024, we found a stable majority who would prefer a state commission of inquiry—65% now, compared with 67% in July 2024. And once again, only a minority selected the other options we presented: a government commission of inquiry (that is, whose members are appointed by the government), 17% today compared with 13% in July 2024; and a review conducted by the state comptroller and internal reviews by the defense establishment and government ministries, 12% today compared with 8% in July 2024. The differences between Jews and Arabs on this question were minor.
A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that in all three camps, a majority express a preference for a state commission of inquiry, though of differing sizes—a very large majority on the Left and in the Center, and a small majority on the Right.
Agree that a state commission of inquiry is the most suitable mechanism for investigating the events of October 7 (Jews; %)
We asked: “Which of the following options do you support more strongly, regarding the Levin-Sa’ar proposal for changes to the Judicial Selection Committee?” In the total sample, as in both the Jewish and Arab samples separately, 42% of respondents support keeping the current structure of the Committee, which requires agreement about the judges chosen among all the professional representatives, and gives a veto on judicial appointments both to political representatives from the coalition and to the justices on the Committee. Meanwhile, 29.5% support changing the structure of the Committee in line with the Levin-Sa’ar proposal, so that only political representatives—from the coalition and the opposition—will have a veto on judicial appointments (Jews, 32%; Arabs, 18.5%), while 18.5% say they have no preference (Jews, 16%; Arabs, 32%).
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that a large majority of those on the Left and in the Center support keeping the current structure of the Committee, while the largest share of those on the Right (though not a majority), support changing the Committee’s structure (45%).
We also asked: “In your opinion, would there be a difference in quality between the judges appointed using the current system and judges appointed using the system proposed by Levin and Sa’ar?” In the total sample, 35% of respondents think that the judges appointed under the current system would be of a higher quality, while 29% believe that the judges appointed under the new system would be better.
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found a similar pattern to the previous question: On the Left and in the Center, the majority of respondents think that the judges appointed under the current system would be of a higher quality, while on the Right, the largest share (though not a majority, at 45% again) hold that the judges appointed under the new system would be superior.
The right time? We asked: “In your opinion, is it correct or not correct at the current time to advance the Levin-Sa’ar proposal regarding the Judicial Selection Committee?” Among both Jews and Arabs, the share of those who think that this is not the appropriate time to advance the Levin-Sa’ar proposal is significantly larger than the share who think that now is the right time (Jews: correct to advance it now, 38%; not correct, 47%; Arabs: correct to advance it now, 35%; not correct, 50%).
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a large difference between those on the Left and in the Center, of whom a large majority oppose advancing the Levin-Sa’ar proposal at the current time, and those on the Right, of whom just over half support advancing the proposal now.
Is it correct or not correct at the current time to advance the Levin-Sa’ar proposal regarding the Judicial Selection Committee? (Jews; %)
Slowing down the legislation, in order to reach broad agreements: We asked our respondents whether Justice Minister Levin should slow down the legislation in order to try to reach broad agreements between the coalition and the opposition. In the total sample, 43% agree that efforts should be made to reach broad agreements, even at the cost of delaying the legislation; 22.5% think that there is no point in trying to reach agreements, because they do not believe in the integrity of the negotiators; and 18% oppose slowing down the legislation (16.5% say they don’t know).
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that two-thirds of those on the Left and more than half of those in the Center agree that consensus should be sought between the coalition and the opposition, even at the cost of delaying the legislation. On the Right, too, the largest share of respondents are in favor of attempting to come to an agreement (39.5%), though this proportion is smaller than those found on the Left and in the Center. It is worth noting that in all three camps, we found a similar share of around 20% who oppose trying to reach agreements because they do not believe in the integrity of the negotiators. Presumably, on the Left and in the Center this lack of trust is toward the representatives of the coalition, while on the right, it is directed at the representatives of the opposition.
On the Right, those who oppose decelerating legislation—whether on principle or because they do not trust the negotiating parties—constitute 45%, a larger share than those who support delaying legislation in order to reach broad agreements (39.5%). By contrast, on the L eft and in the Center, the overall share of those who oppose a halt in legislation (25% and 34%, respectively) is significantly smaller than the share who support such a delay in order to reach broad agreements (Left, 66%; Center, 52%).
There have been calls for Justice Minister Levin to slow down the legislation in order to try to reach broad agreements between the coalition and the opposition. What is your opinion? (Jews; %)
Was it Trump who secured the deal? President Trump recently claimed that the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas and the release of the hostages agreed as part of the first stage were achieved thanks to him. We asked: “In your opinion, was US President Trump right or not right when he said that the ceasefire agreement and the release of the hostages were achieved thanks to his intervention?” A large majority of the total sample (72.5%), and of the Jewish and Arab samples separately (74% and 64%, respectively) responded in the affirmative. A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals only small differences, with a majority in all three camps of the opinion that Trump was right to take credit for these achievements (Left, 83%; Center, 79%; Right, 74%).
Was US President Trump right or not right when he said that the ceasefire agreement and the release of the hostages were achieved thanks to his intervention? (total sample; %)
Pressure on Israel in the future? We asked our respondents: “In your opinion, what is the likelihood that President Trump will put serious pressure on Israel, or even impose sanctions, if the Netanyahu government does not fall in line with processes he initiates in the Middle East, such as a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia?” Similar to the distribution of responses to the previous question, we found widespread consensus among both Jewish and Arab respondents that there is a very high or fairly high likelihood of this happening (total sample, 72.5%; Jews, 73.5%; Arabs, 67.5%). Once again, in the Jewish sample, there is majority in all three political camps who think that there is a very high or fairly high likelihood that Trump will pressure Israel in this way, though this majority is smaller on the Right (Left, 89%; Center, 88%; Right, 66.5%).
What is the likelihood that President Trump will put serious pressure on Israel, or even impose sanctions, if the Netanyahu government does not fall in line with processes he initiates in the Middle East, such as a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia? (total sample; %)
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The January 2025 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between January 28 and February 2, 2025, with 604 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 151 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.57% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by Shiluv I2R. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.