Majority of Israelis Support a Deal to Release All Hostages and End the War
A majority of Israelis (57.5%) support a comprehensive deal for the release of all the hostages in return for an end to the war in Gaza; Most Israelis think the current situation in Syria serves Israeli interest (52.5%); 68% of all Israelis, as well as 60% of Likud voters, are opposed to a law exempting Haredim from military service, even if this would mean a dissolution of the Knesset and new elections.
Photo by Itai Ron/Flash90
The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute between January 5–8, 2025. It was based on a representative sample of the population in Israel aged 18 and above, comprising 600 Jewish interviewees and 150 Arab interviewees.
Topics covered in this report:
- The national mood and Israel’s overall situation
- Getting back to normal
- The impact of the current situation in Syria and the future of the Israeli presence in the buffer zones
- The deal for the release of the hostages
- The Military Service Law and approving the state budget
- The expected rise in the cost of living in Israel
- A plea bargain for Netanyahu, and the involvement of his family members in matters of state
- Expectations for 2025
The level of optimism regarding the future of democratic rule in Israel has remained low and stable for around half a year now (this month: total sample, 37%; Jews, 39%; Arabs, 27%). By contrast, there has been a steady climb in optimism about the future of national security, with around half of all respondents now optimistic in this regard. However, the overall high share of optimists, along with the continuing rise in optimism, reflect mainly the views of the Jewish public in this regard, while the level of optimism among Arabs is much lower (optimistic: Jews, 56%; Arabs, 23%).
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security (total sample; %)
Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a majority of optimists on the Right regarding both the future of democratic rule (55%) and the future of national security (66.5%). In the Center, there is a large minority of optimists about the future of national security (43%), and a small minority of optimists regarding democratic rule in Israel (19.5%). On the Left, just over a third are optimistic about the future of national security (37%), but only a tiny minority are optimistic about the future of democratic rule (8%).
Seemingly due to the improvement in the security situation and the stabilization of day-to-day civilian life (see below), this month’s survey confirms the significant downward trend in the share of respondents who characterize Israel’s overall situation as very bad or bad, and the moderate rise in the share who rate it as very good or good—a trend we observed back in October 2024.
Israel’s overall situation (total sample; %)
The difference between the assessments of Israel’s overall situation among Jews and Arabs is large. Though in both publics, only a minority characterize the situation as good or very good, the size of this minority is much larger in the Jewish sample (25%) than in the Arab sample (16%). Similarly, a much larger share of Jews than of Arabs say that Israel’s situation is so-so (34% versus 13%, respectively). Accordingly, the proportion of Arabs who define the situation as bad or very bad (71%) is much larger than the equivalent proportion of Jews (41%).
Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a small minority on the Left and in the Center who define Israel’s overall situation today as good or very good (7.5% and 9%, respectively), compared to more than a third (35%) who hold this view on the Right. Accordingly, and unsurprisingly, the share of those who think Israel’s situation is bad or very bad is much larger on the Left (72%) and in the Center (53%) than on the Right (29%).
The distribution of responses to the three questions above shows that Arab citizens have a much more negative view of the current situation in Israel than do the country’s Jewish citizens. However, within the Jewish public, those on the Left—and to a slightly lesser degree, also those in the Center—are closer in their view of the current situation to the Arab public than to those on the Jewish Right.
The figure below clearly indicates a strong trend of personal life returning to normal among the Jewish public: This month, 75% reported having gone back to normal, or close to normal, in terms of work, media consumption, meetings with family and friends, and so on.
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that a large majority in all three camps report a return to normality, with that majority largest on the Left (79%), despite this being a camp in which the majority categorize Israel’s overall situation negatively and are not optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel or the future of national security. A similar share of those on the Right say their personal life has returned to normal (77%), while the lowest proportion (albeit still a majority) was found in the Center (66%).
By contrast, only a minority (though large) of the Arab public report a return to normality, presenting a similar picture to that found in previous months, albeit slightly improved.
Personal life has returned to normal, or close to normal, to a very large and fairly large extent (%)
We cross-tabulated the responses in the Jewish sample about returning to normality with the responses about Israel’s overall situation, and found that a majority in all categories report that life has gone back to normal, though this majority was larger among those who define Israel’s situation as good or very good (84%) than among those who define it as so-so (74%) and bad or very bad (69%). A breakdown of the Jewish sample by area of residence found a lower level of return to normality among those in the north of Israel than in other areas. In the Arab sample, regional differences could not be determined.
We asked: “In your opinion, does the current situation in Syria, following the fall of the Assad regime, serve Israel’s strategic interests or harm them?”
A majority of the total sample (52.5%) think that the situation in Syria serves Israel’s interests, while only a small minority (11.5%) think it harms them, and 16% believe it neither serves nor harms Israel’s interests. A larger-than-usual share of respondents selected the “don’t know” response (20%).
While among both Jews and Arabs, a larger share of respondents think that the situation in Syria serves Israel’s interests than think that it harms them, the differences between the two samples are considerable: 56% of Jews say that the situation serves Israel’s interests, compared to only 34.5% of Arabs.
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that in all three camps, the share of respondents who think the situation serves Israel’s strategic interests is larger than the share who hold the opposite view. However, the proportion on the Right who say that the situation in Syria serves Israel’s interests (62%) is much larger than the equivalent proportions in the Center (45%) and on the Left (48%).
In your opinion, does the current situation in Syria, following the fall of the Assad regime, serve Israel’s strategic interests or harm them? (%)
Future of the Israeli presence in the buffer zones: In light of the deployment of IDF forces in the buffer zones in Syrian territory, we asked the public what Israel should do in this regard in the future. In the total sample, 41% of respondents think that Israel should keep these territories until the security and political situation in Syria becomes clearer, while a slightly smaller share (37.5%) say that Israel should keep these territories permanently due to their strategic importance. Only a minority of 13% think that Israel should withdraw from these territories as soon as possible.
There is a large difference on this issue between Jews and Arabs: The Jewish sample is almost evenly divided between those in favor of holding these territories permanently and those who think Israel should retain them until the situation in Syria becomes clearer, while only a small minority support an immediate withdrawal. By contrast, around half the Arab respondents think that Israel should withdraw from the territories in Syria immediately, a quarter support holding on to them until the situation in Syria becomes more stable, and only a small minority think that Israel should keep them permanently.
Israeli military forces are currently deployed inside the buffer zones with Syria. In your opinion, what should Israel do in this regard in the future? (%)
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that more than half the respondents on the Left (54%) and in the Center (60%) support keeping these territories until the security and political situation in Syria becomes clearer, while a similar share of those on the Right (55%) think that Israel should hold on to them permanently.
Prime Minister Netanyahu was recently quoted as saying: “If there is a deal, and I hope there will be, Israel will renew the fighting after it. There is no point in muting or hiding this, as renewing the fighting is intended to complete the goals of the war. This is not a barrier to a deal—it encourages a deal.” In this context, we repeated a question asked previously (though worded slightly differently) about a possible deal for the release of the hostages and continuing the fighting in Gaza.
As has been the case in recent months, the majority of the public support a comprehensive deal for the release of all the hostages in return for Hamas’s demands for an end to the war. A small minority support a partial deal that will bring home only some of the hostages in return for a temporary ceasefire in Gaza. Together, more than two-thirds of the public support a deal for the release of all or some of the hostages. On the other hand, around a quarter support continuing the military pressure on Hamas, which they believe will lead to a more favorable deal for Israel in the future.
Regarding Netanyahu’s words as quoted, what do you think Israel should do? (total sample; %)
Once again, we found large differences between Jews and Arabs: An overwhelming majority of Arab respondents (81.5%) support a comprehensive deal (partial deal, 7.5%; continued military pressure, 2.5%), compared to slightly over half (53%) in the Jewish sample (partial deal, 13%; continued military pressure, 27%).
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found (as expected) that a large majority of those on the Left and in the Center support a comprehensive deal for the release of all the hostages in return for an end to the war. The Right is evenly divided between those in favor of a comprehensive deal and those who support continuing the military pressure on Hamas. Interestingly, only a minority in each of the three camps support a partial deal.
Regarding Netanyahu’s words as quoted, what do you think Israel should do? (Jews, by political orientation; %)
A breakdown of responses by vote in the 2022 elections (total sample) reveals overwhelming support among voters for Opposition parties for a comprehensive deal in return for ending the war. However, a deal of some kind (comprehensive or partial) is also the option favored to some extent by voters for each of the Coalition parties, over the option of continued military pressure on Hamas. Among Likud voters, 51.5% support a deal (comprehensive, 36%; partial, 15.5%), while 41% support continued military pressure. Among voters for Religious Zionism, 48% support a deal (comprehensive, 28%; partial, 20%), while 43% support continued military pressure. Among voters for United Torah Judaism, 40% support a deal (comprehensive, 26%; partial, 14%), while 34% are in favor of continued military pressure. Finally, Shas voters are evenly divided, with 46.5% supporting a deal (comprehensive, 31%; partial, 15.5%) and 46% favoring continued military pressure.
As we also found in previous surveys, Jewish women are more inclined than Jewish men to support a comprehensive deal for the release of all the hostages in return for an end to the war (59% versus 46%, respectively). Only 23% of Jewish women favor continued military pressure, compared to 31% of Jewish men. In the Arab sample, we did not find significant differences between men and women.
The Haredi parties are making their support for the state budget conditional on an exemption from military service for yeshiva students. Failure to approve the budget by the date required by law (March 31, 2025) will lead to the Knesset being dissolved and new elections being held. We asked our respondents about their preferences in this regard.
Overall, a large majority of the public are opposed to a law exempting Haredim from military service: In the total sample, 68% think that such a law should not be passed, even at the cost of the budget not being approved and new elections being held (Jews, 69%; Arabs, 60.5%). By contrast, 23% think that a law exempting Haredim from military service should be passed in return for support for the budget from the Haredi parties, in order to avoid new elections (Jews, 23%; Arabs, 20%).
Comparing responses from Haredi and non-Haredi Jewish respondents reveals a stark contrast between the two groups: Three-quarters of the non-Haredi respondents are opposed to passing a law exempting Haredim from military service, while a similar proportion of Haredi respondents support such legislation. However, it is worth noting that a not inconsiderable share of Haredim (almost a quarter) oppose passing a military exemption law, even at the cost of new elections.
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found a majority in all three camps opposed to passing a law exempting Haredim from military service, though the differences between the Left and the Center, on the one hand, and the Right, on the other, are large (among other reasons, because the majority of Haredim identify with the Right).
Which do you think is preferable: passing the law that exempts Haredim from military service in return for support for the budget from the Haredi parties, in order to avoid new elections; or not passing the law and risking the budget not being approved and new elections being held? (Jews; %)
Breaking down responses by vote in the 2022 elections (total sample), we found that a clear majority of voters for Zionist parties in the Opposition are against passing such a law. At the same time, even among voters for the non-Haredi parties in the Coalition (Likud and Religious Zionism), the share of respondents opposed to the law is considerably larger than the share who support it. Among Likud voters, 60% oppose passing a law that exempts Haredim from military service, even at the cost of new elections being held, while only 26% are in favor. Among voters for Religious Zionism, 47% are opposed to the law and 39% support it.
Among voters for the Arab parties, we found a relatively small share who oppose the law. This may stem from two factors: First, the fear that engaging with the issue of Haredi enlistment will lead to a discussion about military or civilian national service by Arab citizens of Israel; and second, the fact that a large proportion of Hadash voters (21%) selected the “don’t know” response.
Oppose passing the law that exempts Haredim from military service even at the cost of the budget not being approved and new elections being held (total sample; %)
Against the backdrop of rising prices in Israel and the expectation that this trend will continue in the coming year, we wanted to know whether or not the public are worried that their standard of living will be negatively affected by the increase in the cost of living. We found considerable differences between Jews and Arabs: Around 90% of Arab respondents are worried that their standard of living will suffer, either to a large extent (70%) or a moderate extent (19.5%). The equivalent shares of Jews are much lower, with 60% worried (28% to a large extent and 32% to a moderate extent).
Breaking down the responses by income reveals that among both Jews and Arabs, the level of concern varies with income: as expected, the higher the income level, the lower the level of concern. However, this pattern is particularly evident among Jews, while among Arabs, even those with high incomes express a high degree of worry that their standard of living will be significantly worsened.
In your estimation, will your standard of living be worsened or not by the expected rise in the cost of living? (by income level; %)
Analysis of the responses also reveals differences between men and women. Jewish women are more worried than Jewish men about the expected negative impact on their standard of living, while Arab men are more worried than Arab women.
Think that their standard of living will be worsened to a moderate or large extent (%)
In the Jewish sample, we found differences between the Haredi and national religious groups, on the one hand, and on the other, the traditional religious, traditional non-religious, and secular. Less than half of the Haredim and national religious expect their standard of living to decline to a large or moderate extent (43% and 42%, respectively), while in the other groups, these concerns are shared by a majority ranging from 62% to 67% of respondents.
Most influential factor: We asked: “Which of the following factors has the greatest impact on the expected rise in the cost of living in Israel this year?” half the respondents view the cost of the war as the most influential factor in the rise of the cost of living, while around a quarter cite the policies of the finance minister. The cost of the coalitionary agreements is ranked third.
Which of the following factors has the greatest impact on the expected rise in the cost of living in Israel this year? (total sample; %)
Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that the largest share of those on the Left (41%) consider the policies of the finance minister to be the factor with the greatest impact on the rise in the cost of living, followed by the high cost of the war (27.5%). On the Right and in the Center, this order is reversed: The cost of the war is considered to be the leading factor, albeit by very different shares of respondents (Right, 57.5%; Center, 36%), followed by the finance minister’s policies (Right, 16%; Center, 28.5%).
We asked: “Do you agree or disagree with the opinion that Netanyahu should be offered a plea bargain granting him a pardon if he admits to the charges against him and in return retires from political life?”
In the total sample, 40% are in favor of such an arrangement, and 49% are against it. In the Jewish sample, the share of those who oppose a plea bargain (52%) outweighs that of those who support it (36%). Among Arab respondents, however, this picture is reversed, with a majority (57%) supporting a plea bargain (perhaps in order to distance Netanyahu from the political arena) and a minority (33%) opposed.
Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation produces some very interesting results: Among those who define themselves as on the Left, an even larger majority than that found among Arab respondents (71%) are in favor of a plea bargain for Netanyahu that includes an admission of guilt, a pardon, and retirement from politics—presumably for the same reason of wanting to see Netanyahu leave political life, and perhaps also due to fears that at the next elections, he will again win a majority that will enable him to form a new government. In the Center, too, a small majority support a plea bargain under such conditions (53%). By contrast, only around a fifth of those on the Right (22%) take a favorable view of such an arrangement.
Agree that Netanyahu should be offered a plea bargain granting him a pardon if he admits to the charges against him and in return retires from political life (%)
It should be remembered that these findings are entirely preliminary and theoretical, as there is currently no such plea bargain on the table.
Involvement of the prime minister’s family in matters of state: We asked: “Do you agree or disagree with the claim that Netanyahu’s family members are overly involved in matters of state?”
In the total sample, two-thirds of respondents (65%) agree that Netanyahu’s family members are indeed overly involved, a view held by 62% of Jews and 78% of Arabs.
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a large majority on the Left and in the Center who think that such over-involvement exists (94% and 81%, respectively). The Right is divided on this issue, though the largest share of respondents (48%) agree with the claim of over-involvement, while 41.5% disagree.
Agree with the claim that Netanyahu’s family members are overly involved in matters of state (%)
At the turn of the year, we wanted to know about the public’s expectations for 2025 for themselves personally and for the State of Israel.
On a personal level, there are positive expectations, in line with the return to normality: The majority of respondents think that 2025 will be a good year or quite a good year for them personally (total sample, 66%; Jews, 69%; Arabs, 51%). In the Jewish sample, analysis by political orientation (jews) finds a large majority of respondents with positive expectations on the Right (76%), a solid majority on the Left (60%), and a small majority in the Center (54%).
By contrast, the expectations for the State of Israel are less optimistic, and the share of those who think that the new year will be good in this respect are lower in all cases and in all groups than the equivalent share on a personal level. In addition, among Arab respondents, the share who think that 2025 will not be a good year for the country (61.5%) is much larger than the share who think that it will be a good year (29%). Among Jews, opinions are divided, with 47% believing that 2025 will not be a good year for the State of Israel and 46% that it will be a good year.
Think that 2025 will be a good year or quite a good year (%)
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The December 2024 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between January 5–8, 2025, with 600 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.58% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.