Dr. Asaf Malchi

This study was designed to assess the level of satisfaction among students in higher yeshivot (ages 17 and above), their personal and social challenges, and their attitudes toward possible alternatives to yeshiva studies, such as vocational training and employment.

How would different tracks of enlistment change the longstanding Israeli ethos of service and sacrifice for the state and society?

To enhance ultra-Orthodox men’s prospects in the Israeli job market – new and innovate solutions, by way of education, must be put in place.

Despite the many challenges integrating the ultra-Orthodox into the workforce is essential for the well-being of Israeli society, the labor market, and the ultra-Orthodox community itself

This new study offers the perspective of Jewish Israelis who are not ultra-Orthodox—their attitudes on ultra-Orthodox integration in the labor market and their experience with employing the ultra-Orthodox or working alongside them on a daily basis.

The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly increased school dropout rates due to its exacerbation of the already emotional, social, and academic crises affecting multiple age and population groups.

Though this handful of demonstrators is not representative of ultra-Orthodox society as a whole, it reflects a growing trend among young ultra-Orthodox men who find an outlet in right-wing protests.

Government agencies have not geared up to effectively address the phenomenon of marginalized ultra-Orthodox youth

For many, the spiritual and educational dangers inherent in leaving large numbers of young people with no binding religious framework outweigh the health risks in keeping these institutions open

IDI experts present analysis of recent behavior of the ultra-Orthodox sector and present recommendations for an exit strategy from the lockdown, to be applied in the coming weeks and months.

In light of their demographic growth, the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel have to attempt to become part of in the broader Israeli society.

Despite the fact that the State of Israel and its central institutions are essentially secular and reflect a Zionist self-image, according to data from the 2016 Democracy Index only two-thirds (64%) of ultra-Orthodox Israelis report having a strong sense of belonging to the state. 

What is Wrong with the National Civic Service program for the Ultra-Orthodox and How to Reform It?

Even though military service seems to be one of the most blatant threats to the ultra-Orthodox lifestyle, it has become a rather attractive channel for broad segments of the community.

More and more ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Israelis are enlisting in the IDF, driven by personal, financial, and professional motives, with military service seen as an “entrance ticket” to Israeli society and to the labor market. But military service also introduces them to the shared components of identity and citizenship linking them to the state and its values, and enabling them to identify with others, from outside their community.

This article presents the main milestones in the recurring attempts to put a satisfactory arrangement for the deferment of military service for yeshiva students in place. In doing so, it surfaces the changes that have occurred over time in the constitutional, legal, and public responses and attitudes on this issue.

Israel's secular elite has lost its enthusiasm for combat service and now targets intelligence units, such as Unit 8200.

For the ultra-Orthodox sector and for us as a society, justice is not charity.

With 50% of young Haredi men expected to enter the labor market actually those with poorer skills and abilities, there is an urgent need for an in-depth rethinking about Haredi education. 

Army service is an extremely powerful “employment engine” for most ultra-Orthodox men whose religious education does not provide them with the general background or professional training necessary for joining the work force outside the ultra-Orthodox sector.